HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME VII APRIL, 1914 NUMBER 2

SOCIAL PROGRESS AND RELIGIOUS FAITH[1]

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There are not a few circles in our day in which social progress and religious faith are regarded as being in at least a semi-unfriendly relation. The leaders in the cause of the industrial classes indeed, like the Social Democrats and the Syndicalists, often thoroughly denounce religion. Workers for general social amelioration are frequently indifferent to religious faith. Great masses of people are convinced that religion does not help toward social progress and so regard it as at best a dead weight upon society. On the other hand, when churches or religious groups become vigorously active for social progress, the alarm is sure to be raised that their religion is becoming "mere social ethics." When social topics are considered in the pulpit or at the mid-week service, the fear is expressed that real religion is being crowded out. When religious leaders throw themselves into social causes, they are suspected of having lost faith in "spiritual" forces. Not infrequently we hear people say that they are "tired of the social uplift"; though it is barely more than a decade since there arose any wide-spread interest in our country in social questions.

[1] Address of installation as professor of philosophy of religion and Christian ethics in Oberlin Theological Seminary, September 25, 1913.

Even those who regard such positions as extreme are yet doubtful as to how much relation there should be between the two interests in question. They are apt to feel that, while social progress and religious faith have their points of contact, they also are often divergent, and that each may flourish very well without the other. In fact, the question of their relation is precisely one of the points where people are conscious of confusion of thought, and, consequently, of hesitancy in action.

There are certain underlying notions which go far toward explaining this confusion and hesitancy and the more extreme attitudes as well. It is these underlying notions that we are especially to take up for consideration.

In the first place, according to a widely prevalent view religion is inherently conservative.[2] This is a view which both the social worker and the defender of faith are apt to share. Let us listen to the way that the defender of faith is likely to put the matter: "Religion," he will say, "is not by nature progressive but conservative. It does not invent the new; it cherishes the old. It does not explore the unknown; it venerates the true and tried and well-known. Its work is not to originate but to consecrate, not to construct but to conserve, not to disturb the souls of men with infusions of energy, but to soothe them with anointings of peace."

"There is," the defender of faith may add, "a psychology supporting this view. Religion is a matter of feeling and instinct, and these are essentially conservative functions. The progressive, constructive faculties are the reason and the will, and the fruit of their activity is science and morality. The movements of the religious consciousness are different and betray a different origin. Religion broods and meditates, grows contrite, pleads,

[2] Cf. Baldwin's "Mental Development, Social and Ethical Interpretations," chap. X; and Marshall's "Instinct and Reason," chaps. VIII–XII.

adores. Such currents of emotion must have familiar objects around which to flow. Thus religion, having its source in the conservative side of our natures, must work predominantly as a conservative influence upon humanity."

But the worker for social progress, accepting this theory of religion, often goes farther. He says that because religion is conservative it is also obstructive. It gets in the way of progress, and is frequently found fighting against it. It anathematizes the progressive spirits and places upon the reactionary the robes of authority. And even where it does not take active measures adverse to progress, it still acts as a dead weight, a massive pressure in favor of things as they are.

One who takes this view will claim that the facts are on his side. He will point to the long "warfare between science and theology," and to the present attitude of hostility or timidity towards "modernism." He will point to those countries which are progressing towards fuller democracy as the ones in which the working classes are alienated from the church, and in which the church is inclined to support vested interests; and on the other hand he will point to the lands of reaction and oppression as those where religion has the undisturbed faith of the common people, and where the church is an instrument for keeping them in bondage. Thus he will urge that the facts themselves show religion to be both inherently conservative and practically obstructive.

The array of facts which the social worker who is distrustful of religion can summon for his justification is so formidable that it raises the question whether the theory on which the facts are being interpreted is sound, and whether the defender of faith, in admitting that theory, does not surrender his own cause. *Is* religion really conservative in its essence, and thus liable to be

obstructive in its workings? This is a question which we must consider carefully, if we are to gain a clearer understanding of our subject.

But, before taking up this question, another underlying notion must be indicated which helps to explain the idea of a semi-unfriendly relation between the cause of social progress and that of religious faith, and also the confusion of thought as to what the relation really should be.

This other underlying thought is that religion, being a relation between the soul and God, is essentially individual. It must have, to be sure—every one would hasten to add—its social expression in churches and forms of worship; but this social expression is apt to be thought of as being primarily for the sake of fostering the individual experience, which alone is religion. It must have too its social expression in the shape of an influence upon the moral activities of society. But this is understood as a product of religion, often only a by-product; this social activity is not something in and through which one has religious experience. So, after all, religion is something that might very well flourish without any social progress at all.

Here too the social worker and the defender of faith are apt to agree in theory. The one as well as the other is ready to assume that religion *per se* is an individual matter. But their very agreement becomes the source of a new estrangement. The worker for social progress is disposed to leave religion as a matter of individual concern out of account. Of course where this is done for temporary and immediately practical reasons, as in the case of many social settlements which are dealing with conflicting faiths, no exception can be taken. But often the social worker goes much farther and disregards religion altogether. He is likely to look upon religion as an elective in the curriculum of human education, which

fewer and fewer will take. He is disposed to think of the sphere of religion as being determined by taste, temperament, type of mind, rather than social need.

But frequently the social worker goes even beyond this neutral position and takes an aggressively hostile attitude toward religion. We find him insisting that religion, being individual, fails in what it claims as its own special work—the salvation of mankind. Man, he maintains, is a product of social conditions, of heredity and environment. He is played upon by many and complex social influences, which really determine what the individual man shall be. Hence in order to save the individual we must save society. This is a work that must be done by social forces. Consequently, religion is a negligible matter.

To all this the defender of faith raises a vigorous protest. He insists that society will never be saved until we save the individuals who make it up. And the salvation of each individual is a personal question. It requires conversion—a change of heart and a reformation of will. Of course, the converted man should be active for social ends, according to his ability. But the mainspring of such activity must be an inward experience of salvation. Hence the defender of faith urges, "Save the individual, and social progress will take care of itself."

Here again the fact of opposition in practical policy suggests that there may be a defect in the common underlying theory. Is religion at all adequately described when it is said to be essentially individual? When we say that true religion is inward and personal, should we assume this to mean that intrinsically religion is something quite different from the social side of our experience, so that social activity is an external product, or even a by-product, of religion? Clearly, these are matters that our theme requires us seriously to consider.

If then we are to do anything toward removing confusion of thought as to what should be the relation between social progress and religious faith, these two fundamental questions present themselves: Is religious faith essentially conservative, and hence, as many social workers claim, largely obstructive of social progress? And is religious faith inherently individual, and hence, as many defenders of faith insist, bound to make the salvation of individuals its chief direct object?

I.

In considering these questions, let us turn first to the facts themselves. We already have indicated the kind of facts which are brought forward to show the alleged conservative and individual nature of religion. But there are other facts of a most important character which lead to the opposite conclusion. Indeed they are of such weight that we may say: *Religious faith at its best, and therefore in its inherent nature, is a powerful force for social progress.*

The evidence which is earliest in origin and most striking in nature for this vital relation is to be found in prophetic religion; and by prophetic religion I mean particularly the religion of the great Hebrew prophets. No one will question that in the prophet we see religion at its best. His clearness of vision, his ardor and purity of passion, his sweep, intensity, and self-abandon—these, in our highest moments, we covet with all our souls. Other religious types often become names of disapproval. The priest, the pharisee, the ecclesiast, the puritan, or even the mystic, may at times denote what is defective and unideal. But the prophet has become a synonym of the highest character and clearest faith. The prophet is the religious type that can fully meet the requirements for leadership in the modern world. And

it is one of the great new insights of today that the prophet is a practical ideal for us all. It is of the utmost moment therefore to note the manner in which the prophet's religious experience was attained.

The distinctly prophetic consciousness of God formed itself under the pressure of social injustice. It was the luxury, license, and extortion by which the strong victimized the weak that most aroused their holy resentment. It was the misery, degradation, and oppression which the weak suffered at the hands of the strong that called forth their divinest compassion. Listen to the relentless denunciation of social wrong by Amos: "For they know not to do right, saith Jehovah, who store up violence and robbery in their palaces. I will smite the winter-house with the summer-house; and the houses of ivory shall perish, and the great houses shall have an end, saith Jehovah."[3] Or hear the heart-wrung wail of the compassionate Hosea: "There is nought but swearing and breaking faith and killing and stealing and committing adultery."[4] Isaiah, in his turn, utters his outraged protest against the Jewish princes: "What mean ye that ye crush my people and grind the face of the poor?" And then with pitiless irony he depicts the luxurious women of Jerusalem, who are "haughty, and walk with outstretched necks and wanton eyes, walking and mincing as they go, and making a tinkling with their feet," and enumerates all their apparatus of luxury—"the headtires, and the ankle chains, and the sashes, and the perfume boxes, and the amulets."[5] And Micah makes the same bitter complaint: "Woe to them that devise iniquity and work evil upon their beds! When the morning is light, they practise it, because it is in the power of their hand. And they covet fields and seize them, and houses and take them away." "The prince asketh, and the judge is ready for a reward; and the

[3] Amos 8 10, 15. [4] Hos. 4 2. [5] Isa. 3 15, 20.

great man, he uttereth the evil desire of his soul. Thus they weave it together. The best of them is as a brier; the most upright is worse than a thorn hedge."[6]

These passionate utterances of the Hebrew prophets reveal the direction in which the mighty currents of their religious life poured themselves out. Every great new form of religious consciousness has some ideal to which the sense of God gives reality and motive power. In some forms of religion the ideal is philosophic and cosmic; it represents predominantly the order of nature and man's harmony with nature. In other forms it is psychological and has to do with reuniting a divided self or curing a sick soul. But the ideal of the prophets was primarily social. It aimed at securing righteous and humane relations among men and reforming the social order. This social ideal is what gave shape to that consciousness of God which we recognize as loftiest and most intense, and as having the most meaning for our day.

But the prophet does not simply make a passive protest against the existing social order. He actively seeks to reform it. Other religious types—the Hindu, the monastic, the quietist—react from social disorder by seeking to withdraw from it and to lead a separate life according to their own ideals. Not so the prophet. His sense of God launches him against social injustice. The symbol of the prophet's religious consciousness is the plumb-line of Amos's vision. By his consciousness of God's righteousness he finds the political and social life of his people out of plumb. Then he remonstrates, pleads, arraigns, condemns, scourges, sparing no class—neither princes nor aristocracy nor men of wealth nor judges nor priests—sparing no institution or practice—neither business nor luxurious living nor courts of justice nor the customs of the sanctuary—pouring out his soul in his effort to make his people know the righteousness of God

[6] Micah 2 1, 2; 7 3, 4.

as the law between man and man. In brief, the religion of the prophet made the man himself a mighty social force. He knew no life with God which could keep apart from the service of men. The deepest nature of God was expressed in his will for righteousness among men, in his judgment upon social injustice, in his compassion toward the weak and oppressed. The experience of such a God as this was inseparable from the effort to make his will prevail in the social order. If the Hebrew prophet may be taken as embodying the highest type of prophetic religion, then that form of religion is in its deepest nature a social force.

There are, however, social types of religion which are backward-looking. Such most notably is the Confucian religion. This faith, as we know, exalts the social order to the highest place. But the social order thus exalted is that of the remote past. In by-gone ages is to be found fully embodied the ideal to which the present must live up. As for the present social order, it needs to be mended rather than re-formed. It is not to be developed but maintained. Now in contrast to all this the prophetic type of religion, as is shown by the Hebrew prophets, is forward-looking. It aims to re-form, to reconstruct. Its ideal is in the future. This is largely because prophetism is more religious than Confucianism. Since the living, active will of God is a present reality for the Hebrew prophet, the prevailing state of things has to his mind no finality. For the Hebrew prophet the ultimate fact is not an existing social order, but a supreme spiritual power willing a better social order.

Great constructive work resulted from prophetism. The thorough-going reform under Josiah, embodied in Deuteronomy, was such a result. The preservation in the Exile of the nation's faith, and the reconstruction of the Jewish state, taken in the large, are products

of the prophetic spirit. Even in the denunciations of the great pre-exilic prophets the constructive motive was underlying. In the first chapter of Isaiah, known as "the great arraignment," we find this message from the Lord to Jerusalem: "I will turn my hand upon thee, and thoroughly purge away thy dross. . . . Afterward thou shalt be called the city of righteousness, a faithful town." The prophetic union of denunciation with the constructive motive receives its classical expression in Jeremiah's vision of the two baskets of figs. While Zedekiah and those still in Jerusalem are denounced as being like the basket of very bad figs, "which cannot be eaten, they are so bad," for the captives in Babylonia there is a message of hope. They are the basket of good figs, "like the figs which are first-ripe," and Jehovah will bring them back again to their own land. Thus the prophetic spirit demanded not only the vindication of God's righteousness through judgment, but also its realization through mercy. No sooner was the destruction of the unrighteous order accomplished than the construction of the righteous order was to ensue.

This fundamental constructive purpose of the prophet finds full expression in the great ideal which he gave to the world—the ideal of the kingdom of God. In this ideal are gathered up all the prophetic motives. By it the Christian faith was cradled. Through it the best spirit of our modern time finds expression. But the permanently constructive character of this ideal, as of the prophetic type of religion in all its aspects, was given to it by Jesus. In Jesus we find that climax of Hebrew prophetic religion by which it becomes world-religion, and in him we find eternal expression of the motives for social progress. If then we are to appreciate the full value of prophetic religion as a social force, we must turn to Jesus' thought of the kingdom of God.

Jesus universalized the idea of the kingdom. He made the conditions for entrance into it not political but moral. He described the qualities of its members not as Jewish but as human. He depicted its activities not as violent and retributive, but as spiritual, righteous, and beneficent. In the Roman centurion, in the Syrophoenician woman, in the Samaritan portrayed as acting in a neighborly way to one of his Jewish despisers, in the publican and outcast who were eager for his message he saw more hopeful citizens of the kingdom than in the religious models of his people. Indeed he declared, "Many shall come from the east and the west, and shall sit down with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven; but the sons of the kingdom shall be cast forth."[7] Like the scientist of today, who everywhere in nature sees forces where we see only inert objects, so Jesus saw universal human values where his fellows saw only caste and custom. In his work of establishing the kingdom he swept away all barriers which stood in the way of the simple claims of human life.

But Jesus did more than this consummating of the prophetic work. He universalized the prophetic consciousness itself; that is, he opened to everyone the same sense of God's nearness and power, the same sense of having an inspiration and a mission direct from God, which the ancient prophets had. He declared that the least in the kingdom of God was greater than John the Baptist. He showed that all who were ready for the life of love were sons of God. He said that everyone who did God's will was most deeply akin to himself—"the same is my brother, and sister, and mother." He found that the deeper truth was hidden from the wise and understanding, and revealed unto babes. By every resource of thought, imagination, and example he sought to bring to his fellow-men, of whatever type, that imme-

[7] Mt. 8 11, 12.

diate experience of God which is the possession of the prophet.

But this is only one side of the prophetic type of religion, and it is only one side of Jesus' work. We commonly express this side by saying that Jesus made religion personal and inward, that he completed the individualizing of religion. But the other side of prophetic religion, the social side, was no less characteristic of Jesus. And with him the two sides are, if anything, more closely related than with the Old Testament prophets. For the content of his individual religion itself was social. All his central ideas have the most direct social meaning. The thought of God's Fatherhood as that of a loving will working towards universal human good, the thought of man's sonship as a sharing in the work of that loving will, the ideal of the neighbor, of the physician, of greatness through service—all these blend religion and social life most intimately. Hence individual religion for him meant also individualizing social responsibility. In his work of universalizing the religious consciousness of the prophets he kept together their sense of God and their social goal. Infinite sources of truth and power were available for every soul, but only as used to meet social need. The sense of God and the service of men were inseparable.

But the full measure of the union which Jesus effected between the life with God and the service of men is not to be learned simply from his teaching. It can be learned only from his life and deeds. Jesus subordinated himself to the kingdom. He did not put himself first; he put the triumph of God's will among men first. He fought injustice. He launched himself against that form of social wrong with which he was directly confronted—religious caste feeling. He hung the millstone of his wrath about the neck, not of the sinner in general, but of the man who was sinning against the weak. He

died not only to save men from sinning, but to save them from being sinned against. So also he poured out his mercy, his healing power, his message of forgiveness, upon the helpless and hopeless multitudes. With every resource of mind and heart he strove to open the door of the kingdom to those against whom it had been shut by the Pharisees. To banish fear and anxiety from timorous, harrowed minds, to awaken faith in benumbed souls, to unearth the deeper, better self in the worldly and irreligious, to shepherd the mass of common people—for these ends he unreservedly spent his power. Thus he became the embodiment of the ultimate law of the social order; namely, free self-sacrifice by those who possess spiritual values in order to make those values available for others. The cross itself is the symbol of this ultimate social law. It is the emblem of the supreme life given to create life. It stands for the losing of life to impart a gospel and to establish the kingdom of God on earth.

Thus the facts about prophetic religion—that type originating with the Hebrew seers and transformed into a world-religion by Jesus—amply support the position taken at the outset of this discussion. They make strongly for the conclusion that religion is not essentially a conservative tendency, and that it is not individual in such a sense that it may thrive apart from social interests, but that, taken at its best, it is a powerful force for social progress.

But in maintaining this position we need not confine ourselves to the beginnings of our faith. There are important facts in modern religious life which make for the same conclusion. Consider, for example, that movement which must rank as one of the most important characteristics of our religious life in the last hundred years—the development of liberal Christianity. The leaders of this movement have been distinguished

no less for their social spirit than for their liberalizing work. In fact, these two sides of their influence seem to be most intimately related. So that we may say, a powerful force for social progress appears again in modern liberal religion.

Let us note the relation of some of the leaders of liberal religion to social progress. William Ellery Channing must be counted one of the chief originators of the humanitarian and philanthropic movements in our country in the early part of the last century. He was foremost in promoting the causes of anti-slavery, of temperance, of humane treatment of criminals, of diminishing poverty, of promoting peace, and of elevating the laboring classes. An early entry in his journal, where he makes a list of "things to be done in town," reads like the most modern program of social betterment. And into all his strenuous activity in these directions he carried a devout Christian spirit and a truly prophetic consciousness. Speaking of God's call to social reform, he said: "In thus calling us, he imposes on us a burden such as the ancient prophets groaned under. We must 'drink of the cup' and 'be baptized with the baptism' of our Master."[8] Horace Bushnell, from whom flows so broad a stream of influence for liberal religion, was foremost in civic progress in Hartford, and one who maintained that "politics are under the law of God." Professor Walker writes of him: "As a citizen he was a man of far-reaching vision and inspiring leadership."[9] Henry Ward Beecher, of whom Lyman Abbott says that "he probably did more than any other man in America" to lead the Puritan churches into a faith both vital and liberal, was foremost in the anti-slavery struggle—making public opinion, counselling with statesmen, and

[8] Channing's Life, centenary memorial edition, by W. H. Channing, pp. 131 and 457.

[9] Great Men of the Christian Church, p. 362.

fighting another Gettysburg for the cause of the Union on the platforms of England.

Or among Englishmen think of Frederick Denison Maurice, one of the chief channels for the liberalizing influence of Coleridge, and at the same time the originator of Christian Socialism and founder of the Workingmen's College in London, the precursor of the university settlements, Toynbee Hall and Oxford Hall, and so of the social settlement movement. Or recall Charles Kingsley, typical of the men who rallied around Maurice, who gave ardent support to social causes both on the platform and by his articles and novels. Or consider Frederick W. Robertson, not so much the initiator of a movement as a preacher of unrivalled power with the working classes, consuming his strength during those brief but wonderful six years at Brighton in organizing a Workingmen's Institute, which against much opposition he carried through successfully.

Finally, bring to mind the group of leaders of the present day in our own country—more impressive because more numerous—who stand for liberal religion and social progress: President Tucker, founder of the Andover House in Boston; Professor Peabody with his pioneer courses in Harvard on Christian social ethics; Washington Gladden, early and valiant champion of the cause of labor; and others now in the full tide of their activity, of whom Graham Taylor, Charles R. Brown, and Walter Rauschenbusch are but shining examples. The direct social service of these men is very great. Their influence as leaders in the churches is still greater. But what we especially should not fail to note is the ardent religious impulse present in their social endeavor. The powerful nature of this impulse may be felt, for example, in these words of Rauschenbusch, from his last book, *Christianizing the Social Order:* "Were you ever converted to God?" he asks. "Do you remember the

change in your attitude to the world? Is not this new life [the movement for social righteousness] which is running through our people, the same great change on a national scale? This is religious energy, rising from the depth of that infinite spiritual life in which we all live and move and have our being. This is God."[10]

Not all liberal theology, we must admit, can be counted on to share the social motive. Professor Gerald B. Smith, in his recent and notable book, *Social Idealism and the Changing Theology*, points out as "one of the chief dangers which lies before us in our efforts to reconstruct our theology," that the work be too exclusively scientific and intellectual and too remote from social interests.[11] But where real liberal religion is present—that is, religion greater, deeper, fuller than even the best forms of thought and institution can contain—there is abundant evidence that one of its chief characteristics is a progressively social spirit.

But we must turn for a moment to another group of facts closely connected with those just considered. This group of facts is furnished by modern missionary activity. In modern missionary religion we may also see a powerful force for social progress. The entering wedge of missions is often the definitely philanthropic work of the physician and the hospital. Dr. Peter Parker "opened China at the point of the lancet." After many years in China a certain civil engineer, who professed little personal interest in religion but who was most friendly to missionaries, said in my hearing that the work of a single hospital in China would justify all the money spent on missions there. The Moslem understands the ministry of the physician when his mind is closed to every other form of the Christian message. The Boxer rioter who was Dr. Watson's first patient in Shansi learned unmistakably what "love for enemies" means. Philanthropic work is thus a most significant part of the missionary enterprise.

[10] Page 6. [11] Page xviii.

Missionary education, in turn, is unmistakably social in its consequences. The school and college change the social status of women, and give both sexes a new sense of the worth of personality. From these educational influences movements for political liberty have flowed, with the most astonishing results. This appears directly in the securing of Bulgarian liberties a generation ago, and in the recent establishment of the Republic of China, and less directly in the case of other Asiatic countries. Finally comes the effort of missionaries to transform the economic life of the people among whom they labor, by agricultural and industrial schools and the introduction of machinery.

Leading missionaries explicitly adopt the point of view of social progress in propagating Christianity. So Dr. Hume in *Missions from the Modern View* argues for the sociological approach to missions. We find him affirming: "The missionary—whether recent or long in the land—is sure to do some injury to himself and to his work and to his people if he fails to realize the fundamental laws which have always controlled and should control all social and religious progress." [12] Not infrequently missionaries are influential advisers of statesmen, as was Dr. DeForest of Japan. Sometimes they have the shaping of entire policies, as in the case of the new educational system of Turkey. Sometimes they even construct the entire life of a people, as did Mackay in Uganda. But in so vast a field we can only suggest; the present argument has been given monumental expression in Dr. Dennis's *Christian Missions and Social Progress*.

Thus the notions that religion is essentially conservative, and that it is individual in such a sense that it can thrive apart from social progress, have large masses of fact against them.

They are opposed by prophetic religion in its classic embodiment, and by those phases of faith so closely

[12] Page 121.

related to it, modern liberal religion and modern missionary religion. Each of these phases of faith is gaining an increasing hold in our day. A religion inspired by the divine impulse and social passion of the prophets, regulated by the liberal spirit of our scientific age, and resolutely bent upon the universal goal of the modern missionary—that is the religion for the present and the future, the only adequate expression of the mind of Christ. Such a religion calls upon us to abandon those notions so often shared by the social worker and the defender of faith—which at the same time set them at odds—and to think of religion as essentially a progressive and constructive force, and in its innermost meaning as no less social than individual. As an aid to this end let us re-examine some of the reasons by which the notions criticised are commonly sustained.

II.

We may consider first the reason already mentioned —that religion, being a relation between the soul and God, is intrinsically individual in such a sense that it may really thrive without relating itself to social progress.

Now no examination of this reasoning would be helpful which did not at the outset recognize how great is the value of understanding religion in the personal and individual way. "God and the soul! the soul and its God!"—much of the preciousness of religious experience is summed up in those simple terms. No need of human mediation; each personality has direct access to God. That means spiritual independence. No dismay over outward misfortunes. The soul has an inner life with God. Therein is spiritual strength. No morbidness over not gaining one's own will; one may will what God wills. This is the entrance to life's deepest joy. The direct, inward, intimate relation of the soul to God is

one of religion's supreme achievements, gained at the cost of great struggles with dogmatic authority, with the deadness of the letter, with formalism in worship and morals; an achievement never again to be lost so long as the Son of Man finds faith upon the earth.

But when this individual experience of religion becomes sufficient unto itself, so that it monopolizes the idea of religion; so that one may say of social relations, "they are good, but they do not, even at their best, constitute an experience of God"; then we must ask ourselves whether the fullest and deepest meaning of religion is not being allowed to slip away. One says to us, "Behind the veil of sense is an ideal world of divine thought which the soul may find," and we respond, "Let us build a tabernacle there." But may not the divine thought be even now moulding things of sense into an expression of itself? If so, our tabernacle will be located outside of God's workshop. Or one says, "Beneath the perplexing turmoil of human affairs is a realm of light and peace where the soul may dwell"; and we answer, "Let us take refuge there." But what if God himself is in the midst of the human turmoil, illuminating it and shaping it into orderly, peaceful action? Then we shall have fled from the daylight of religion into its twilight. Or one says again, "Out beyond the conflicting, unintelligible stream of life and time is an eternal existence where the soul may have repose"; and we are led to give all our thought and effort to preparing for that existence. But what if, into this very stream of life and time, unclear though it be to us, God is pouring the infinite energy of his love? Then by steering out of that stream we shall have abandoned the means of arriving at whatever good the future has in store. In brief, if God himself is actively in the midst of our social relations, then the soul's most direct experience of God cannot be apart from those relations.

How social relations may constitute an experience of God we may best comprehend from the standpoint of the union between the ideas of God's immanence and his Fatherhood. Immanence is the form in which we are required to think of God by the evolutionary view of the universe. The Christian conception of God as Father best satisfies the ethical view of the universe. Hence one who feels bound to unite evolutionary forms of thought with Christian ideas of value will think of God both as an immanent and as a fatherly God. This means however that God should be thought of as the power moving through the developing world-process toward the realization of a vast conscious purpose, and that this purpose is most clearly seen where men are being fashioned into sonship to God and into a brotherly society. God is in the brotherly society somewhat as the spirit of a transcendent genius is in his disciples. Imagine a great laboratory under the guidance of a Pasteur. Everywhere would be active investigating minds, and everywhere would be the dominating ideas and influence of the master. The inspiring genius would both stimulate the originality of individuals and unify their efforts in a common work. And the more harmonious, and at the same time original, the work of the disciples, the more truly would it be the expression of the inspiring genius. In like manner, only in a far profounder and more intimate degree, God is immanent in the brotherly society. The relation between the immanent God and the human mind is both fuller and freer than in God's immanence in nature, because in the case of man the relation is a moral one. But the relation between the immanent God and the man of filial and brotherly mind is the fullest and freest of all, because here, through moral means, the deepest will of God finds expression.

How then, from this point of view, should we seek the deepest experience of God? First we should ask our-

selves, "What is God now doing in his world? To what end is his loving will most intensely going forth?" And then we should ask, "How may I be taken up into this divine working, and most actively participate in it?" Now we already have dwelt upon the Christian answer to these two questions. It is found in sharing in the work of social progress for the realization of the kingdom of God. But in this answer the contrast between individual religion and social experience drops away. As President King, in his *Theology and the Social Consciousness*, has so truly said: "The very meaning of religion is sharing the life of God. . . . God's life, according to Christ's teaching, is the life of constant and perfect self-giving. To share the life of God, therefore, . . . is to come into the life of loving service. The two fall together from the point of view of the social consciousness." [13] Thus when we say that religion is a relation between the soul and God, we should understand ourselves to mean an active relation to the working God in his effort for social ends.

But this emphasis upon activity as being pre-eminent in religious experience requires us to re-examine another opinion which has underlain the semi-unfriendly relation between religious faith and social progress. This is the opinion that religion is essentially conservative for the reason that it consists primarily of meditation, adoration, and other passive moods.

It would be hard indeed to think of a vital religion which was devoid of these more passive moods. Personal religion can scarcely be separated from conscious worship, from self-surrender, from up-wellings of inward inspiration. But even these phases of religious life fail of their best meaning if they are taken in an exclusively passive sense. And along with these we are coming more and more to emphasize distinctly active experiences as of the utmost importance in religion.

[13] Page 93.

The fundamentally active nature of religious experience at its best is made evident by the Christian idea of faith. It is true that faith has its passive meaning, but that is not its supreme meaning. Faith often requires that we relax and rest back upon God, but it never means a relaxed life. It calls for self-surrender, but that surrender is to the working and self-giving God. Christian faith means loyalty to the cause of bringing to pass a brotherly society on earth in the confidence that it is God's own cause. Hence faith is forward-looking and adventurous. It stimulates activity and releases new energy. It is the spirit of enterprise in the moral world. Of the "faith-state," with the beliefs that accompany it, Professor James says: "We are obliged, on account of their extraordinary influence upon action and endurance, to class them amongst the most important biological functions of mankind."[14] But if this conception of faith be true, it becomes clear how mistaken it is to regard religion as inherently conservative in its social influence.

We are coming, indeed, to recognize that religion, so far from being primarily conservative, is essentially creative in its workings. Professor Hocking, for example, presents religion as "creating men, conferring on them power and freedom to create." He writes: "He who would be creative in any direction would do best to pursue that from which alone creativity can result, a personal knowledge of the Absolute. This is that 'guidance of God' for which men may legitimately pray, and expect an answer. When the holy spirit is come, he shall lead you into all truth; and not otherwise is new truth or new value accessible to mankind."[15] Religion then is to make the soul alert, resourceful, inventive. It is to awaken intuition, to make the mind fertile and the

[14] Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 506.
[15] The Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 478.

will productive. Its purest essence is seen where there is originality and creativeness in the moral and spiritual realm.

Each one may test this thought for himself. Which is the diviner experience—when the soul is spellbound in the presence of a great religious ideal or fact, or when that same ideal or fact is carrying one on, with however much stress of soul, to its concrete embodiment in deed? Must we not say that the latter exceeds the former by as much as life exceeds mere thought or feeling? As Coleridge, rich of imagination but weak of purpose, falls short of Browning, the union of genius and moral vigor, or as the Brook Farm philosopher falls short of the founder or savior of our nation, so the religion that is merely passive and reflective falls below that which sustains the soul in new activity and in creativeness. Jesus' cry, "I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how am I straitened till it be accomplished!" hushes us with the thought that the eternal will of God was at that moment passing through birth-pangs into deed. And must we not say of every human soul which is straitened until a sense of divine purpose is brought to accomplishment, that in such is being enacted God's highest creative deed?

But now this active and outgoing faith of which we have been speaking, this resourceful, inventive, creative type of living which is religion at its highest—wherein will it find its chief expression? Obviously, in the relation of man to man, in the promotion of social progress. And here we have gained a point of view for revising those opposing judgments: "Save society, and the individual will take care of himself," and "Save the individual, and society will at once be saved." A great part of the perplexities and problems that will confront the minister of the immediate future are comprised in the situations out of which these opposing judgments spring.

With conscientiousness we must ask ourselves what we should do in the midst of such conflicting claims.

Our present generation is discovering that the gospel which aims exclusively at the individual breaks down, because it neglects some of the chief forces by which the individual is shaped. An individual is not something entirely pre-arranged and devised in advance. Not even from the most ideal view of him is this true. An individual is always more or less in the making, and hence susceptible of being played upon by every social force. Now if many of these social forces are themselves unchristian, it is fatuous to leave them unchanged while working for the individual's salvation. If this be done by the ministry and the church, they become like the one or two righteous directors of an unrighteous corporation—powerless to influence the decisive issues. They become unequally yoked together with unbelievers. It is indispensable therefore that religion seek to bring the other social forces into real partnership with itself. Until all the great social forces become Christian in their trend, the work for the salvation of individuals will be fatally weak at critical points. Every wise movement in the cause of social reform and progress is a matter of vital concern to the ministry and the church. The protection of women-laborers, the prevention of child-labor, an adequate standard of living for every wage-earner, the public health, public amusements, an education which shall equip the individual for life, the social settlement and the development of neighborhood life, the moralizing and developing of local self-government, the cause of temperance and the warfare against social vices, the development of rural life by co-operation and by social activities—these and similar causes must have the power of Christianity definitely behind them. Any given minister or church, it is true, may have to do with but few of these movements, perhaps directly with none. But

the Christianity of every community, taken as a whole, should be most directly related to them. Possibly the chief specific work of the ministry and the church will always be the services of worship, religious education, and the culture of family life. Nevertheless, each of these functions should be given a strong social direction and impulse; and ministry and church should be ready to do pioneer social work, inspiring and initiating such work at any point of social need.

The abandoning of the purely individual point of view is all the more necessary, because that point of view misinterprets the very nature of religious forces themselves. Our whole argument goes to show that those forces at their best are social—having a definite social aim and inspiration. Prophetic religion, modern liberal religion, modern missionary religion, are saturated with social passion. If we would bring men into the fellowship of these forms of faith, we must fill their hearts with the same motives, and then focus their efforts upon their own sphere of social influence. To confine the interest of ministry and church to individuals is like pouring hot fluid into thermos bottles. It leaves a vacuum around each soul, which may keep the warmth in for a time, but which prevents both its radiation and its replenishment. An individual is not fully saved until he has the social spirit. He must become part of God's present working for a brotherly society among men, and must bring his own increment of originality and creativeness to that cause, if he is to enter fully into the saved life.

But the effort for social salvation which ignores the individual is also gravely mistaken. The individual furnishes the motive to society, as society affords scope to the individual. A society rationally organized but unconcerned about individuals would be like honeycomb without honey; its richness and sweetness would be

gone. Such a society would gradually lose the values for which it was created. We all know how soulless an institution designed for human welfare may become, how hollow and perfunctory its service, when it ceases to be animated by a warm and direct interest in individual men. The mistake of allowing such interest to evaporate has been too often and egregiously made, and too painfully retrieved, for us to allow our present social movements to make it again. The sense of the preciousness of personality, and of the need of winning each personality into its full development, must remain the only adequate motive for social endeavor.

Moreover, for workers for social progress to ignore the saving of the individual is to confound their own efforts, because the individual embodies the very principle of progress. Speaking from the standpoint of evolution, the individual stands for the element of variation in nature. And the same is true in the moral realm. It is to the individual man who knows salvation for himself that we must look for the swift and sure perception, the prompt and vigorous reaction, by which opportunity is seized and advancement made. In a moral society there must be great numbers of such leaders in larger and smaller spheres, and indeed everyone must be equipped to make his personal and inimitable contribution to the welfare of the whole.

Social progress then needs the service of personal religion. It needs that intensive work in the individual soul which personal religion alone can effect. With the perfecting of our means for securing to all men the values of life there must go a steady renewal and enlargement of those values. Here is a great work for personal religion. With the constant enrichment and complexity of our ideals must go the renewal and the broadening and deepening of our spiritual powers. Here again is a great need for religious faith. And as for social causes

themselves, though they often are dealing with conditions and institutions rather than directly with men, which of them does not gain new meaning from the thought of the infinite worth of the soul, from the sense of the immanent God actively working out his will in this present world, and from the application of Christ's law that only he who loses his life for a great end shall find it?

There is then abundant reason for reversing the opinion that religion is inherently conservative in its influence and mainly individual in its application. For we have seen that while religion is a relation between the soul and God, the God with whom the soul seeks relation is one who is spending the resources of infinite love to bring to pass upon earth a society of brotherly men. Hence a full experience of him means a sharing in that very work. We have seen too that while the soul is to rest back on God in meditation and worship, it also is to become an expression of God's creative will by itself going forward to add its own increment of vital energy and creative originality to the total life of mankind. And we have seen that individual and social salvation must go hand in hand in the thought and effort both of the Christian church and ministry and of the social worker. These conclusions support the one already drawn from the survey of prophetic religion, modern liberal religion, and modern missionary religion. They require us to think of religion as essentially a progressive, constructive, social force. It therefore rests upon us as our privilege and duty to work for the doing away of any unfriendly and divisive spirit between defenders of faith and workers for social progress, and to seek to bring these two great interests into such intimate union that each shall powerfully reinforce the other.

MARK RUTHERFORD

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"We shall read today in the Book of Experience." These words of Bernard of Clairvaux serve well as an adequate preface to the six short novels by "Mark Rutherford," which constitute an important contribution to the intimate religious literature of the last century. For, although cast in the form of fiction, these narratives clearly belong to that comparatively small class of inevitable and significant works which are best described as "confessional." Indeed, neither the form of the books, nor the shelter sought behind his now familiar pseudonym, served long to conceal the identity of the author, or to divert attention from the autobiographical aspects of his works.[1]

William Hale White was born in Bedford, England, in 1831 and died in March, 1913. In this Midland stronghold of Dissent his father was a printer and bookseller, and a member in good and regular standing of the Independent Meeting founded by John Bunyan. "The recollections of boyhood, so far as week days go, are very happy. Sunday, however, was not happy." The lad seems to have lived for the six days a healthy, natural life; but the seventh day proved, alas! that he was "not one of God's children, like Samuel, who ministered before

[1] Autobiography of Mark Rutherford, 1881. Mark Rutherford's Deliverance, 1881. The Ethic of Benedict Spinoza, translated by William Hale White, 1883. The Revolution in Tanner's Lane, 1887. Miriam's Schooling, 1890. Catherine Furze, 1893. Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione et de Via, Benedict Spinoza, translated by William Hale White, 1895. Clara Hopgood, 1896. A Description of the Wordsworth and Coleridge Manuscripts in the Possession of Mr. T. Norton Longman, 1897. An Examination of a Charge of Apostasy against Wordsworth, 1898. Pages from a Journal and Other Papers, 1901. John Bunyan, 1905.

the Lord girded with a linen ephod." When he was fourteen or fifteen, however, he became entangled in the religious conventions of his time, was "converted," and in due season "admitted" to Bunyan Meeting. "Then came the great event and the great blunder" of his life. He decided to enter the ministry; not because of any prophetic burden or any apostolic woe, but rather because that way lay the path of least resistance. Incidentally this choice was very gratifying to his mother, "who was a little weak in her preference for people who did not stand behind counters." After six years of perfunctory preparation for his calling, Hale White passed through a genuine spiritual awakening. He was at that time a student in New College, St. John's Wood. His new experience led him to seek fresh interpretations of experience, and he soon fell under suspicion for his radical views and independent spirit and was summarily expelled from the College. In this extremity he appealed for moral support to the Reverend John Jukes, pastor of Bunyan Meeting; but the Reverend John being prudently orthodox and quite unwilling to compromise his comfortable position by befriending heretics, refused the desired aid. Hale White then drifted to London, where he obtained temporary work under John Chapman, editor of the *Westminster Review*. It was here, at 142 Strand, that he had his brief memorable fellowship with George Eliot, who reappears in his first book as "Theresa Wollaston." Subsequently he became London correspondent for two provincial papers, and finally obtained a position in the Admiralty, which he held until his retirement, late in life. For those intent upon discerning the precise line between fact and fiction in his books, the few autobiographical notes written in 1909 for his immediate family and since published as *The Early Life of Mark Rutherford*, are an indispensable guide. But, as he himself says in the beginning of this slight volume, most

of its record "has been told before in a semi-transparent disguise"; and it is in his disguises that William Hale White has spoken most directly and most intimately of his religious experience.

The Autobiography of Mark Rutherford appeared in 1881. In its general outline it is the story of the writer's own life up to the time he left the *Westminster Review*. It was written thirty years after the last of the events which it narrates, yet while those events still belonged to the writer's present consciousness. "I have been accused of secrecy and reserve. The real truth is, that nobody more than myself could desire self-revelation." The long interval of silence quickened, almost unnaturally, his powers of introspection and delineation. When finally the book appeared, in unpretentious paper binding, as an inevitable outcome of the imperative need for self-expression, it was, in its sincerity and poignancy, a modern Jeremiad. His early experience "had been shut up in his heart as a burning fire, and he was weary with forbearing and he could not stay." Such then is this record of one born into a world of "rigid Calvinistic Independents," brought up in an atmosphere of spiritual unreality, sent to a theological college to fit himself for the ministry in which he was "to meet the doubts of the nineteenth century; to be the guide of men; to advise them in their perplexities; to suppress their tempestuous lusts; to lead them heavenward." There he listened to countless lectures "as irrelevant as the chattering of sparrows," there he was girded with those weapons of dogma by which he was to achieve "a triumphant refutation of the sceptic and the shallow infidel," weapons which in the thick of the fight he found to be "mere swords of lath." Because, in the face of such a perfunctory process, he attempted to work out his own salvation, it was suspected that he "did not rest in the simplicity of the gospel" and was not content with "a repetition of the old,

old story; of which, Mr. Rutherford, you know we ought never to get weary." Leaving the school under official disfavor, he put through two brief, unhappy pastorates; first over an orthodox congregation where a few prosaic souls mechanically reiterated the five points of Calvinism, and then in a Unitarian chapel, "where a few descendants of the eighteenth century heretics still testified against three Gods in one." One after another the articles of his inherited faith became incredible and were renounced. "Nakeder and nakeder had I become with the passage of the years, and I trembled to anticipate the complete emptiness to which, before long, I should be reduced." His only human fellowship in those dreary days he found with the "Republican atheist," Mardon, and his daughter Mary. Wearying finally with a message of negations, which he knew to be joyless and unprofitable, he left the ministry and took up literary work in London, only to discover new and unsuspected capacities for failure and to end in utter self-contempt. From such desperate self-loathing he had been in part rescued by Theresa, when he was suddenly summoned to Mardon's death-bed.

"All that night Mary and I watched in that topmost garret looking out over the ocean. It was a night entirely unclouded and the moon was at the full. Towards daybreak her father moaned a little, then became quiet, and just as dawn was changing to sunrise he passed away. . . . I went back to London. Before I had gone twenty miles on my journey the glory of a few hours before had turned into autumn storm. The rain came down in torrents, and the wind rushed across the country in great blasts, stripping the trees and driving over the sky with hurricane speed great masses of continuous cloud, which mingled earth and heaven. I thought of all the ships which were on the sea in the night, sailing under the serene stars which I had seen rise and set; I thought of Mardon, lying dead, and I thought of Mary. The simultaneous passage through great emotions welds souls, and begets the strongest of all forms of love. Those who have sobbed together over a dead friend, who have held one

another's hand in that dread hour, feel a bond of sympathy, pure and sacred, which nothing can dissolve."

Here *The Autobiography* ends. His friend and editor, "Reuben Shapcott," says of him in a postscript that at this time Mark Rutherford passed through a crisis which issued in better things. "Something happened, . . . there was some recoil, some healthy horror of eclipse in this self-created gloom, which drove him out of it. . . . He was content to rest and wait."

In *Mark Rutherford's Deliverance* (1881) the narrative is resumed. We find him as a city correspondent for country journals and as a clerk in the Borough. The trite euphemisms of arm-chair philosophers about the joy of work had no meaning for him, and in his sordid, monotonous tasks he was forced to "arch his back to bear his burden and find some compensation elsewhere." As the earlier book was the record of his spiritual negations, so this second book is the record of his first tentative affirmations. The quest for positive values was not wholly vain. He found a friend, M'Kay, and they two found a few other friends, a coal-porter, a copying clerk, a waiter, obscure souls "whom the world had crushed out of all shape." These all met Sunday afternoons and painfully fashioned their "Drury Lane theology," a very meagre theory of faith and practice with only two or three articles, "not thirty-nine, nor, alas! a third of that number," but yet a creed to live by. They achieved not merely the Stoic power to endure, but even some measure of contentment with their lot. Then came Mark Rutherford's sudden meeting and as sudden marriage with Ellen, whom he had forsaken in the old days, and who like himself now came to the meeting out of great tribulation. *The Deliverance* ends with another of those strangely moving, impressionistic passages by which Mark Rutherford so skilfully conveys

the suggestion of "something far more deeply interfused." With Ellen he leaves London for his one holiday in all the year and goes down to the sea-shore.

"We had a wonderful time. . . . We brought our food with us, and sat upon the shore in the shadow of a piece of the cliff. A row of heavy white clouds lay along the horizon almost unchangeable and immovable. . . . The leval opaline water differed from a floor by a scarcely perceptible heaving motion, which broke into the faintest ripples at our feet. So still was the great ocean, so quietly did everything lie in it, that the wavelets which licked the beach were as pure and bright as if they were part of the mid-ocean depths. About a mile from us, at one o'clock, a long row of porpoises appeared, showing themselves in graceful curves for an hour or so, till they went out farther to sea off Fairlight. Some fishing boats were becalmed just in front of us. Their shadows slept, or almost slept, upon the water, a gentle quivering alone showing that it was not complete sleep, or if sleep that it was sleep with dreams. The intensity of the sunlight sharpened the outlines of every little piece of rock and of the pebbles, in a manner which seemed supernatural to us Londoners. . . . It was perfect—perfect in its beauty—and perfect because, from the sun in the heavens down to the fly with burnished wings on the hot rock, there was nothing out of harmony. Everything breathed one spirit. Ellen and I sat still, doing nothing. We wanted nothing, we had nothing to achieve. No reminiscences, no anticipations disturbed us; the present was sufficient and occupied us entirely."

"A month later," says the brief editorial footnote, "my friend was dead and buried." The task of self-revelation was ended.

These first two books are unquestionably the most perfect of all. They were fashioned out of the heat of early feeling, made triply intense by long years of self-suppression and silence—a feeling which Mark Rutherford was much too sincere to feign in after-years. And yet the volumes which follow, though less compelling and less beautiful, are in their own way quite as significant. Having satisfied the need for self-expression, Mark Rutherford was able to turn from an intensely

subjective report of his experience to an impersonal, objective criticism of that experience. In his third novel, *The Revolution in Tanner's Lane* (1887), he takes his stand outside himself and his early world and attempts to estimate the values of his inherited faith and practice. The story of Zachariah Coleman, stanch Republican and orthodox Calvinist, gives the author ample opportunity to appraise Calvinism fairly, and to discuss in the terms of a single experience that momentous change in the Christianity of the nineteenth century by which "the man rose up behind the Calvinist." Then follow three other short novels, each of them taking its name from the woman whose spiritual discipline and development it recounts: *Miriam's Schooling* (1890), *Catherine Furze* (1893), and *Clara Hopgood* (1896). While no longer parochial in their problems or theological in their content, these narratives are still predominantly religious. With Calvinism left far behind as an incredible system, Mark Rutherford here undertakes the rehabilitation of old dogmas in new forms. In the interesting stories of these women we find the few needful but sufficient intimations of the larger spiritual affirmations of a mature experience.

The wealth of material and the charm of style of these six books makes any adequate critique difficult. Merely as a writer of English prose, Mark Rutherford has won a place with the masters of that art. His books are short, the best of them scarcely over a hundred pages—a welcome respite from the tediously prolonged meanderings of the contemporary psychological novel. He has a marvellous clarity of style, a simplicity and a directness, which are the fruits of a sincere nature schooled by hard experience to direct speech. His own canons for style are given us in his description of Mary Mardon: "There was no sort of effort or strain in anything she said, no attempt by emphasis to make up for weakness of thought,

and no compliance with that vulgar and most disagreeable habit of using intense language to describe what is not intense in itself." He must have followed all his life the advice which he received from his plain-spoken father: "If you write anything you consider particularly fine, strike it out!" As a stylist, Mark Rutherford is to be judged and justified by the argument from silence. The books which he might have written but did not write, give to the brief books he did write their abiding literary excellence.

It is not as a writer of high prose that Mark Rutherford will live, however, for his themes and not his treatment of those themes give to his work its perennial interest. He is, by his own right, the spokesman for mid-Victorian Independency, a world which without his witness would have been mute and perhaps ultimately forgotten. He has done for the humble Nonconformity of his own Midland counties what Trollope did for the Establishment in sleepy cathedral towns, what George Eliot did for Methodism through the country-side, and what Jane Austen and Miss Mitford did for innocuous gentility at large. "Cowfold" is the "Barchester" of Dissent. "Would that the present historian could bring back one blue summer morning, one afternoon and evening, and reproduce exactly what happened in Cowfold square, in one of the Cowfold shops, in one of the Cowfold parlours, and in one Cowfold heart and brain." The deed fulfilled the wish. Mark Rutherford knew with Emerson that "every man can live all history in his own person," and he set himself seriously to interpret the universal human interest and the deep significance of humble events in obscure places. "The garden of Eden, the murder of Cain, the deluge, the salvation of Noah, the exodus from Egypt, David and Bathsheba, with the murder of Uriah, the Assyrian invasion, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the

Resurrection from the Dead; to say nothing of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, the tragedy of Count Cenci, the execution of Mary Queen of Scots, the Inquisition in Spain, and the revolt of the Netherlands, all happened in Cowfold, as well as elsewhere, and were perhaps more interesting there because they could be studied in detail and the records were authentic." He writes like the poet Gray, revealing the universal value and meaning of some particular provincial "village Hampden" or "mute inglorious Milton."

Often he bids us laugh at the quaint contradictions of his world, that world which Kingsley once called, in happy paradox, "Orthodox Dissent." If Bergson be right, that humor springs to birth where free agents act mechanically, then there is a wealth of humor in the lives of these folk of Cowfold—Nonconformists who mechanically conformed to their own self-imposed conventions. What liturgy ever mumbled from a book could be more conventional than the "long prayer . . . which generally began with a confession that we were all sinners, but no individual sins were ever confessed; and then ensued a kind of dialogue with God, very much resembling the speeches which in later years I have heard in the House of Commons from the movers and seconders of addresses to the Crown at the opening of Parliament." When did the ancient Nonconformist liberty of prophesying ever degenerate into such dreary repetition of uninspired theological platitude as in these days of which we read? "The minister invariably began with the fall of man, propounding the scheme of redemption, and ended by depicting in the morning the blessedness of the saints and in the evening the doom of the lost. There was a tradition that in the morning there should be 'experience,' that is to say, comfort for the elect, and that the evening should be appropriated to their less fortunate brethren."

And how the conventions of this lean ecclesiasticism were reflected in the social usages of these communities! Again and again, as one reads, it is to laugh, not with Gargantuan laughter which spends itself in one noisy outbreak, but rather with the quiet smile of the "Comic Muse, grave and sisterly," who, looking upon this world, "compresses her lips." Who but the simpering deacon of Water Lane Chapel, Mr. Snale, would object to the *Book of Martyrs* because, "although Mr. Fox might be a very good man, and was a converted character, yet he did not, you know, Mr. Rutherford, belong to *us*"! What depths of parsimony in the single phrase "potatoes *or* cabbage," by which the meagre options of the Sunday dinner are presented! What nice caste-systems, more rigid than any of the godless East, are found in these Dissenting towns! Woe to him who overstepped the boundaries of his particular communion, that rare intrepid soul "who preferred tea with some taste in it from a Unitarian, to the insipid wood-flavoured stuff sold by the grocer who believed in the Trinity"!

And then how the genial laughter of comedy becomes occasionally the hard laughter of satire, which Meredith says is like "a blow in the back or the face"! There was the Reverend John Broad, who after his three sermons on Sunday "always professed himself a little 'Mondayish.'" This humor turns bitter and merciless, a scathing criticism of the moral impotence of decaying Calvinism, as we are introduced to Thomas Broad, supposedly "the child of pious parents and of many prayers, who had not been exposed to those assaults of the enemy of souls which beset ordinary young men," but actually "a brazen red-hot idol" of coarse passions, whose caddish deeds stand out in ugly relief against his father's efforts "to improve Thomas where he was weakest, that is to say, Systematic Theology, and more particularly in the Doctrine of the Comforter." This was Mark

Rutherford's great criticism of Calvinism, made frankly in his first book: "It is remarkable that the scheme was never of the slightest service to me in repressing one solitary evil inclination." All the bitterness of personal protest against the inconsistencies and insufficiencies of that system as he knew it, are summed up in the superb irony of that unforgettable chapter on Romans 8 7, a passage almost unrivalled in English fiction. We listen to Thomas Broad's first sermon, his sermon upon "the carnal mind." We hear the judgment of a fellow-theologue that "it would be better in the future to be a little simpler and to avoid what may be called the metaphysics of the Redemption." We see Thomas, himself "Mondayish" like his reverend father, calling upon Pauline, and then coarsely tampering with the sanctities of her clean person. We see her mark him with a mark like the brand of Cain. And, then inconveniently bandaged but unabashed, we see him in his pulpit on the following Sunday. "He had struck out the metaphysics and put in a new head—'Neither indeed *can* be.' The Apostle did not merely state a fact that the carnal mind was not subject to the law of God; he said, 'Neither indeed can be'! Mark, my brethren, the force of the *neither can.*"

Yet both the thoughtful smile of quiet humor and the merciless laughter of cruel satire are merely foils to the serious purpose of these books. Great as is their human and antiquarian interest, valuable as they are already becoming as first-hand documents from an era that has closed, these books are of greater moment as the records of intimate individual experience. Each of them tells of the struggle of some one soul to work out his own salvation. A process of natural selection, therefore, must always determine the readers for whom Mark Rutherford really writes. Those to whom orthodoxy is precious for its own sake will find him disquieting. Those who are dogmatically committed to a religion of healthy-

mindedness will find these narratives depressing, if not unintelligible, for they tell of sick souls. Those who demand a complete and consistent system of thought will find our author disappointing, for he abandoned such a system and never found a substitute. To those who thrive only upon some new thing these books will be stale and unprofitable, for they have only the oldest and most hackneyed philosophy of life, and one can "discover" Mark Rutherford only as he discovers the book of Job, that is, for himself. "The persons who to me have proved attractive," he says, and his readers are determined by these words, "are those who have passed through such a process as that through which I myself passed." These are the persons to whom the riddle of existence is an imperative problem; persons who are compelled alike by temperament and circumstance to wrestle with life until it yields, if not a clear meaning, at least some measure of blessing; persons to whom religion and love more than all other human interests give, if not a final answer to life's problems, at least a valid working hypothesis. To all such persons Mark Rutherford speaks with authority and not as the scribes of nineteenth-century literature.

By his own confession he writes of "commonplace lives." But the word "common" falls from Mark Rutherford's lips, not with the suggestion of worthlessness, but rather with the intimation of those deeper values which Wordsworth gave it when he spoke of "the common heart of man." In his own words, he had found "that what is commonplace is true." These characters of his, he goes on to say, will be "disappointing to persons who prefer men and women of linear magnitude to those of three dimensions." After the manner of the world they live narrow circumscribed lives, utterly devoid of broadening circumstance. There is here no familiarity with the affairs of state or society that the

worldling should enjoy the fellowship of these obscure souls. But the negligible first dimensions of character serve to set in bolder outline the heights and depths of spiritual experience, of which even the most commonplace are capable. Mark Rutherford has deliberately chosen not to confuse the issues or confound the values of his work by introducing the world's standards of greatness. For he tells us, not how men go abroad through the kingdoms of this world, but how they go down into Hell and rise up to Heaven. These are the aspects of the "commonplace" which he portrays. The chapter on "Miss Arbour" is the classical instance of his ever-recurring thesis that beneath the dull surface of obscure lives there are unsuspected heights and depths. "Who would have dreamed that such tragic depths lay behind that serene face, and that her orderly precision was like the grass and flowers upon volcanic soil with Vesuvian fires slumbering below? I was taught, as I have been taught over and over again, that unknown abysses, into which the sun never shines, lie covered with commonplace in men and women, and are revealed only by the rarest opportunity."

Nor are these commonplace persons simple characters, to be easily classified by one or another of our familiar categories. The novels are written by one with a veritable genius for introspection, yet they seldom attempt any analysis of character. Mark Rutherford knows that our whole inward life, with its baffling impulses and contradictory ideas and unresolved aims, makes even the simplest of us a hopelessly involved being. So he says of Catherine, "It is vexatious that a complicated process in her should be represented by a single act which was transacted in a second. It would have been more intelligible if it could have written itself into a dramatic conversation extending over two or three pages; but as the event happened, so it must be recorded." How

refreshingly candid after the tedious and unconvincing character-studies of contemporary fiction!

Indeed Mark Rutherford cannot accept as valid the hard-worked modern categories of sincerity and insincerity, by which our nebulous contemporary theology would distinguish the saved from the lost. This familiar distinction suffered recent rebuke at the hands of Father Tyrrell, who wrote to Canon Lilley in one of his last letters, "As to the question, 'Are we honest?' I reply, indifferent honest. English John Bull speaks as though honesty were the simplest and most elementary of virtues, and not the very last quintessence of a noble character. . . . The honesty question always riles me." Mark Rutherford anticipated Father Tyrrell in his affirmation that sincerity is not an adequate and final substitute for orthodoxy. "I never, hardly, see a pure breed either of goat or sheep. I never see anybody who deserves to go straight to heaven or who deserves to go straight to hell. . . . There is no such thing as a human being simply hypocritical or simply sincere. We are all hypocrites more or less, in every word and every action, and, what is more, in every thought. It is a question simply of degree." Hence Mark Rutherford, like Browning, sees some measure of sincerity in the most patently inconsistent persons. The most despicable of all his characters, Rev. John Broad, was "a big, gross-feeding, heavy person with heavy ox-face and large mouth"; but "he was probably as sincere as his build of body and soul allowed him to be." Mr. Cardew, a refined and sensitive churchman, finds himself suddenly entangled in the meshes of illicit love, and so became one whom the world would call "a canting, hypocritical parson, a type not uncommon, described over and over again in novels, and thoroughly familiar to theatre-goers." Mark Rutherford knows otherwise: "The truth is that he did not cant and was not a hypocrite. . . . The accusation of

hypocrisy, if we mean lofty assertion and occasional and even conspicuous moral failure, may be brought against some of the greatest figures of history. Because David sinned with Bathsheba, and even murdered her husband, we do not discredit the sincerity of the Psalms." Mark Rutherford has no interest in lack-lustre, lukewarm souls, incapable of inconsistencies, but prefers to tell of men and women in the making, complex, passionate, and unresolved, only slowly bringing order out of the spiritual chaos of their human heritage.

The religious history of these commonplace yet intricate characters follows naturally, though not consciously or artificially, the general direction and stages of the "mystic way," which we are now rediscovering. Mark Rutherford himself, Zachariah Coleman, Miriam Tacchi, Catherine Furze, Clara Hopgood, belong to that goodly fellowship of souls who, in Saint Martin's phrase, "all speak the same language and come from the same country." They begin life with certain inherited creeds and institutions. For a time these external traditions of faith and practice suffice; but as the strain and stress of intimate experience increase, these second-hand solutions to first-hand problems no longer suffice. Such was Miriam's plight: "She was now face to face with a great trouble, and she had to encounter it alone, with no weapons and with no armour save that which Nature provides. She was not specially an exile from civilization; churches and philosophers had striven and demonstrated for thousands of years; yet she was no better protected than if Socrates, Epictetus, and all ecclesiastical institutions from the time of Moses had never existed."

All personal religion which is worthy of the name has its origin in some experience through which external tradition is replaced by immediate conviction. This is the time of the "soul's awakening." Coleridge understood the almost casual character of this event: "Awakened by

the cock-crow (a sermon, a calamity, a sick bed, or providential escape) the Christian pilgrim sets out in the morning twilight." Mark Rutherford understood, with Coleridge, that the immediate causes of this initial religious experience may be relatively trivial. Churches, theological colleges, systems of dogma, all had touched Mark Rutherford but had failed to wake him. Then one day, as he was going down his Damascus Road, he "happened to find amongst a parcel of books a volume of poems in paper boards. It was called 'Lyrical Ballads,' and I read first one and then the whole book. It conveyed to me no new doctrine, and yet the change it wrought in me could only be compared with that which is said to have been wrought on Paul himself by the divine apparition. . . . Wordsworth unconsciously did for me what every reformer has done; he recreated my Supreme Divinity." So Mark Rutherford writes of Miriam's new birth in a passage so intimate and so suggestive that a later novelist has built a whole story around its final sentences:

"What had she undergone? A little poverty, a little love-affair, a little sickness. . . . Miriam had a vitality, a susceptibility, or fluidity of character, call it what you will, which did not need great provocation. There are some mortals on this earth to whom nothing more than a summer morning very early, or a certain chance idea in a lane ages ago, or a certain glance from a fellow creature dead for years, has been the Incarnation, the Crucifixion, the Resurrection, or the Descent of the Holy Ghost.

"A man now old and nearing his end is known to Miriam's biographer, who one Sunday November afternoon, when he was but twenty years old, met a woman in a London street and looked in her face. Neither he nor she stopped for an instant; he looked in her face, passed on and never saw her again. He married, had children, who now have children; but that woman's face has never left him, and the colours of the portrait which hangs in his soul's oratory are as vivid as ever. A thousand times he has appealed to it; a thousand times it has sat in judgement; and a thousand times has its sacred beauty redeemed him."

Mark Rutherford knows that it is not within our human power to determine the times and the seasons and the ways of the Spirit. The most insignificant happenings of the unanticipated hour may bring the soul to its rebirth, for sensitive souls are moulded by the slightest influences. "Ye must be born again. The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth. So is every one that is born of the Spirit."

Then after the season of new birth, with its intimations of more abundant life, there follows the hard but inevitable time of readjustment, the period of "purgation." From the pleasure-state of its awakening, the soul swings over to the pains of renunciation. Augustine must loose his hold upon "the baggage of the world." Francis, gay, genial, romantic, must strip himself naked in the streets of Assisi. Antoinette Bourignan must cast away even the last single penny which she took with her that morning she renounced the world. The tale of these drastic denials of the creature is told again in Mark Rutherford's narratives. Miriam, Catherine, Clara, all make the great renunciation; they achieve the power of doing without that which they most desire.

The demands of this period are imperative and remorseless. There can be no temporizing, no compromise. Not that which is indifferently loved, but that which is most loved must be denied. The records of this time have been told fully and once for all in the incomparable *Confessions* of Augustine; yet in Mark Rutherford's account of his renunciation of his mistress, metaphysics, there is deep poignancy. By nature he was open to the seductions of speculation; "by a cruel destiny he was impelled to dabble in matters for which he was totally unfitted. . . . Just in proportion to his lack of penetrative power was his tendency to occupy himself with difficult questions." In passing through

his season of spiritual purging he was forced to turn his back upon this one interest, which above all others fascinated him and snared him. There are those to whom theological negation gives a kind of rude pleasure. In many respects Mark Rutherford's negations were not unlike those which Edmund Gosse has recorded in his *Father and Son*. But, unlike Gosse, Mark Rutherford tells the story with humility and pain and deep feeling for the tragic transition through which his time was passing. He could never be satisfied with Gosse's facile iconoclasm. To him the renunciation of old creeds and the casting off of outworn systems is a painful self-mutilation. Suso's self-appointed bodily mortifications were hardly more grievous than the spiritual discipline which Mark Rutherford accepted as his lot. He falls back again and again upon the familiar mystic symbols of nakedness and poverty when he seeks to describe the issues of this process. One after another he strips off the decent intellectual habiliments of his faith and stands finally naked before the world, overcome with "the feeling of my own worthlessness and the longing for death as the cancellation of the blunder of my existence."

The price of these negations was the greater because it was Mark Rutherford's lot to renounce one of the greatest intellectual systems which the mind of man has ever achieved. There is nothing facile in his denial of Calvinism, but everywhere a full and measured appreciation of its inherent credibility. "This at least must be said for Puritanism, that of all the theologies and philosophies, it is most honest in its recognition of the facts. . . . Even if Calvinism had been carved on tables of stone and handed down from Heaven by the Almighty Hand, it would not have lived if it had not been found to agree more or less with the facts. . . . I object to giving the name of Calvin to a philosophy which is a necessity in all ages. 'Are not two sparrows sold for

a farthing and not one of them shall fall to the ground without your Father.' This is the last word which can be said, and at times it is the only ground which does not shake under our feet."

The great renunciation asked of Mark Rutherford was, therefore, not that of a particular system, but of intellectualism as a whole. He never replaced Calvinism by any other and less consistent system; he simply issued from his period of negation in settled anti-intellectualism. His charge against Calvinism was unique in his own day, yet it anticipated something of the dominant temper of our day. Calvinism collapsed, not because it was unintellectual but because it was over-intellectual. When in later years he looks back upon those early unhappy days, he speaks of metaphysics as other saved men have spoken of the world, the flesh, and the devil. "I shun all those metaphysical speculations of former years as I would a path which leads to madness." He never even aspired to an answer to the riddle of the universe. He is content to place the most contradictory facts in juxtaposition, and to leave the Spirit, in fulfilment of the creative task, brooding over the paradoxical chaos of a pluralistic universe. "No theory of the world is possible. The storm, the rain slowly rotting the harvest, the children sickening in cellars, are obvious; but equally obvious are an evening in June, the delight of men and women in one another, in music, and in the exercise of thought." Mark Rutherford admits that there may be those gifted genuises who can profitably occupy themselves with the effort to achieve an intellectual reconciliation between the contradictions of experience; but he has no fellowship with them. He much prefers the homely company of his own Zachariah and Pauline, lay, private persons, "happily for them committed to nothing, not subsidized by their reputations to defend a system."

The mystic period of negation has its own recompenses. In renouncing Calvinism, Mark Rutherford found Christianity. "The most desperate private experiences cannot go beyond the garden of Gethsemane," and at the very nadir of his world Mark Rutherford met Jesus. "The mere knowing that other people have been tried as we have been tried is a consolation to us. . . . In the worst maladies, the healing effect which is produced by the visit of a friend who can simply say, 'I have endured all that,' is most marked." So it was that Mark Rutherford discovered Jesus, not through a limited atonement or irresistible grace, but in "the fellowship of his sufferings." Jesus is not to him a "young Apollo," busied with glad affirmations of this present world, but the great World-Denier. One or two of his passages upon this central theme are prophetic of the interpretation of the gospel which the modern eschatological school is forcing upon contemporary theology. In one of the darkest hours of his life he sat and listened to Mary Mardon singing from "The Messiah" "He was despised and rejected."

"The song wound itself into the very centre of my existence. I seemed to be listening to the tragedy of all human worth and genius. . . . The song is potent, because with utmost musical tenderness and strength it reveals the secret of the influence of the story of Jesus. Nobody would be bold enough to cry, 'That too is my case'; and yet the poorest and humblest soul has a right to the consolation that Jesus was a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief. . . .

"The story of Jesus is the story of the poor and the forgotten. He is not the Saviour of the rich and prosperous, for they need no Saviour. The healthy, active, and well-to-do need Him not, and require nothing more than is given by their own health and prosperity. But every one who has walked in sadness because his destiny has not fitted his aspirations; every one who, having no opportunity to lift himself out of his narrow town- or village-circle of acquaintances, has thirsted for something beyond what they could give him; everybody who, with nothing but a daily round of mechanical routine before him, would welcome death if it were martyr-

dom for a cause; every humblest creature, in the obscurity of great cities or remote hamlets, who silently does his or her duty without recognition—all these turn to Jesus, and find themselves in Him."

Having thus come to himself and having found himself at deeper levels, Mark Rutherford passed at once from "The Everlasting Nay" into "The Everlasting Yea." He now sets himself resolutely to the task of affirmation, to the discovery and assertion of positive values in life. This is to be an intimate task; for a man's religion "is not something without any particular connection with him. It is the answer to questions which have been put to him, and not to those which have been put to other people." Moreover it must be a slow task; for "there is no remedy for our troubles which is uniformly and progressively efficacious. All that we have a right to expect from our religion is that gradually, very gradually, it will assist us to a real victory."

His first affirmations, "the compensations for life" he calls them, seem at first sight pitifully disproportionate to the need and sorry substitutes for the dogmatic values he had destroyed. Yet, if these early "compensations" are meagre in content, they are prophetic in spirit. As the moralists tell us that the size of a sin does not alter its inherent wickedness, so Mark Rutherford implies that the mere amount of some recompense for life does not affect its inherent worth. So, like the "Preacher" of old, he does not deprecate even the creature-pleasure of the passing moment. There is no realm of ends contemplated by the ancient injunction to eat one's bread with joy; yet the whole reaction to life implied in that bidding is positive, and warrants Mark Rutherford's exegetical comment that "happiness, if it does no mischief, is better than most spiritual misery." Then beyond the happiness of the moment there are those countless trivial avocations, our hobbies, by which we are

delivered from ourselves. The butterfly-catcher of *The Autobiography* is a spiritually constructive force in Mark Rutherford's world, and leads to the wise reflection that "men should not be too curious in analyzing and condemning any means which nature devises to save them from themselves, whether it be coins, old books, curiosities, butterflies, or fossils." Then, through these saving avocations, one rises to other and fuller recompenses, those wide-spread and readily accessible intimations of the Infinite which will deliver even the most circumscribed life from its slavery to "the petty and personal." Everywhere the world of sordid particulars is pierced by "chinks through which to touch the universal." "The sea was a corrective to the littleness all round me." Even more than the sea the stars became the mediating symbol of the Infinite. How often, in one novel after another, does Mark Rutherford lift his eyes to the heavens at night and repeat the mystic affirmation, "All shall be well and all shall be well." "The provision in nature of infinity ever present to us is a great help. No man can look up to the stars at night and reflect upon them without feeling that the tyranny of sense is loosened, and the tyranny too of the conclusions of his logic. . . . I sought refuge in the idea of God, the God of a starry night with its incomprehensible distances; and I was at peace, content to be the meanest worm of all the millions that crawl on the earth."

So by the way of his "compensations" Mark Rutherford gets home again to God, and attempts his first conscious and deliberate religious affirmation. "I felt as if somehow, after many errors, I had once more gained a road, a religion in fact, and one which essentially was not new but old, the religion of the Reconciliation, the reconciliation of man with God. . . . This surely, under a thousand disguises, has been the meaning of all the forms of worship which we have seen in the world. . . . In my

younger days the aim of theologians was the justification of the ways of God to man. They could not succeed. They succeeded no better than ourselves in satisfying the intellect with a system. Nor does the Christian religion profess any such satisfaction. It teaches rather the great doctrine of a Remedy, of a Mediator; and therein it is profoundly true." Thus far did Mark Rutherford come in the *Deliverance*.

In the last three novels the problems of theology are supplanted by the problems of love, and the men give way to women. Yet in following the experiences of Miriam and Catherine and Clara, Mark Rutherford is still seeking under the guises of this human interest a further development of the religious consciousness. One who was so minded could plot the two curves of theology and love in these six books, and see how the spiritual mean remains constant. Two detached remarks in the earlier novels indicate the line along which the love-interest is to be developed. "Blessed is love; blessed is hate; but thrice accursed is that indifference which is neither one nor the other, the muddy mess which men call friendship." "Passion does not dawdle and compliment. It may devour and burn like a flame; and in a few moments, like flame, may bring down a temple to dust and ashes; but it is earnest as flame, and essentially pure." There are few writers who have drawn as nicely as Mark Rutherford the sharp line between passion which is clean and passion which is unclean. The vivid picture of Pauline Caillaud dancing in her attic tenement before her father and Zachariah, is marvellous alike for its freedom and its restraint. First and last he is an intense nominalist in his treatment of love. Catherine Furze loved Mr. Cardew: "But what is love? There is no such thing. There are loves, and they are all different." Baruch Cohen, a middle-aged widower, finds himself in love with Clara: "But it was

not Clara Hopgood who was before him; it was hair, lips, eyes, just as it was twenty years ago."

It is not with love as a physical experience, however, that Mark Rutherford is concerned, but rather with the struggle of naturally free souls to realize their freedom and find themselves through the human restraints and disappointments of the divine passion. His women all belong to one type. Theresa Wollaston, Pauline Caillaud and her daughter Pauline Coleman after her, Miriam Tacchi, Catherine Furze, and Madge Hopgood, each of them in her particular environment was "like a wild sea-gull in a farm yard of peaceful, clucking, brown-speckled fowls." As the earlier books were studies in theological incompatibility, so the later books are studies in personal incompatibility, efforts to discover in the terms of the most intimate of all human relationships the ever needful "religion of Reconciliation."

In the earlier novels, where the theological interest predominates, the function of the women is clear and simple, they achieve the deliverance of the men from their spiritual bondage. Mark Rutherford begins where Goethe left off: "*Das Ewig-Weibliche zieht uns hinan.*" Theresa and Pauline each "add one more beatitude to those in the gospels: 'Blessed are they who heal us of our self-despisings.'" In the later novels the immediate spiritual dilemmas of the women become paramount, and Mark Rutherford sets himself seriously to achieve for his heroines the deliverance and reconciliation which he had found for himself. In *Miriam's Schooling* the most untamed of all these women of "wild irregular genius" is reconciled to her plodding husband by the discovery that, although he had no soul for *Romeo and Juliet*, he could understand the movement of the heavenly bodies, which, for all her eager romanticism, she could not understand. With telescope and orrery

she became a novitiate at his feet. In this simple way she learned the first necessary lesson in the school of religious experience, the lesson of Humility. Through her broken and contrite pride, love came to its own.

In *Catherine Furze* the dilemma is yet more serious. Though it was altogether unlikely "in a sleepy midland town knowing nothing but the common respectabilities," the daughter of an ironmonger fell in love with a married clergyman. The trouble grew until one sultry afternoon they stood together by a riverside. "She loved this man; it was a perilous moment; one touch, a hair's breadth of oscillation, and the two would have been one." But in obedience to a something, that inhibition which in the perilous moment always saves Mark Rutherford's men and women, Catherine conquered herself and in so doing gave Cardew the power to conquer himself. He went back to his wife, and "no woman ever had a husband more tender or devoted than hers in those later years." When at last he came and knelt by Catherine's bedside as she was dying, he could only say, "You have saved me," and she whispered in reply, "*You* have saved *me*." "By their love for each other they were both saved. The disguises are manifold which the Immortal Son assumes in the work of our Redemption."

And finally in the last novel, *Clara Hopgood*, our dilemma has become veritable tragedy. Outraged respectability deplored this book when it appeared, because it told of Madge Hopgood's fall and her determined refusal of the conventional reprisal, marriage. But outraged respectability missed the whole content of this largest of the novels; for this is the story, not of Madge Hopgood's fall, but of Clara Hopgood's great renunciation, by which finally she transfers to her discredited sister a love that might have been her own, and so saves her sister by her vicarious sacrifice. She goes to Italy with Mazzini and dies there in the service of political

liberty, and one day long after, when her name was mentioned, Baruch said to Madge, "The theologians represent the Crucifixion as the most sublime fact in the world's history. It was sublime, but let us reverence also the Eternal Christ who is forever being crucified for our salvation." By these devious ways Mark Rutherford found again that "orthodoxy" which once he lost awhile. In *Clara Hopgood* "the wheel has come full circle."

Such are the novels of this man for whom, in William James's memorable words, "religion exists not as a dull habit, but as an acute fever rather"; to whom, in his own words, "the love of a woman to the man who is of no account is a true testimony of what God is in his own heart." They are the records of "The Dark Night of the Soul." They are melancholy, not "because it is easy to be melancholy and the times lack strength"—and who that knows Arthur Hugh Clough or Matthew Arnold would disparage the inevitable melancholy of those transition years?—they are melancholy because he who would be one with God must first wander in a far country. The writings of all the mystics seem to issue in anti-climax. The Union to which they bear witness seems but a meagre recompense for their sufferings. What more grievous story has been left the world than that of Suso, and how inadequate the simple conclusion to it all: "And later, when God judged that it was time, He rewarded the poor martyr for all his suffering. And he enjoyed peace of heart, and received in tranquillity and quietness many precious graces." Mark Rutherford's work, likewise, seems to issue in anti-climax, yet in the occasional intimations of a peace which passeth all understanding, we are given to know that this modern Servitor of the Eternal Wisdom came "*ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem.*" It is not by chance that more than one of these records of the "Dark Night"

ends with a daybreak, a daybreak like that to which Miriam rose very early, on the first morning of her soul's peace.

"It poured with rain during the night. Miriam lay and listened, thinking it would be wet and miserable on the following day. She dropped off to sleep, and at four she rose and went to the window and opened it wide. In streamed the fresh south-west morning air, pure, delicious, scented with all that was sweet from fields and woods, and the bearer inland as far as Cowfold of Atlantic vitality, dissipating fogs, disinfecting poisons—the Life-Giver.

"She put on her clothes silently, went down stairs, and opened the back door. The ever watchful dog, hearing in his deepest slumbers the slightest noise, moved in his kennel, but recognized her at once and was still. She called to him to follow her, and he joyfully obeyed. . . . She paced about for a little while, and then sat down and once more watched the dawn. It was not a clear sky, but barred toward the east with cloud, the rain-cloud of the night. She watched and watched, and thought after her fashion, mostly with incoherence, but with rapidity and intensity. At last came the first flush of scarlet upon the bars, and the dead storm contributed its own share to the growing beauty. The rooks were now astir, and flew, one after another, in an irregular line eastwards black against the sky. Still the colour spread, until at last it began to rise into pure light, and in a moment more the first glowing point of the disc was above the horizon. Miriam fell on her knees against the little seat and sobbed, and the dog, wondering, came and sat by her and licked her face with tender pity."

A PROTESTANT AND SOCIAL VIEW OF THE CHURCH

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The Church is a divine institution, just as all legitimate organizations, like the State, the university, the political party, or the private club, are divine institutions. This is the outcome of any thoroughgoing acceptance of the Protestant position of the essentially divine character of all life, the priesthood of all believers, and the rejection of local divine places. Any special claim the Church can make must be based not on its essential character but upon its purpose and aim, and its special efficiency in pursuit of some end. That some ends in life are higher than others goes without saying. The end of a private club is legitimate and praise-worthy, but it is not in the judgment of thoughtful men on the same level of importance for life as a university. It is true that any scale of importance is finally based upon judgments of value which are in the last analysis extra-rational. The end aimed at by all churches, and among them we must include synagogues, cathedrals, and the lecture-halls of the Ethical Culture Society, is the mediation to men of the unseen and eternal values of religion and ethics. And each particular church bases its claim for recognition upon its assertion that it is attempting to mediate the truest and highest of these values in the most efficient way it knows. We thus see that the Church or churches represent the community, or rather parts of the community, organized for a particular purpose. The older distinction between a visible and invisible church should have lost all meaning for a consistent Protestantism, because

it was fundamentally based on the false assumption that our relationships with God depended upon the mediation of the church, and that outside of the church there was no salvation. Hence to account for certain obvious facts, an invisible church had to be postulated. The logic of Protestantism makes any such assumption needless. Our relationships to God and salvation are not in the keeping of any church.

Nor is it accurate to speak of any separation between Church and State, for as a matter of fact it is the same community organized for two distinct purposes; but the purposes cannot be more than relatively distinct, and the community has always an interest in any organization and its purposes and can never permit entire separation. Nor have we actually either in the United States or in France any such separation. All that has happened is a changed relationship between the community organized for certain political purposes and the community organized for certain ecclesiastical ends. In the United States all ecclesiastical organizations receive a large subsidy, and are communal servants in so far as they accept remission of taxes. Even in France there is no real separation. The community guarantees protection to all ecclesiastical bodies and in a measure regulates their life. There is simply in France a more radical recognition of the real character of all such organizations within the communal limits. The community in its protection of the physical and corporate life of all churches recognizes them as a part of its life. It is a matter of expediency how far it taxes or subsidizes these organizations, just as it is a matter of expediency how far it should subsidize Trades Unions or private educational institutions. The assumption is always that some kind of social service is being rendered to the community.

Genetically, the ecclesiastical organization of the community, like the educational, was coterminous with the

political organization, commonly called the State. With the increasing complexity of human life and great differentiation of human needs, there has arisen a greater differentiation of function. Administrative and defensive organizations have arisen out of the political, and indeed with various degrees of deliberate separation from the political life. In one sense the political organization must always be supreme, because its main purpose is defence, and for that purpose it must control brute force. The maintenance of peace within and without demands physical force, and the community intrusts the control of this force to organizations which have seldom risen adequately to their high responsibility and have often lamentably betrayed their trust. Hence it is a grievous error to identify the State with any organization which temporarily controls the physical force of the community. Often history must decide whether the control of overwhelming physical force was exercised by the State or by a usurper. Only growing social experience and increasing knowledge and independence on the part of the individuals of a community will enable us to determine the adjustments socially most expedient between the various organizations which express various elements in the communal life.

At present the ecclesiastical organization of the community is probably both broader and more effective than any other expression of communal vitality. The only possible rivals are the political and educational interests; and on the educational field the ecclesiastical organizations are so interwoven with various institutions for promoting knowledge that alliance rather than separation is still the note of the relationship. In the political field it is noteworthy that as communal efficiency rises, there come into being administrative bodies which cease to be political and take over large areas of life once dominated by political interests. In the United States the

most exciting political election induces roughly fifteen million men to enter a polling booth once in four years, and spend perhaps an hour's travel in order to vote. On ordinary occasions the vote sinks to less than seventy per cent of this number. Moreover, only about one-sixth of the population are legally entitled to political expression at the polls, while over one-third of the community are avowedly organized ecclesiastically, and over two-thirds are probably more vitally connected with some church than with any political party. The churches, for example, have a seating capacity for nearly seventy per cent of the population, and the seating capacity more than keeps pace with the population, while the nominal membership outstrips it. On any given Sunday there are probably more people in churches of one kind or another than went into the polling booths in November for the Presidential election.

It may be that the churches are "losing ground," but there are no evidences of it on the numerical side. All the various organizations in which the communal life finds expression are relatively defective and inefficient. The political organizations are notoriously wasteful, time-serving, and ineffective. No one who has to do with the educational machinery can rise from the study of what it is as compared with what it might and should be, without sickness of heart. So also the community ecclesiastically considered is most obviously to a great degree badly served by the churches and synagogues. They are divisive, often narrow, selfish, and inefficient. There are however degrees of inefficiency; and just in the measure in which any of the ecclesiastical bodies are successful in mediating the highest unseen values to the communal life, just in that measure are they "true" churches and are doing what the community instinctively demands of them.

In the past the churches have failed in various degrees to mediate the unseen values to the communal life which was advancing in complexity and was possessed of an increasingly intelligent outlook upon life. This has been the fruitful cause of a constant restlessness and dissatisfaction within the organized religious life; and has resulted in the rise of new sects and organizations aiming at better expression of the vast variety of human needs. The various bodies minister to different levels of aesthetic and cultural demands. Nor does it seem likely that with increasing communal heterogeneity the rise of new organizations will cease. Exactly the same forces are at work in political parties, and we see the same stupid inflexibility, and the same waste and confusion. An examination of the historical facts seems to show that the political State and the ecclesiastical bodies have never been more than exceedingly partial and imperfect organs for the communal life, and one main trouble has always been that these bodies in an arrogant way have constantly assumed that they did really incorporate that life. Only the sad awakening of such years as 1517 and 1793 reveal the real facts of serious misrepresentation. No political State and no ecclesiastical body has ever succeeded in expressing the communal life more than very imperfectly. There is a higher citizenship than ever wholly organized a political State, and a nobler religious life than ever became completely embodied in an institution.

On reason however why the ecclesiastical organization counts for more than any other as an expression of the communal life is that in Christianized countries, at least, women and children are given more place. Political states have excluded all that the power-possessing class could safely exclude, and political parties have always had their eye upon gaining power in the political state. Hence the pressure of the ecclesiastically organized com-

munity is steadier, and the life of the churches more nearly representative of the whole community than any group of political parties. For this reason also the churches elicit an unselfish devotion and a steadier self-sacrifice than all other organizations put together, although in recent years the educational interest begins to some extent to rival them. The communal life has many needs and is slowly and often blindly fashioning organs to minister to those needs. The earliest of all such organizations are seldom sharply defined in their functions. The earliest forms of organization seem to have been of a political-military and a religious-educational type. The religious demands are however interwoven with all other demands, and the organs called into being to meet one set of needs must often adapt themselves to meeting an entirely different set of wants. The defensive organs become the organs for the exercise of internal political power. At the same time the danger of institutional life is rather fixity than extreme adaptation; hence both churches and political parties by their very nature tend rather to conserve than to create. Life is forever struggling within the organization for new and more perfect expression, and often it is hampered and crushed instead of conserved by the forms built up to guard it. These conserving forms of the past are often a weight and hindrance, and in a measure become misrepresentative of the real life of the organization. They however continue to have their function as an expression of the continuity of life, and as an abiding confession that the present is a child of the past, and should have a reverence for the parental life. As occasionally however the bark of a tree binds it and kills the tree, so in the ecclesiastical life creedal forms and ritual observances have more than once bound the religious life, and violent disruption or deadly stagnation has always ensued. No one can observe the churches of Spain or Italy with anything like

intelligent sympathy, and not realize that they are ministering to pronounced needs of the social organism; but at the same time it is also perfectly evident that they have long ceased to be the expressions of the total religious life of those communities, and that because of their religious and ethical imperfections many noble religious and ethical enthusiasms are being starved and stunted. And yet on account of the monopoly these churches possess of the organs for religious expression, it is difficult for any spontaneous religious wants to make themselves properly felt. This same thing is measurably true of Protestantism, particularly where the relationship between the political State and some one denomination is of the kind somewhat inaccurately known as "established."

In the United States the Protestant churches with all their evident shortcomings are essential elements in the communal life; at the same time they are no longer representative of the whole religious life even of the non-Roman Catholic population. For one thing, the financial burden of any effective ecclesiastical organization is very heavy. Buildings, rituals, an educated ministry, organs, choirs, are exceedingly costly. At least nine-tenths of the property of the United States is controlled by one-tenth of the population. This one-tenth is largely called upon to pay the bills of a relatively prosperous Protestantism, and "who pays the piper calls the tune." So it easily happens that the churches try to maintain a standard set by the prosperous one-tenth, and nine-tenths are consciously or unconsciously shut out. Or, what is almost worse, it happens that the churches try to minister to the "other half" without really knowing what are their religious wants and habits. We often hear of "today's demand" for this or that, for "ornate" worship or "intellectual" preaching, or "the simple Gospel," when the truth is that the demand is that of a

small and paying minority, while no one knows what would be the demands of the majority were it not so voiceless and uninterested. The real difficulty which faces the Protestant Church is an economic one. Its corporate life is relatively wasteful, and the constituency from which it would naturally draw its strength is economically taxed by the strain on its material resources. We have aped the cathedral-building which was once the open centre for the whole religious life of the community; then we close up the building, save for four or five hours a week. The waste is at once apparent. At the same time this difficulty faces the communal life on its political side. American democracy has as yet neither proper ecclesiastical nor political organs for making its real needs known. Nor have we any adequate machinery for meeting those needs, were they known. The church is simply a part, and a most important part, of the entire question of communal reorganization. In some respects it is both less wasteful and more democratic than the political and educational organizations. It takes in women and children, which the political organization fails to do, and it ministers to adult life as the educational organization has hitherto not done. Some radical political thought, realizing the institutional conservatism that inheres in all external organizations and finding it an obstacle in the way, fondly dreams of its destruction. In point of fact, it would be necessary to destroy all institutions to get rid of conservatism. Universities and schools are in general far more hide-bound in thought and custom than the churches, and for reasons a thoughtful man can easily supply for himself. They are, for one thing, built upon the external authority of a teacher addressing the immature. Nor would the destruction of institutional conservatism necessarily make for progress; because the energies of the communal life would at once be absorbed by the task of constructing new

institutions bound soon to develop their own type of conservatism.

The hope of the Protestant churches must be such a democratic reorganization of the communal life that they may rest upon a broader economic basis for their material life, and thus come into closer touch with great ranges of religious need and aspiration now untouched and undreamed of. The churches are no worse off than the schools and universities, which also now minister to the tastes and needs of a small possessing class, and respond directly to the life of that class, and only indirectly and almost by happy accident to the non-possessing class. The whole matter is one of relative inefficiency. We talk freely of pedagogic reform, and also of reconstruction of the church; but we do not know the needs to which pedagogic reform and reconstruction must minister—and no one knows, least of all the voiceless majority. We who are trying to minister in school and church to the supposed needs of a half-awakened Democracy are guessing in the dark. Our chiefest social service will be awakening the Democracy to demand its own economic, political, and religious self-expression. It may well be that an economically awakened Democracy, with political autonomy and real religious freedom, will give expression to its religious life in forms as different from those of today as a Quaker meeting-house is from a pagan temple. But it is more than likely that it will revert to many of the aesthetic inspirations of a pagan, feudal, and aristocratic past, and evolve out of them a richer and more inspiring symbolism. Indeed it is almost useless to speculate upon the direction the religious life of Democracy will take. The most we can do, we are in part doing, in cultivating a much larger elasticity in our ecclesiastical machinery. The Salvation Army, the Young Men's Christian Associations, the Boy Scouts, the various Settlement Guilds,

and the like, are all individually subject to serious criticism, but they are wholesome expressions of the church's attempt to adapt its life more completely to the whole range of human need. But at almost every point the worker is face to face with the lack of that economic autonomy without which Protestant individualism and spiritual freedom are unable really to find themselves. This disability we should frankly face, and instead of arrogantly identifying the life of the church with the religious life of the community, honestly admit that we do not and cannot comprehend the religious life of the community, and set ourselves to the task of awakening the community to its need of more complete Protestant and Democratic autonomy.

MARTIN LUTHER IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT CRITICISM

EPHRAIM EMERTON

The decade just passed has witnessed an unusual activity in the production of books about Martin Luther. This activity has been greatly stimulated by the re-introduction of a method of controversy which reasonable men had been hoping was forever silenced. Until about a generation ago there had been two obvious and hopelessly opposed ways of approach to the subject of Luther's character and work. From the one side he was presented as an angel of light; from the other as the type of a depraved and malicious spirit, moved to activity not through any desire to improve the condition of his people but because, being the malignant thing he was, he could not act otherwise. It need hardly be said to the readers of this *Review* that both of these views of Luther are essentially false. They are perfectly intelligible, one equally with the other. They are the natural precipitation of the bitter controversies that gathered about him in his life, and continued long after his death to complicate the political and economic struggles out of which the new Europe of our day was born. In the light of our modern historical method, both views appear crude and unscientific. They represent a way of looking at historical characters and historical events to which we are apt to apply the crushing word "old-fashioned." And in fact it did seem, up to a very few years ago, that these primitive judgments, which classified men into good and bad, angels and fiends, had become a thing of the past. We flattered ourselves that the canons of historical criticism had become so well fixed in the habits of our

modern thought that we were no longer blind to the intermediate shades of quality and motive that determine human action. We thought we had learned that no man is wholly good or wholly bad; that no historical movement is all along one direct line, but that if we would really understand it, we must follow it in its many windings and disentangle it from the many cross-roads of opposing forces that tend to confuse and to obscure it.

For more than half a century scholars had been occupied in delving deeper and deeper into the original sources of historical knowledge, confident that the more completely these were brought out into the light, the more certainly we should be able to eliminate the false and the uncertain and to fix forever the volume of the certain and the true. That confidence was but another expression of one of the most noticeable tendencies of the modern world—the tendency to believe that, in the words of the poet who more than any other was the prophet of modern optimism, "We needs must love the highest when we see it." A right method, it was supposed, must inevitably lead to sound results. We forgot that there is another side to this matter. We overlooked the bitter fact that learning, right method, intellectual power, may all be perverted to the service of the false and evil as well as applied to the service of the true and the good. It is only when, behind all the apparatus of sound scholarship and beneath all the force of intellectual capacity, there is honesty of purpose, purity of aim, and a genuine love of the liberty which knows no fear of consequences, that we can hope for the highest results of research.

Now if we apply these rather large generalizations to the special case of the study of Luther, we see that what we have ventured to call the "old-fashioned" crudity of judgment was pretty definitely repudiated more than a generation ago. And it is interesting to note that this abandonment of the extreme partisan attitude begins

on the Protestant side. Not only was it a Protestant, it was a Lutheran writer, Professor Julius Köstlin, who gave to the world the earliest considerable study of Luther from an avowedly strict historical point of view. While maintaining the attitude of reverence for the great achievements and the commanding personality of his hero, Köstlin was not blind to the defects and limitations that at many points seem to dim the lustre of his renown. And so it has been with the host of other Protestant scholars who have followed the way marked out by Köstlin. They also have endeavored to preserve what was valuable in the older tradition, and at the same time not to lose the advantage that comes from treating a great human figure in a human way.

But not only Protestants have felt the influence of the modern emphasis upon a truly historical method. Catholic scholars too, trained in the schools of Protestant Germany, began to approach this subject of the Reformation in a markedly fairer spirit. On this side the lead was taken by two men of vast learning and industry, inspired by common zeal to present their side of the great controversy in such a way as to conciliate the scientific spirit of their day. These two men were Johannes Janssen and Ludwig Pastor. Both chose for their field of work the period of European history following upon that of the Middle Ages proper. It was their cue to admit with admirable frankness the evils of the Church system in that period and to acknowledge the need of reformation. In so far they disarmed criticism from the outset. But then came, of course, the question, how this reformation might and ought to have been accomplished. These authors contended that the means of reformation were all indicated by the very constitution of the Church itself. Though the Church was a divine institution, it was in the hands of fallible men, by no means exempt from the passions and follies of human

kind. In its development there must occur those waves of soundness and unsoundness which mark all human endeavor. In its periods of decline it had only to enforce still more strictly that divinely instituted discipline which had so often rescued it from apparently impending ruin, and it would once more assume its rightful place as the infallible guide of human conduct.

From this point of view it followed that all violent reformation deserved rather the name of revolution, with all its attendant horrors and confusions. Revolution might lead to schism, and schism meant the rending of the seamless garment which symbolized the essential unity of the Christian Church. With the actual process of the Reformation under the lead of Luther, these Catholic scholars could therefore have no sympathy; but they were not quite willing to adopt the traditional view of him and his work as criminal. It was not a question of crime, but of blunder. The Reformation was a mistake, and Luther was the victim of a series of errors arising, not from a vicious nature, but from the extravagance of an over-sensitive conscience preyed upon by solitary brooding and working itself out in a continuous sequence of audacious actions.

In defence of this attractive thesis, Janssen in his *History of the German People* and Pastor in his *History of the Papacy* marshalled their evidence in the form of a vast accumulation of quotation from contemporary writings, especially from the writings of the Reformers themselves, and above all from those of Luther. The success of these undertakings was immediate and enormous. The reader, critical or sympathetic, found himself overwhelmed by this mass of apparently unanswerable testimony. The combination of frankness and learning with good temper and a generally respectful tone appeared to be irresistible. Of course a war of counter-demonstrations ensued. Protestant scholars

rushed to the rescue, and the air became lurid with the flames of the combat. It was easy to show that the frankness of the new Catholic presentation was only apparent; that evidence had been twisted and perverted and combined to accomplish the desired result; that after all, the real issue, the justification of the Reformation, remained essentially untouched.

Still, as the smoke of the encounter lifted, it became apparent that henceforth the treatment of the whole subject would have to be set upon another plane. Protestant scholars acknowledged gladly the many contributions to actual knowledge which their confessional opponents had made. Whatever disposition might still linger to represent Luther as something a little more than human was pretty well counteracted by the weight of evidence to the contrary, and on the other hand it seemed impossible that the old violence of assault could ever again be revived. That was the situation so long as the papacy of that remarkable man, scholar, and gentleman, Leo XIII, continued. Pope Leo died in the year 1903 and was succeeded by the Venetian peasant, Giuseppe Sarto, who under the name of Pius X still occupies the throne of St. Peter. Within a year of his accession appeared the first volume of a book called *Luther and Lutheranism*,[1] by a Dominican friar, Heinrich Denifle, who for more than twenty years had held the position of sub-archivist at the Vatican. The thesis of this book was one especially useful in Catholic exhortation—namely, that no one has ever become a recreant to the true faith unless he had previously become a wicked man. Every departure from the doctrine of the one holy and apostolic Church must be traceable to some mental or moral depravity on the part of the erring person.

[1] Luther und Lutherthum in der ersten Entwickelung, von P. Heinrich Denifle, O. P. 1904–1909.

In pursuance of this thesis, Denifle brought together and marshalled into one terrible indictment every suggestion which a mind open to that kind of evidence could extract from contemporary literature, and especially from the utterances of Luther himself, pointing toward a depraved imagination and a diseased moral nature as the mainsprings of his activities and the basis of the seductive influence which he exercised over the minds of his followers. It was a frank return to the attitude of a previous age. As to the great learning and ability of the Dominican scholar there could be no manner of doubt. He had demonstrated these in a long series of critical studies of mediaeval institutions, which had won for him the hearty recognition of all competent authorities. He was on his way to England to receive the highest honors of the English academic world, when he died at Munich, June 10, 1905, a little more than a year after the appearance of the first volume of his assault upon Luther. A second and a third volume, from materials which the author had long been gathering, appeared in rapid succession.

This book of Denifle's is not a biography of Luther. It is not even an attempt at this. "I am no Luther-biographer," the author himself says in his preface to the second edition. It is rather a psychological study, based upon historical method and directed to proving the point from which the author sets out, namely, that Luther was merely the mouthpiece for a type of corruption which for more than a century had been creeping into the Church and threatening its very life. It is worth while to follow for a moment the process which Denifle tells us he followed in approaching the subject of his work. He had occupied himself, he says, for many years with studies especially in regard to the University of Paris and the devastation of churches and monasteries in France during the Hundred Years' War; and

this had led him to the conviction that the late fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries were an almost continuous period of decadence in the spiritual standards of the Church. Rationalism, individualism, paganism, the lust of the flesh, the delight of the eye, had all been slowly sapping the foundations of the structure which the devoted faith of the true Middle Ages had built up. Especially had the world of nominal Christians turned away from that ideal of the Christian life represented by the monastic system with its manifold reactions upon society in general. All this wide-spread discontent and criticism seemed to our Dominican scholar only so many manifestations of the world against the Church, the flesh against the spirit, the devil against Christ. What appears to others as the spirit of enlightenment, leading with all its dangers through struggle and doubt to ultimate clearness and deliverance, this seems to him the spirit of darkness blinding the eyes of the world and causing it to stumble about in uncertainty, until the one divinely appointed guide shall again be able to command its allegiance.

This process of decadence within the Church he finds then typified and personified in Luther. He grants to him, grudgingly, a certain measure of good intention and a barren kind of capacity; but, aside from these dubious endowments, he is to him only the expression of the general corruption of mind and soul to which the unhappy tendencies of the previous century had been inevitably leading. The key to the nature of this so-called reformer is plainly a gross and irresistible sensuality. It is this germ of corruption which poisons all his being and leads him to the other vices which from an early point determine his action. Especially does it lead him, as sensual indulgence always must, into a fatal disregard for truth. The whole world of law and order and religion becomes hateful to him because it seems to

stand in the way of his own selfish desire. Having the spirit of falsehood within him, he lies to himself. Evil becomes good in his sight. When the man of the fifteenth century sinned, he knew he was sinning. He did not try to deceive himself or others with the fiction of a new morality that confounded right and wrong. And because he knew that he was sinning, he kept open for himself a way of reform. There was always for him and his kind the hope that through this sense of sin they might be brought back once more to the kindly bosom of that Mother Church that was always more ready to forgive than to condemn. But for this Luther and his kind there was no such hope. They sinned, and then made a new law to justify their sin. When Luther, moved by uncontrollable desire, broke the vows he had solemnly taken and united himself with a woman who had been through the same process of apostasy, he had the audacity to call this union a marriage and to declare that it had the approval of the divine command.

One sees the cleverness of this method of attack. It is of no avail that Luther, and his defenders to this day, point out the perversion of the system which had led him and countless others into a relation with the world which their sober and mature judgment condemned as false, and out of which therefore every right instinct of their nature taught them to escape. All this could be interpreted as merely an excuse to justify their own perverse and corrupted action. It would not help, to show that a long series of faithful servants of a true Christianity had for generations been protesting against precisely these fictitious restraints upon everything that was natural and right in the closest of human relations. From the days of Gregory VII such protests had not been lacking. They had come, not from men who were seeking justification for their own private acts, but from devoted adherents of the system they were compelled to

criticise. Such men were grieved and pained by the corruption they saw in the holiest places, and advised an entire change as the only means of escape. They had been silenced by the weight of that centralized power that saw in the existing system the only defence of its own authority. But now such voices would be silenced no longer. It was perfectly true that Luther was giving expression to a feeling of restless impatience with fictitious and hypocritical restraints; but this was done only that a new Christianity in greater harmony with the eternal rightness of the good universe of God might be brought into being.

The reply to this assault was as difficult as the reply to those critics of the English Reformation who represent this event as merely the result of King Henry VIII's obstinate determination to rid himself of a wife who no longer suited him. It is as idle in the one case as in the other to attempt a direct reply. Such movements as the Reformation in Germany and in England are too vast and too complicated to be summed up in any such simple formula. The only way to reach an intelligent comprehension of them is to trace them back through the long and intricate development which brought society at last to such a point that there was no longer the possibility of compromise. It is not the personality of the leader nor the immediate circumstances about him, that are of the highest importance. These are the dramatic elements of the situation, and for that reason they are sure to attract and hold the attention. It would have been better if this violent and insolent attack had been allowed to pass in utter silence. But the undoubted learning and the high official position of the writer seemed a challenge which the Protestant scholars of Germany could not afford to neglect. With one accord they again rushed to the defence of their national and religious hero. A new deluge of pamphlets, each

aiming to place in its proper light some aspect of Luther's personality or some incident in his career, was poured out upon the world of readers. Especially, of course, the teachers of Church History in important universities, men like Harnack, Kawerau, Kolde, Walther, put themselves immediately on record as protesting alike against the spirit and the content of the offending book.

In the interval of barely ten years a whole literature has made its appearance. In general it must be said that the tone of the controversy on the Protestant side has been dignified and worthy of the traditions of the best historical scholarship. It has acknowledged frankly the few contributions which the learned Dominican has made to our actual knowledge. It has repudiated, so far as such repudiation was necessary, the extravagant laudation of the earlier days. But it has left no room for doubt as to its absolute rejection of the point of view and the conclusions of its adversary.

It was natural that Father Denifle, himself a "religious" and a Dominican at that, should have directed his attack with especial venom against Luther's whole relation to the monastic system. It was not merely that Luther had abandoned his monastic profession, broken his vows, and led multitudes of others to do the same. His chief offence was that he had misrepresented the sacred idea of the regular life. Luther's own utterances on the subject would lead us to believe that he had entered the monastery in order that he might secure deliverance from the sense of sin that was oppressing him. He had given it a fair trial. He had not been in the attitude of rebellion against the minuteness of the rule, which had marked the attitude of Erasmus, for example. On the contrary, he had conformed with scrupulous exactness to every requirement, in the vain hope that thus he might acquire the peace of mind he sought. Failing to find this relief, he had passed through a stage bordering on

despair, and out of this stage he had worked himself only through persistent study of the Bible and its interpretation in the light of the theology of Paul and Augustine. In other words, he had found through the process of personal experience his solution of the problem of personal sin and sinfulness. The method of conformity to a system of prescribed practices had failed. He had gone beyond and above all prescriptions to the personal and intimate relation of the sinful soul to the God who made it. Now this is what the dominant Church could not and cannot forgive. If the individual could thus leap over all the bounds of form and ceremony which it had established, then its occupation was gone, and it was quick to perceive this inevitable conclusion. Denifle did not waste his time in dwelling overmuch on the wickedness of breaking vows and seeking the gratification of sensual desire under the excuse of religious scruple. These things he characterizes with vicious side-thrusts which leave no doubt as to his opinion. What he chiefly dwells upon is the false-heartedness of Luther in professing any such idea of the monastic life. Luther ought to have known that the profession of the monk was not primarily a process intended for the deliverance from sin. The whole notion of the monastic vow as a "second baptism," whereby a man was sacramentally renewed in spirit, he declares to be a complete misapprehension. Not as a guarantee of spiritual perfection but only as an aid toward this end, is the regular life truly to be interpreted. All this Luther ought to have known and probably did know; so that he is guilty, not only of an overwrought hysterical motive in entering the monastery, but of deliberate lying about it when it became necessary to defend his apostasy. The answer to this particular charge of Denifle is admirably stated by Karl Benrath in his treatise on *Luther in the Monastery*.[2] It is made clear that this is only

[2] Luther im Kloster (1505–1525), von Karl Benrath. 1905.

one of the countless illustrations of Denifle's controversial method. He begins always with the point he desires to make, then seeks for words of Luther which by some perverse ingenuity can be twisted into a self-condemnation, then draws his foregone conclusion, and proceeds to build upon this the foundation for a new indictment. Benrath shows by a perfectly just historical method that Luther was fully justified in the year 1505 in thinking that the monastery life would be the surest way to secure him the peace which his boy's soul craved. It is not necessary to imagine that he expected any miraculous demonstration of such a deliverance. His surrender to the requirements of the house would indicate the contrary. What he probably did expect was that through this surrender he would find himself growing daily in what he would have called the Christian character. When he did not find this, he began the course of questioning and reaction which finally carried him outside the bounds of the monastic relation.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the foul insinuations with which Denifle pursues his victim during the years of struggle with the monastic limitations. Enough that his only material here consists of a series of scattered utterances of Luther himself, largely in personal letters, never specific in their references, and always leaving large room for interpretation, but used here with true Dominican inquisitorial cleverness in the sense most unfavorable to the defendant. Reduced to their lowest terms, they all fall back to the one simple statement that Luther was made a man and not a monk and believed that he was not singular in this respect. His unpardonable offence was that he believed a man was something better than a monk and did not hesitate to say so.

This note of personal abuse is continued throughout the discussion of Luther's early years, and furnishes the foundation upon which the whole judgment of his later

accomplishment is built. It has been the task of his Protestant defenders to show the falsity of the method and to illustrate this by reference to specific points. Denifle has then replied to his critics with sweeping accusations of a character quite in accordance with his assault upon Luther himself. The chief points in this rejoinder are found in the familiar charges of ignorance and falsehood. If we could accept this criticism, we should have to believe that all the vast output of German scholarship in the past two generations had been thrown away. These scholars, the most eminent in their field, are represented first as utterly incapable of understanding even the first principles of historical inquiry. Evidence means nothing to them, because they are constitutionally, or, if you please, confessionally disqualified to weigh and measure it. They cannot read the documents necessary to establish their opinion. They are ignorant of things that every Catholic child knows in its cradle. And then these ornaments of German scholarship, thus incapable of any worthy achievement, are united in a conspiracy to pervert the truth. They are worthy disciples of their master and involved in the same condemnation.

Denifle's book was received with jubilation by the Vatican wing of the papal party. By the more moderate and more decent element it met with distinct reproof for its vicious method, but was accepted as a final judgment upon the man and the movement it had condemned. Denifle himself had disclaimed the character of a Luther-biographer. His work was, as he himself said, to trace the movement of the Reformation as embodied in the person of its leader back to its origins in a corrupt and decadent clericalism in the century previous. In so doing he set himself, as has been well shown by his critics, in distinct opposition to that other Catholic school of which Janssen and Pastor were the best representatives. They had maintained with a wealth of illustration that the

Church of the fifteenth century was doing very well indeed. Personal corruption and false leadership there were, to be sure, just as there is bound to be in all institutions intrusted to human hands, but the means of reformation were contained in the very constitution of the Church itself, and these agencies would have worked out the redemption of the Church in their own way and time, if only they had been given the chance.

In presenting their view of the case, they were always pointing forward to the time when these forces of regeneration should rally and find expression in the Counter-reformation of the late sixteenth century. Denifle, by throwing his emphasis on the corruptions of the fifteenth century, has only made the more clear to every seeing eye the hopelessness of the notion of a true reform without a shock of revolution. He has demonstrated that the system which had produced the papacy of the Borgias and the Medicis could never have been trusted to cleanse itself of the principle of decay that lay in its very structure.

The last volume of Denifle's book appeared in 1909. Within barely two years the problem of a complete biography of Luther, which he had definitely set aside, was taken up by another Catholic scholar of acknowledged eminence, the Jesuit, Hartmann Grisar, professor at the University of Innsbruck.[3] In this monumental work, in three ponderous volumes, Dr. Grisar has undertaken to present from the Roman point of view the life and work of Luther as a process of development. Like Denifle, he has sought for the moving springs of the reformer's action, but he has found them in a somewhat different source. Without specific reference to his predecessor, he frankly repudiates his whole theory of Luther's personal depravity as the origin of his fall from grace. In a few brief sentences he expresses his

[3] Luther, von Hartmann Grisar, S. J. 3 Bde. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1911.

opinion that the material for a judgment of Luther's early experiences, whether in his own utterances or those of others, is far too meagre to permit of confident conclusions. At the same time Grisar accepts the theory that loss of faith is "not uncommonly" (i, 86) the result of moral corruption; only he is unable to find this connection of fact in Luther's case. So also in his treatment of the charge against Luther that his whole attitude toward the monastic problem was determined by his conviction of the uncontrollable nature of sensual desire, Grisar is honest enough to see that Luther meant this to apply to every kind of temptation of the will toward selfish desire at the cost of others and did not mean to limit it to the single element of physical lust.

Nothing could be fairer than Grisar's statement of the principles he proposes to follow in his work. He declares himself unreservedly to be aiming at historical truth and nothing else. That is of course what all historians have done ever since there was any writing of history, and, as very few of them have been able to live up to their declarations of principle, so we need not charge it as an especial crime against Dr. Grisar that he also has allowed certain modifications to creep into his actual practice. For one thing, he makes it clear that his historical attitude must comprehend also a certain psychological position; and that is always a dangerous venture for the historian. To account for the actions of his subject, he must create for him a psychological condition, and when he has made such a condition satisfactory to himself he must refer everything to that. It is an attractive method. It offers at every turn the clew which the biographer is always seeking; but the honest historian knows that there is nothing more illusive than precisely these alluring clews. They are more than likely to lead him into the very snares which he is trying

to avoid. For, after all, a human genius is too subtle a thing to be formulated under the headings and subheadings of the psychologist's system.

Another of Grisar's declarations deserves our notice. He explicitly declares his independence of the views of Denifle or of any other authority. He rejects with some little warmth the idea that there is or can be a "Catholic" verdict upon Luther's personal character and experiences. Only in the sense that, as a matter of course, every Catholic must approach the subject with "the doctrines and the essential institutions of the Church as his standard for Luther's opinions and reforms." Denifle's personal opinions, he says, were his own, and he claims for himself the same independence. That has a very fair sound; but notice the caution of this reservation. What are the dogmas, and which are the essential institutions of the Church? That is precisely the question at issue; and because this is the question, the party which is bound to assume as its standards the very things that are in dispute can never stand in a truly historical attitude toward the persons or the institutions which have rejected these standards. The protestations of Dr. Grisar therefore do infinite credit to his good-will, but offer little promise that through his activity any noteworthy progress toward a mutual understanding between the two great wings of western Christendom will be made.

If Dr. Grisar rejects Denifle's principle of moral degeneracy as the explanation of Luther and Lutheranism, what does he substitute for it? Mainly two motives, by which he thinks the downward course of the so-called reformer was determined. The first of these motives is an ever-increasing, uncontrollable self-concern, developing as time went on into a fatal self-assertion, a contempt of all authority except such as he could turn to the support of his own individual conclusions. It was

not that Luther based his opinion or his action upon Augustine or upon Scripture, but that, having through his own perverse activity come to certain conclusions, he then found, or wished others to think he had found, support in these undoubted foundations of Christian tradition. The other motive, upon which Dr. Grisar dwells with great emphasis and prolonged argument, is Luther's sensitiveness to mystical influences. To his mind, already started upon its quest for a new source of spiritual satisfaction, came the subtle suggestions of what our author calls a "false mysticism." By that I understand him to mean a mysticism which over-emphasizes the individual process of reaching religious satisfaction through personal, spiritual communion with the source of all spiritual certainty. Such over-emphasis seems to him—and in this he is undoubtedly right—to underestimate the importance of those other methods of approaching the divine bestower of peace to the soul which the Church has systematized and the key to which it claims to hold. That is a distinction which to the Roman Catholic must always seem decisive. The Church could never afford to question or even to minimize the importance of a profound spiritual attitude of the believer toward the highest problems of the Christian experience. What it could, on the other hand, equally not afford to give up was the claim that such a spiritual attitude should express itself in forms recognized and controlled by the organized system of the Church's administration. Whoever allowed himself to come too directly into personal relation with the God who had made him and to whom he was responsible, must inevitably seem to be setting himself in a certain opposition to the existing system of the Church. It is these two elements taken together, an uncontrollable self-assertiveness and a morbid sensitiveness to imagined spiritual suggestion, that constitute Grisar's Luther-psy-

chology. Starting with these, it is easy to refer to them every individual act of the reform programme.

It is a pleasure to turn from the directly controversial pamphlets written in reply to the Roman assault, and to notice the steady progress of busy scholars in presenting continually new evidence of Luther's actual work and thought. Such a bit of carefully studied evidence is Johannes Ficker's edition of Luther's *Lectures on the Epistle to the Romans*.[4] Long known and used by scholars in copy, it was reserved to Professor Ficker to utilize the Berlin manuscript in Luther's own hand. We have here, reproduced in a beautiful edition, the Latin text as Luther copied it out, his brief notes marginal and interlinear, and then his commentary, the main substance of the lectures. One sees here the complete process of Luther's thought in the two years (1515–16) immediately before his first great appeal to the world with the Ninety-five Theses of 1517. We can trace his studies in all authorities, ancient and modern. We can see how at a given point he must have received the new Greek Testament of Erasmus, and how from there on he profited at every step by its use. We learn from this illustration how Luther was feeling his way, deeply impressed with the great leading thought of justification by faith, yet feeling always the apparent contradiction between this and the imperative duty to do right, and so seeking to reconcile these two through a complete understanding of Paul's deepest meaning as interpreted by Augustine.

A very useful little contribution is Professor Scheel's collection of documents[5] selected especially to illustrate Luther's development down to the year 1519. In his preface the author enumerates more than forty books

[4] Luther's Vorlesung über den Römerbrief, 1515–16. Herausgegeben von Johannes Ficker. 2 Bde. Leipzig, 1908.

[5] Dokumente zu Luthers Entwickelung (bis 1519), von D. Otto Scheel. 1911.

and articles which have appeared since 1900 on this subject. The documents here given are arranged by topics, and under these they are grouped as far as possible according to the volumes of Luther's writings. Intended primarily for the use of special students, they form an interesting body of evidence on the much-discussed main question as to Luther's sincere and irresistible progress toward the convictions which from 1519 on were to dominate his action.

One of the most difficult problems of Luther's early career is that of his relation to the established civil powers. The prince under whose immediate authority he lived, the Elector Frederic of Saxony, was well known for his sturdy and orthodox piety and his generally conservative character. How was it possible for Luther to speak and act with such freedom, not to say such reckless boldness, without being checked from the start by this civil control? The answer is at least partially to be found in the personality of Georg Spalatin, the Elector's most trusted counsellor, and at the same time the devoted friend, admirer, and patron of Luther.[6] Between the two there went on for many years a voluminous correspondence, very much of which has been preserved, and on the basis of which this volume of Dr. Berbig has been written. To one who is willing to follow it carefully it demonstrates anew, and from a quite different side, the same fundamental fact: that Luther's intellectual and spiritual progress was a slow but steady development of a central idea working itself out under the influence at once of continuous study and a rich experience of life. It supplies the evidence which proves at the same time Luther's substantial equipment of worldly wisdom. He recognized from the beginning that it would be idle to protest and proclaim unless he were

[6] Georg Spalatin und sein Verhältniss zu Martin Luther bis zum Jahre 1525, von Georg Berbig. 1906.

to find support in the temporal powers, and his relations with Spalatin show the consistent application of this principle. As Melanchthon was Luther's foil on the theological side, so was Spalatin on the political. It is only regrettable that Luther did not have the orderly habit which led Spalatin to preserve his correspondence. We are in consequence obliged for the most part to reconstruct the contents of the chancellor's letters from Luther's replies; but even so we gain from this publication an inspiring picture of Spalatin's wise and cautious, but at the same time liberal and generous support of Luther's early activity.

The same problem, only in much finer detail, is considered in Kalkoff's study of the early treatment of Luther's case by the Roman tribunal.[7] Probably few readers can quite realize how delicate the situation was in the year 1518; how slight a change in the balance of forces would have thrown Luther into the hands of Rome, and how little hope there would then have been that he would escape the final penalty of his rashness. To accomplish this result only one little jog at the right point in the mechanism of the papal-imperial-German-nationalistic machinery was needed. If the Elector Frederic of Saxony had yielded for a moment to the pressure brought to bear on him by the clever diplomacy of the Curia acting through Cardinal Cajetan, and had let Luther slip out from under his protection, the cause of German reform would probably have been indefinitely postponed.

Kalkoff's investigations in Italian archives have made it possible for every student to see for himself all there is to see in the way of original documentary evidence for this complicated bit of diplomacy. The volume is made up partly of narrative and partly of registers of documents arranged in chronological order and accom-

[7] Forschungen zu Luthers Römischem Prozess, von Paul Kalkoff. Rom, 1905.

panied by a running commentary. The documentary chapters are the most instructive and are hardly less readable than the narrative; which is a model of everything that a literary style—even a German literary style—ought not to be. Even so, however, the effort to understand it is well worth making, if only to gain one more convincing proof of the quality, both active and passive, of the steadfast Elector.

American scholars also have been making their worthy contribution to this work of the past decade. *The Political Theories of Martin Luther*, by Dr. L. H. Waring,[8] is a study of the reformer's relation to the many practical questions involving governmental control over the action of the individual which were forced upon him by the immediate demands of the time. In this, as in every other field of his activities, Luther was an opportunist rather than an abstract theorist. He met the several crises of his career with such practical suggestions as each seemed to require, and then defended his advice by reference to general principles. Inevitably he was led into declarations that were more or less self-contradictory. Dr. Waring has collected these various utterances and so put them together as to show the varying attitude of their author at different times, but also to illustrate his well-balanced conception of the nature, the functions, and the rights of civil government in dealing with subjects who themselves had rights equally original and inalienable, or, to use Luther's own phraseology, equally divine. The chapter on the Right of Reform and Revolution is especially instructive in this respect. It shows the reformer in the sternest conflict of principles; on the one hand, his instinctive love of liberty and sympathy with the oppressed; on the other, his profound conviction of the importance of civil order as the indis-

[8] The Political Theories of Martin Luther, by Luther Hess Waring. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910.

pensable foundation of a true liberty and an effective justice.

A monument of industry and patience in the least attractive field of Lutheran studies is *The Confessional History of the Lutheran Church*,[9] by the late Professor Richard of the Gettysburg Theological Seminary. After a brief but comprehensive review of the political, social, and dogmatic conditions of the first twelve years of the Lutheran movement, there follow some two hundred pages, about one-third of the volume, on the inception, the completion, presentation, and confutation of the Augsburg Confession of 1530. Although the author's point of view is, of course, the conservative Lutheran, he presents all the aspects of the amazingly difficult problem with singular fairness. We are made to see and to feel the critical moments when a false step or a timid policy might have endangered the whole cause of religious freedom for Germany and so for the world. The final formula of the Augsburg Confession was a monumental testimony to the spirit of compromise where compromise was possible, and of unshakable firmness when further yielding would have sacrificed fundamental principles and the great practical results already attained. The figure of Luther as the motive force, the beloved and revered teacher, and yet as obviously not the man to be intrusted with so delicate a mission, is brought out into clear relief. Already the current of events was sweeping on more rapidly than he or any other man could have foreseen and was carrying him along with it to results he would certainly not have welcomed.

The remainder of the volume is devoted chiefly to the working out of the several lines of dogmatic speculation started by the Lutheran revolt. On the one hand, we have the principle of liberty, once set in motion never

[9] The Confessional History of the Lutheran Church, by James W. Richard. Published for the author by the Lutheran Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1909.

again to be completely checked. On the other, we see the demand for uniformity, localized in the several principalities, and, happily, having no central organ of expression. The conflict of these two ideas is reflected in the long series of doctrinal formulations which are the subject of the present volume. Dr. Richard was not blind to the outward pettiness and evil temper of these discussions, but he has succeeded in maintaining throughout an objective, judicial attitude which gives to the non-Lutheran reader an almost sympathetic understanding of the real historic value of this apparently hopeless period. It shows itself as a stage of transition from the first generous enthusiasm of Luther's day to the fresh and vigorous impulse of modern German rational thought.

The two biographies of Luther by Professor McGiffert [10] and Dr. Preserved Smith,[11] both published in 1911, were noticed in this *Review* (April, 1912). They are both written for the general reader; the former as the natural overflow of the ripe learning and long experience of the mature scholar and the inspiring teacher, the latter as the first-fruits of a well-trained student showing thorough familiarity with the material and a gift of lucid presentation.

The promise of the latter work has since been well maintained by the first volume of Dr. Smith's translations from Luther's correspondence,[12] which appeared in 1913 and was noticed in this *Review* (October, 1913).

What now is to be our conclusion from this array of testimony on the one side and the other, as to the true Luther? I cannot see that the judgment of sound, reasonable, historically minded Protestant writers, begin-

[10] Martin Luther, the Man and his Work, by A. C. McGiffert. The Century Co., 1911.

[11] The Life and Letters of Martin Luther, by Preserved Smith. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911.

[12] Luther's Correspondence and Other Contemporary Letters, translated and edited by Preserved Smith. Vol. 1 (1507–1521). Philadelphia, The Lutheran Publication Society, 1913.

ning with Julius Köstlin and continuing down to the present day, needs any serious modification. The essential basis for a calm and rational verdict was laid as soon as the extravagant laudation of strict confessional advocacy was abandoned. Luther has shared in the general clearing of the historical vision that has been one of the most marked phenomena of the age of science. To understand him even half thoroughly we must indeed look at him in his historical setting and in the light of his psychological make-up. The charge that he was an individual rather than a type is true. What concerns us today is not whether a man has an aggressive, self-assertive personality, but rather, supposing he has, what use he makes of it. In itself, the demonic obsession with world-moving ideas, such as Luther charges upon himself, is not a ground of suspicion to the modern world. On the contrary, it is precisely to such inspired leaders that we look as the real motive powers in all the great world-movements. When we find such a character, we do not expect to see him moving in the ruts of tradition or employing the gentle methods of the trained diplomatist. Rather we look to see him carried on and sometimes out of himself by the very greatness of his mission.

It is not the impetuous rush of his words in assault or the passionate inconsistencies of detail in his defence that offend us or cause us to lose confidence in his integrity. We are not repelled by seeming contradictions either in his utterance or in his action. What we admire and cling to is the thread of consistent devotion to some one guiding principle, pointing to some far-away hope or some shining ideal of the future. The enthusiasts who cannot claim our sympathy are those whose fire burns out in idle effort, or turns and consumes them because they are not made of the stuff that can bear the fierce heat of the conflict they have aroused. But Luther is not one of these. His was indeed an aggressive personality; but

it was so because of the passionate devotion with which he threw himself into the cause, which he believed to be the cause of God and God's truth. By nature he does not seem to have been of the typical reforming temper. On the contrary, every bit of evidence points to him as being in his youth rather of the shrinking, sensitive quality, that seeks its support in the institutions amid which his lot is cast. He was a good son, a docile and obedient scholar, zealous, probably over-zealous in the punctilious performance of his cloister-routine. He was a trusted official of his order, sent at the age of twenty-seven to Rome as its representative in important affairs, continuing, through the seven years that followed, in all the detail of his several functions as university professor, as parish priest, and as member of his order, without resistance within or criticism from without. He was thirty-four years old before he found himself driven by an irresistible inner impulse to say what had long been shaping itself in his thought about the obvious evils of the Church.

Surely that is not the radical temper. And yet the same steadfastness of purpose which had held him true to his obligations up to the last moment, now worked with equal intensity to hold him faithful to the new obligations into which his new position led him. When on that eve of All Saints he sent out into the world his challenge of the Propositions on Indulgence and Grace, he committed himself to an attitude which admitted of no compromise. Either he must abandon his position or he must go forward. To have gone back would be, as John Huss had said a hundred years before at Constance, to desert all those faithful souls who were now looking to him for leadership. In going on, he was launching out upon an unknown sea. It was impossible to foretell whether the winds that seemed most favorable would not drive him upon the rocks, or fail and leave

him to drift upon the sands. That was to be the most cruel test of his quality, and it is precisely there that hostile criticism finds its welcome opportunity.

It must be admitted that Luther's policy—if indeed we can think of him as having any fixed policy at all—was a policy of opportunism. What the factors were going to be that at any moment would determine his action could not even vaguely be predicted. The opposition of Rome could, of course, be counted upon; but that was the least of his concerns. On that point his mind was made up. What really pressed upon him with at times almost crushing weight was that sense of responsibility to those who now, quite without his previous knowledge and contrary to his expectation, were hailing him as the spokesman of their own deepest convictions and the herald of their most exalted hopes. I do not hesitate to say that now, after criticism has done its worst, the dominant impression of Luther is that of an eminently conservative and constructive genius. His conservative quality was shown as soon as the more radical elements of the revolt against Rome began to make themselves felt and to claim kinship with him. From his Patmos on the Wartburg he watched the gathering of these forces of destruction, then descended upon them and scattered them once for all out of the territory where his own chief constructive work was to be done. In the fury of the peasant outbreak, after a first attempt at reconciliation, he threw himself with all the ardor of his glowing temperament upon the side of social order and reconstruction. No sooner had he in the dramatic scene outside the gate of Wittenberg thrown the ancient law-book of the Church into the flames, than he began to work out with infinite pains and difficulty the plan of a new church-law based upon a harmonious working of the civil powers and the newly organized clergy. On the doctrinal side, recognizing

the spiritual value of the traditional sacramental scheme, he fought to the bitter end the battle of what he considered the crucial element in that scheme—the doctrine of the Real Presence in the Eucharistic ceremony. Finally, in that extraordinary document, the Augsburg Confession of 1530, we see the culmination of this conservative and constructive work. In its dignity, its moderation, and its firmness we read, not indeed the hand, but most truly the heart and soul of Luther.

It is obvious that a character of this type lends itself with peculiar readiness to hostile criticism. The worst as well as the best that has ever been said of him can be supported by reference to his own utterances. His was eminently an expansive nature. What he felt strongly at a given moment he must share with whoever would listen. He was subject to great and violent changes of mood. In his moments of exaltation no words were too strong to express his confidence in the truth of his position. In the depths of his depression he was overwhelmed at times with his own boldness. It was to be expected that under the influence of these changing moods he would say many a thing that seemed absolutely to contradict his former declarations. It is the easiest possible kind of criticism to pick out these separate utterances and weave them into an apparently unanswerable charge of mere opportunist policy leading to the more serious one of deliberate falsehood. Such a method, however, is as false as it is cruel. It is a violation of the first principle of historical judgment—that a man must be measured, not by individual words or deeds, but by the whole completed record of his accomplishment, and by the dominant motive of his life.

Criticism of Luther merges naturally into a criticism of Lutheranism and thus of Protestantism in general. We are told that the work of Luther set back the wheels of progress for at least a century. We are pointed to the

pitiful divisions among Christians, due to the emphasizing of petty points of difference, to sectarian intolerance, to the fanaticisms that from time to time have disgraced and endangered the name of Christianity itself. We are asked to contrast the splendors of art and the glories of literature which belong to the noble record of triumphant Catholicism, with the poverty of the worship and the sordidness of discipline that have often marked the Protestant communities; and then we are expected to imagine that if it had not been for Luther and his work, the world would have gone right on under the mild sway of Leo the Medicean and his successors, developing all that seems to us now attractive and correcting or suppressing all that was repellent. Is there anything in the situation of European affairs in the year 1517, or in the story of Roman Catholicism through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which can make us strike the balance so as to appear more favorable to that side of the account?

Certainly, to the open-minded student the answer cannot be doubtful. We can ask nothing better for this great spiritual leader than to have all the light possible thrown upon him from every source. And if in the fierce illumination of hostile controversy some dark spots seem to grow even darker than before, there will be ample compensation in the clearer judgment of the man as a whole. Let us be grateful for every contribution to this judgment, no matter from what source it may come; but let us not for a moment lose out of sight that one foundation-principle of Protestantism—that no earthly power shall stand between a man and his God, and that there are many roads leading to the Kingdom of Heaven.

A CRISIS IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

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The construction and working of ecclesiastical machinery has always been allowed to be the special function of High Churchmen of every description. For there are High Churchmen not only in the Church of England and the Episcopal Church in America, but in every church. The division of churchmen into High, Low, and Broad is founded on the different attitudes of the human mind—legal, emotional, intellectual. All Christians reverence the Church, the Bible, and the conscience. But in presence of a problem one man will ask what is the teaching of the Church? Another will turn to consider what the Bible has to say about it. A third will endeavor to trace it to its basis in the necessities of thought and life. Religion is, for the High Churchman, devotion to an institution; for the Low Churchman, to a person; for the Broad Churchman, to abstract truth. Such sturdy guardians of the different important ways by which the soul approaches God are fortunately found in every church. And so the man who stands pre-eminently for the special tenets of the fathers, whether Calvin, Wesley, Swedenborg, or Channing, is as truly a High Churchman as he whose fathers are Ante- or Post-Nicene. And if the faith is regarded as having been delivered to the saints once and for all, the construction of machinery for its preservation will be not only the duty but the delight of the loyal ecclesiast. The High Churchman therefore has ever been strong in organization, while his Low or Broad Church brother has been intent on other things, and then has been sur-

prised to find that church conventions and ecclesiastical offices have not gone his way.

But movements in the Church of England in the last year or two have indicated that other parties in her are awaking to the importance of organized action. Two books have just appeared which show that the Broad Churchmen and the Evangelicals are each endeavoring to define their position, with a view of attracting adherents and arranging an order of battle.[1] It has been sometimes said that Evangelicalism is dead. According to Rev. Mr. Herklots, it is not only not dead but very much alive, and holding the key to the reconciliation in the future of all sides of the Church of England and of all Christendom. He points to its origin as a child of the Wesleyan Awakening, and to the beneficent results it accomplished—the popularization of hymns and of singing, of Bible-reading, social reforms and the abolition of the slave trade, the utilization of women in the work of the church, home and foreign missions; above all, its interest in spiritual rather than ecclesiastical problems, and its insistence on bringing each individual soul face to face with God. His theological platform he states as follows: "The Holy Scriptures are to us the inspired and authoritative record of Divine revelation. The deity of the Son of God, His miraculous birth, His authoritative teaching, His atoning death, His glorious resurrection and ascension, His second advent in person, and meanwhile His presence with and in His Church universal—these truths are as dear to us as to them [our predecessors]. Like them, we make bold to 'enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus.' Like them, we teach and preach a living Saviour, a full salvation from sin's penalty and power, and the need for personal contact with Christ the Lord through simple faith, and that grace

[1] The Future of the Evangelical Party in the Church of England. B. Herklots. Elliot Stock. 1913. Pp. viii, 198. 3*s*. 6*d*.

Broad Church. J. E. Symes. Methuen & Co. 1913. Pp. xii, 116.

and faith are alike the gift of God. Like them, we do not for one moment underestimate and undervalue the two great Sacraments of the Gospel."[2] This we may take as a statement of the Evangelical platform.

These principles have, in the opinion of the author, been so successful that by the end of the nineteenth century a quarter of the clergy of the Church of England, so he maintains, were of this party. He criticises his party. "Parties, like houses, need spring-cleaning. In process of time all sorts of worn-out, superfluous, antiquated, and undesirable things accumulate within the party walls. An ecclesiastical rummage-sale might be beneficial."[3] He criticises the intellectual poverty of the Evangelical movement, its narrowness not only of outlook but of spirit, its neglect of art and culture and of services enriched by them; especially—its worst feature—"its spirit of suspicion and disunion, the occupation of heresy-hunting."[4] To distinguish the kind of ritual which is desirable from that which is undesirable, he gives the following test: "Is it an exhibition to man, or is it an offering to God? Does the nature and amount of the ritual observed obsess the mind, excite the senses, and preoccupy the spirit, so as to positively hinder and obstruct the undistracted worship of the Deity; or does it so act upon the tripartite personality of man as to conduce to deep and heartfelt confession, prayer, and praise? In short, does the ritual dominate the worship, or does the worship dominate the ritual? Is the worship the mere vehicle and occasion for the display of the ritual, or is the ritual the mere handmaid and assistant of the worship? If the former, it is ritualism. If the latter, it is its rival and antithesis."[5] This is not a satisfactory test; for no Ritualist would allow that his ritual was a mere exhibition to man, and the worship only its vehicle and occasion. A more logical and satisfactory test

[2] Page 31. [3] Page 38. [4] Page 43. [5] Page 94.

would ask whether the ritual was the necessary and readily apprehended expression of doctrines held. Thus there is a clear line between ritual which is expressive of sacramentarian doctrine—a belief in the corporeal presence of deity on the altar or at the font—and that which is aesthetic only. One may like or dislike a vested choir, but there is no sacramentarianism in it. It is almost wholly a matter of taste; or—since all taste has the shadow of a principle behind it—a question of expressing function by dress. On the other hand, one will not be likely to bow before the altar unless he feels a localization of deity there. Mr. Herklots' principle of discrimination does not discriminate. Moreover, one may doubt whether the Evangelical party will accomplish the victory the author glowingly sees before it until, in addition to that enrichment of its services for which he so justly pleads, it modifies its reliance on the letter of Scripture, arising from its limited view of inspiration, and modifies also its legal and substitutional view of the Atonement, and its insistence on conversion as the sole entrance into the kingdom of God.

Mr. Symes' statement of Broad Church doctrine may make some of his friends hesitant about appearing in his company. For attempts to formulate Broad Churchism have too often been in a minimizing direction, endeavoring to allure inquirers by assuring them that there is nothing so very much after all in these dogma-things which theologians have insisted on. To those who find in Broad Churchism a more profound answer to the problems of life than is found elsewhere and a deeper source of comfort, this is not an attraction, and therefore not an advertisement of their benefactor which they are glad to see set forth. Any treatment of the creeds of the ages which does not regard them as precious algebraic formulae of truths which are eternal, they must deprecate. Any intelligent exposition of these formulae, any attempt

to translate them afresh into living terms of the day, they welcome.

Mr. Symes, it is fair to say, is not directly one of these minimizers; yet his book has an apologetic appearance. His dedication has a noble endeavor: "Dedicated to Unbelievers who have the will to believe." But the impression of the succeeding pages is of an attempt to make the Broad Church pill easier to swallow by diminishing its size. There is not the unfolding of the exultant faith of one who has a grasp on profound and wealthy truth. His judicial aim perhaps deliberately confines him to brief and therefore often apparently superficial statement. In regard to relations between members of the Church of England and Nonconformists, for example, he advocates no course, but says: "It is against the purpose of this book, which aims simply at expounding Broad Church views, to take a side when Broad Churchmen differ from one another." [6] The book gives a brief chapter to each of the main doctrines of the Christian faith and to significant points of religious thought, such as miracles, heathendom, religious education, socialism, as Mr. Symes considers these are held by Broad Churchmen. It is more than a catechism and less than a treatise.

The indignation among Broad Churchmen at the reception given some two years ago by the High Church authorities to Dr. J. M. Thompson's book, *Miracles in the New Testament*, has led to a movement for the abandonment of inactivity and the distinct organization of a Broad Church party. This has given rise to "The Churchmen's Union," which has its members all over England, and has established a monthly magazine—*The Modern Churchman*. Its President is Sir C. Thomas Dyke-Acland; among its Vice-Presidents are Dean Henson of Durham, Canon Rashdall of Hereford, Pro-

[6] Page 102.

fessor Gardner of Oxford, and Professor Henslow; and on its Executive Board are Archdeacon Lilley of Ludlow and Professor Lake of Leyden. Broad Churchmen have hitherto been content with diffusing an atmosphere throughout the community; they are now discovering that they must fight for their lives, and therefore organize.

The fight has been precipitated by an event in Africa. Last June a conference was held at Kikuyu, East Africa, of all the Protestant missionary bodies in the region, for the purpose of establishing among them a working union. The opening service was held in the place of worship of the Kirk of Scotland, and the bishops of Mombasa and Uganda administered the communion to Presbyterians, Baptists, Congregationalists, Methodists, as well as to members of their own church. At once the bishop of Zanzibar petitioned for the impeachment of his brother bishops who had arranged the meeting and admitted to the communion those who were not members of the Church of England. As a consequence, a controversy has been roused which is now going on throughout the entire English Church. Lord Halifax, president of the Church Union, speaks for the High Churchmen in declaring that the event "threatens a schism which will rend the Church of England in two." The bishop of Oxford, Dr. Gore, says it is impossible to continue in a fellowship which threatens anything so totally subversive of catholic order and doctrine. He doubts if the cohesion of the Church of England were ever more seriously threatened. Another High Churchman asserts that any attempt to establish open communion must result "in far worse than secession. The Church of England and the churches in communion would first be thrown into two violently opposing camps, and then be split from top to bottom and broken into pieces." On the other hand, the bishop of Durham, Dr. Moule,

says that if the bishops of Uganda and Mombasa are arraigned for heresy, he stands beside them; and Dr. Sanday, Professor of Divinity at Oxford, declares, "The Church of England, nay, of Christendom, needs us all. We cannot afford to spend our time in squabbling." The London *Times*, conservative as it is, insists that something must soon be done to "gather up the scattered forces of the Christian cause against a degraded and disintegrated heathenism, and against the resolute and united army of Islam, which will otherwise enter in and possess while we are composing our petty differences of administration. The natural means by which to prevent this is to work for, to lay far-seeing plans for, the ultimate creation of one united native Christian Church in the British East Africa Protectorate. It is the head and front of the two offending bishops that they have realized this."

To us at this distance the turmoil may seem strange, almost incomprehensible. Yet we may remember a similar disturbance, though but a murmur in comparison with this uproar, when, at a service in Trinity Church, Boston, on the tenth anniversary of the death of Phillips Brooks, Dr. Edward Everett Hale received the communion at the hands of Bishop Codman of Maine. With all its comprehensiveness, the Episcopal Church has at times been as narrow as the most rigid close-communion Baptist in insisting on admitting to its communion none but its own members. Yet this unfraternal custom is now held by most liturgical scholars to be owing to a historical blunder. It is based on the rubric at the end of the Confirmation Office in the English and American Prayer Books, which is as follows: "And there shall none be admitted to the Holy Communion, until such time as he be confirmed, or be ready and desirous to be confirmed." This at first seems plain; yet this is not a canon, and there is a distinction between rubrics and canons.

The latter are laws passed by the governing body of the church, and are binding upon all its members. But the former are directions for the orderly conduct of the services, and are therefore counsels rather than ordinances. They may be compared to stage-directions, generally to be followed, but by no means prohibitive. This is shown by the recognition in the rubrics themselves of the needs of the occasion. Thus in the second rubric in the Office of Baptism it is provided that for every male child there shall be two god-fathers and one god-mother, "when they can be had." And in the fourth rubric in the Office for the Communion of the Sick it is said, "If a man, either by reason of extremity of sickness, or for want of warning in due time to the Minister, or for lack of company to receive with him, or by any other just impediment, do not receive the Sacrament of Christ's Body and Blood, the Minister shall instruct him, that if he do truly repent him of his sins . . . he doth eat and drink the Body and Blood of our Saviour Christ profitably to his soul's health, although he do not receive the Sacrament with his mouth." To the rubrics in the Prayer Book there is therefore to be added what has been called the rubric of common sense.

But even supposing the rubric of common sense is not called upon in interpreting the rubric of the confirmation service; the historical sense of the latter is violated when it is made to refer to those who are not members of the Episcopal Church. For this is a pre-Reformation rubric, which first appears in the Constitutions of Archbishop Peckham in 1281. There were then no other religious bodies in view than the one Catholic Church; Nonconformists had not come into existence. And that the rubric was not intended to exclude from communion all but Christians of one kind is evident from its practical aim, which is stated in the context. "Many neglect the sacrament of confirmation for want of watchful

advisers; so that there are many, innumerable many, who want the grace of confirmation, though grown old in evil days. To cure this damnable neglect, we ordain that none be admitted to the Sacrament of the Lord's Body and Blood that is not confirmed, except at the point of death, unless he have a reasonable impediment."[7] The confirmation rubric consequently—so most scholars are now agreed—is designed for members of the Episcopal Church, and has nothing to say in regard to members of other churches. It was intended, on the one hand, to prevent the Roman practice of admitting children to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper; and, on the other, to insure that participation in this sacrament, which was regarded not only as essential to Christianity but also to citizenship and qualification for office, should be preceded by due instruction and preparation. It aimed primarily therefore to secure not exclusion but fitness. But a rigid ecclesiasticism has joined this rubric with a narrow view of the historic episcopate, and brandished them before all comers. Here again the London *Times* gives to the authorities of the English Church a needed warning: "They will look, we venture to trust, even at the historic episcopate itself, and ask whether, not the institution but our conception of it, may not be capable of reconsideration. Amid the fitful glimpses that we have had of its origin it is possible to discern that the episcopate arose as a means towards unity. Ought it ever to have developed into a pretext for perpetual dissidence abroad and at home?"

Even the conservative *Spectator*, the organ of English respectability, utters a similar warning (Jan. 3, 1914):

"Let us however face the worst. Let us suppose that we are wrong, and that Bishop Gore and his followers

[7] "Statuimus quod nullus ad sacramentum corporis et sanguinis Domini admittatur extra articulum mortis, nisi fuerit confirmatus, vel nisi receptione confirmationis rationabiliter fuerit impeditus." A Collection of the Laws and Canons of the Church of England, by John Johnson, vol. ii, p. 277. (Lib. of Anglo-Cath. Theology.)

will leave the Church, not because they are themselves asked to give Communion to Nonconformists, but because other bishops and clergy who believed it was their right—nay, their duty—to do so, practised such open Communion and mean to continue such acts of religious loving-kindness. We say that even if this deplorable mistake were to occur, no disruption in the true sense would take place. . . . Secession on the grounds foreshadowed by the bishop of Oxford would secure, we will not say no followers, but followers so few in proportion to the total strength of the members of the Establishment as to be unimportant. . . . The vast majority of the English laity, and even of the English laity who hold High Church doctrines and are in strong sympathy with ritualistic practice, are at heart inspired with the true spirit of the Church of England—the spirit of comprehension. . . . They know that if the Church were to be narrowed to an episcopal sect, and were to become a body inspired by Roman exclusiveness and by the doctrine of *nulla salus*, even though it were not in communion with the Roman Church, it could not last a day."

The Modern Churchman, the Broad Church review (Jan., 1914, p. 517), considers that the almost national discussion of the subject will be of great benefit, and that the existence of it is already a valuable revelation to many who have regarded the Church of England as dominated by the extreme Anglo-Catholics.

It is interesting to note that the leading paper of the Episcopal Church in the United States takes a similar view (*The Churchman*, Jan. 31, 1914):

"In England and in this country there is an important and influential school of earnest and devout Churchmen who think the bishop of Mombasa did wrong. . . . Their objection is based in part upon the familiar rubric at the end of the Order of Confirmation. . . . Does this apply to those who do not conform to the discipline of the

Anglican Churches? There has been in the Church of England and in this country a persistent opinion that this rubric was intended as a disciplinary measure for the children of the Church, to guard them, on the one hand, against premature admission to the Holy Communion, and, on the other hand, to guard the Sacrament against disparagement through the levity of communicants unprepared to receive it. . . . The arguments that support this view of the confirmation rubric are beyond the limits of the present article. They appear to us to be valid. They are corroborated by a traditional practice in all parts of the Anglican Communion. The rubric bears upon children of the Church, for whom alone the Church undertakes to legislate, and not upon those who do not habitually conform to her authority. . . . The Communion at Kikuyu is an impressive spectacle. Men of various denominational connections, all bent on one task—the salvation of the native races through the name of Jesus; all engaged in preaching His gospel; all ready to give their lives in testimony of their faith—some, no doubt, bound to die in the service; all assembled to discuss matters of common concern in the cause of Christ; filled with a holy love for Him and for their fellow-servants; thus they resort to the bishop's altar to receive from him the Sacrament of our Lord's appointment. To us, such an incident indicates that the Holy Spirit is moving His people to compose their divisions and to return to the unity of One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church."

It may be doubted whether this African incident will result, as the High Church prophets gloomily foretell, in the disruption of the Church of England. There are intelligent critics of ecclesiastical affairs who maintain that it would be vastly better if the different parties in the Episcopal Church, and in other churches as well, should frankly recognize their wide differences and

separate. If differences are fundamental, doubtless this is not only necessary but wise. Yet this precludes the beneficial influence of one party upon another, and condemns them to undisturbed isolation and self-content. As long as there is even a nominal bond binding them together, the friction is likely to prove remedial of idiosyncrasies and wholesome; while if the High Churchmen constituted a separate body from the Low Churchmen, neither would affect the other, more than the Methodist now affects the Unitarian. The warring between different divisions in the Roman Catholic Church is quite as great as in Protestantism, though the Roman authorities endeavor to conceal it; but because each is compelled to recognize the others as belonging to its own body, the result has been less divisive than in Protestantism.

Yet even if disruption should not result in England, this incident may bring disestablishment nearer; in which case—so it would seem from a transatlantic point of view—it would prove a great blessing. For the Church of England is so entangled with a special class in society that it has not the chance to have its excellences known to others nor its faults to itself. In order to come to its true self it needs to stand on its own feet. We in America are so accustomed to the separation of Church and State that we can hardly comprehend the gloomy forebodings of English Churchmen at the prospect of disestablishment. We cannot but think that, after the Church's recovery from the shock of that operation, she would experience a new vitality. However that may be, the probability is that this incident will increase for a time the animosities of the different parties, and that the Broad Churchmen and Evangelicals (who object to being called Low Churchmen) will unite against the High Churchmen. As these two African dioceses are independent, it is not probable that any attempt will be made to coerce them

by an official judgment. The custom which the bishops of Mombasa and Uganda have inaugurated will probably be continued in these dioceses and will spread here and there in other missionary jurisdictions. Gradually it may affect the more conservative Church at home, as missionary children have so often done. And then it is possible that the English Church may take a leaf from the practice of the Church of Rome; which has always at first opposed innovations but when she has found she could not fight them, has adopted them, moulded them, and then professed that she had included them all along.

There is rising throughout the world among all Christian bodies a wave of demand for union. By this the High Churchmen of every church understand uniformity. Taking Jerome's mistranslation, which Rome enforced, they insist that there must be one fold as well as one shepherd. Union to them therefore means, "Forsake your ways, all you others, and come and join us." Rome has extended this invitation for several centuries, and it has had little success except when supplemented by a conviction of the intrinsic worth of her position. But there are many who reject uniformity who are working for what is called organic unity: by which is meant some institutional connection, more or less close, among the different Christian bodies, in government, creed, or worship. The nature of this connection is not yet clearly seen by those who are reaching towards it. Whether it is feasible, and if so, under what conditions, is still a problem. But it is becoming every day plainer that, whatever may be the case with uniformity and unity, we have already more union on hand than we have ecclesiastical room for. Young Men's Christian Associations and Students' Volunteer Movements, summer Union churches, undenominational Divinity Schools, and Organized Charities have brought together Christians of all names, not only in common work but in common wor-

ship, and made it difficult for them to shore up their denominational walls. This drawing together means that all are feeling the presence of one and the same spirit. Since spirit shapes body to its own ends, we may perhaps look to the establishment ultimately of some form of organic unity. But it will come not by ecclesiastical conventions imposing ways upon the indwelling spirit, but by the spirit dictating ways to the conventions. It will be with the various ecclesiastical machineries as it was in Ezekiel's vision. "Whithersoever the spirit was to go, they went. When those went, these went; and when those stood, these stood; and when those were lifted up from the earth, the wheels were lifted up over against them; for the spirit of the living creature was in the wheels." The incident in Africa was a result of the greater apprehension of the spirit of Christ, and it will do much to extend the understanding and apprehension of that spirit.[8]

[8] Since this article was written the archbishop of Canterbury has called a Council to meet in July to give advice in the Kikuyu case.

RECENT TRANSLATIONS OF BUDDHIST WRITINGS[1]

ALBERT J. EDMUNDS

PHILADELPHIA

In these volumes, Mrs. Rhys Davids has added to the debt which all students of Buddhist literature are under to herself and her husband. The two volumes of Psalms are canonical, while the *Compendium of Philosophy* is an interesting and esteemed epitome of that third section of the Buddhist canon, the Abhidharma, about which the sects differed so much.

As the present reviewer is not qualified to deal with a metaphysical work, especially one that is edited by a professional philosopher, he will dispose of this first. In her preface the editor says: "It is my conviction that if the way in which the tradition of the Theravādins—it is often called Southern Buddhism—has philosophized, and still philosophizes, on these fundamental questions, could be adequately expounded so as to be intelligible to Western philosophy, tendencies in the former might become apparent which were not a little sympathetic with much in certain notable departures now showing themselves in France, America, and England."

As metaphysicians, both the Burmese translator and his English editor spare no pains in discussing the best equivalent in our tongue for Pali technical terms. Thus,

[1]Psalms of the Brethren (Thera-Gāthā). Translated from the Pali by Mrs. Rhys Davids. London, 1913.

Psalms of the Sisters (Therī-Gāthā). Translated from the Pali by Mrs. Rhys Davids. London, 1909.

Compendium of Philosophy. Translated from the Pali of the Abhidhammattha-Sangaha, by Shwe Zan Aung, B.A. Edited by Mrs. Rhys Davids. London, 1910.

(All three published by the Pali Text Society.)

an editorial note informs us: "*Itthattam* is exactly the 'this thusness' of Artemus Ward, and it is regrettable that so good a word should as yet be outside the pale of serious English." But it is just such scholars as Mrs. Rhys Davids who finally succeed in re-establishing such words. A Japanese scholar, in 1900, already set the example with "suchness," and there is no reason why "thusness" also should not become a respectable philosophical term.

Both translator and editor freely discuss the terms used by Kant and other Europeans, and the fitness or unfitness of such words to represent similar terms in Pali. Thus the editor observes: "I have spent many hours over *javana*, and am content to throw 'apperception' overboard for a better term, or for *javana*, untranslated and as easy to pronounce as our own 'javelin.' It suffices to remember that it is the mental aspect or parallel of that moment in nerve-process, when central function is about to become efferent activity or 'innervation.' Teachers in Ceylon associate it with the word 'dynamic.' And its dominant interest for European psychologists is *the fusion of intellect and will in Buddhist psychology*, to which I adverted under *cetanā*."

Italics ours, with the hope that such a sentence will whet the appetite of the psychologist for more.

Now for the *Psalms*. These books are most important, for they contain not only ancient poetry but stories. In the Pali canon they are placed in the Fifth, or Short, Collection of Sūtras, originally an appendix of utterances by disciples, but in its present form containing very ancient utterances ascribed to Buddha. This Collection, like the Abhidharma, was another section of the canon, about which the sects differed. Thus the prechristian sect of the Dharmaguptas, whose recension of the canon has been lost in the Hindu, but partially preserved in Chinese translations of fifteen hundred years

ago, had a book in this Fifth Collection called *Verses of the Elect* (*Ārya-Gāthā*). As the sect also mentions other poetical books agreeing in titles with those of the Pali recension of the canon (which belongs to the sect of the Elders), it is reasonable to suppose that these Elect Ones' verses were our present *Psalms of the Brethren* and probably also those of the *Sisters*. And in Catholic Buddhism we cannot consider a book fully canonical unless it have been transmitted by more than one sect. Even those thus transmitted betray unmistakable traces of sectarian manipulation. Thus the great Middling Collection (so named, not from its position in the canon, which varied, but from the medium length of its dialogues) contains in the Pali a hundred and fifty-two discourses, but two hundred and twenty-two in the Chinese of another sect, whose Hindu original has been lost. We can only be certain of the genuineness of those discourses wherein both recensions agree (including some found in the Numerical Collection, between which and the Middling there was a constant interchange). Until therefore we can be certain that the Elect Stanzas of the Dharmaguptas were our present *Psalms*, or until we find these in another sectarian canon, we must suspend our judgment. Of course we can fall back upon higher criticism, and argue from language, style, ancient quotations, and the like, that the *Psalms* are very early; but they cannot have the same standing as the Sūtras of the Four Collections common to the two sectarian recensions in Pali and Chinese. Higher criticism has already pointed out that the *Psalms* have been added to, and that the Brethren who uttered them lived over a period of two or three centuries at least, from the lifetime of Buddha, 500 B.C., to the age of Asoka, 250 B.C. If we had a Chinese version before us, as we have of a companion book in the Short Collection, the Logia-Book, we could then, as in this case, bring in the lower criticism in con-

firmation. For in the two recensions the Logia-Book differs, as does the Middling Collection.

To the exhaustive study by Professor Anesaki, now at Harvard University, we owe the knowledge of these fundamental facts about Buddhist criticism. Before that we were free to imagine that the canon of the Elders in Pali was the only one that ever was, though the catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka published by Nanjio in 1883 had already shown us a different recension of the Long Collection and even of the Middling.

We know from the Book of Discipline that it was a habit of the early Buddhists, as of other Orientals, to summarize their doctrines in pithy verses. These verses have a concentrated quality and often a superb music, both of which defy translation. Mrs. Rhys Davids has chosen blank verse as her medium, but sometimes employs hexameters. While the present reviewer prefers rhythmical prose, arranged in lines, like the Revised Version of Job and the Psalms, yet he is so thankful to get another solid fraction of the immortal books in English that he will not press so small a point. The difference between the one kind of rendering and the other, as also the difficulty of translating metaphysical terms, may be seen in the following verses which are found also in the *Hymns of the Faith* (*Dhammapada*). The two sets of verses are identical in the Pali:

Psalms of the Brethren.[2]

676. When he by wisdom doth discern and see:
"IMPERMANENT IS EVERYTHING IN LIFE,"
Then he at all this suffering feels disgust.
Lo! herein lies the way to purity.

677. When he by wisdom doth discern and see,
That "EVERYTHING IN LIFE IS BOUND TO ILL,"
Then he at all this suffering feels disgust.
Lo! herein lies the way to purity.

[2] London, 1913.

678. When he by wisdom doth discern and see,
That "EVERYTHING IN LIFE IS VOID OF SOUL,"
Then he at all this suffering feels disgust.
Lo! herein lies the way to purity.

Hymns of the Faith.[3]

277. Impermanent all compounds of existence!
When this one knows and sees,
Then he becomes averse to pain:
This is the way of purity.

278. Painful are all the compounds of existence!
When this one knows and sees,
Then he becomes averse to pain:
This is the way of purity.

279. Impersonal all mental states!
When this one knows and sees,
Then he becomes averse to pain:
This is the way of purity.

The stories that accompany the poems were compiled by a commentator of the fifth century who lived at Conjevaram, in the south of India, a town to be made famous long afterwards by a forgotten battle of the American Revolution. Now, owing to the late date of the commentator, the stories are reckoned uncanonical. But this regards only their present form. The commentator expressly says that he built upon older commentaries now lost, as well as on the Dhammapada commentary, still extant.[4] The practice of writing stories to illustrate the pithy Sūtras and verses of the early Buddhists was itself early. *And when one of these commentaries was made in primitive times, it was canonized.* This was the case with the explanatory stories to the verses of the *Book of Enunciations*, another poetical section of the Fifth Collection. A story, therefore, in that famous book is canonical, whereas a precisely similar story in the com-

[3] Chicago, 1902.
[4] Brethren, pp. 180, 266, and xxiv.

mentary upon our Psalms is uncanonical. This fact seems to have escaped our learned translator.[5] Thus she calls the story of the Twin Miracle "post-canonical." According to this legend, Buddha sent fire and water from his person to confound unbelievers.[6] Now that this Twin Miracle story was once part of the canonical interpretative legends is not only clear from the methods of higher criticism, arguing from Pali works alone, but has lately been demonstrated by the surer facts of lower criticism. For the profound researches of Sylvain Lévi into Catholic Buddhism have proven that the text of the story in the Sanskrit of the *Book of Legends* (*Divyâvadāna*) is the canonical text of the Book of Discipline of the sect of the Realists. The Chinese version of the latter proves it. Mrs. Rhys Davids makes a similar slip (page 415) when she calls the Buddhist analogue to the Wandering Jew a "Chinese Buddhist legend." It is a Hindu Buddhist legend, occurring in the same *Book of Legends*, and reappearing in the canonical Chinese of the Classified Collection, translated from a lost Sanskrit original, fragments of which have been found in Central Asia. As to the Twin Miracle, that story, with others from the Pali Canon, was graven upon the Great Tope in Ceylon in the second century before Christ. We cannot therefore make a clean sweep of everything as uncanonical because it no longer stands in the extant recension of the canon of the Elders transmitted in Pali.

Apart from these fascinating literary questions, the Buddhist *Psalms* have a still more fascinating human interest. One of the things that strikes a Christian is the prevalence of sudden conversion. Mrs. Rhys Davids leaves the word *aññā* untranslated, though she calls it "gnosis, or intuitive enlightenment, constituting the

[5] Psalms of the Brethren, p. 36, note.
[6] See Buddhist Texts in John, John 7 38; 12 34.

guarantee of Arahantship."[7] "Sudden conversion" would not be a bad translation. Every student of the Pitakas knows the phenomenon. Thus in our present *Psalms of the Brethren* (page 175), a monk sees a pretty dancing-girl in the main street of his town, and the sight, by reaction, kindles the Buddhist reflection that *all is fleeting*. Instantly he realizes his sudden conversion, and testifies thereto in a psalm.

In her introduction Mrs. Rhys Davids draws a charming picture of child converts. They are all ordained at the age of seven, and their artless verses are sufficiently childish to represent the little fellows, even if these did not compose them themselves. The reviewer, for one, is pious enough to believe that they did.

Very instructive too are the editorial statistics of external and internal experience. Among the *Psalms of the Monks*, 141 out of 264 relate to internal experiences, whereas among those of the *Nuns*, 42 out of 73 relate to external experiences. It is fortunate that a psychologist and a woman was at hand to tell us this. Very external, indeed, were some of the Sisters' experiences, as when a nun was persistently tempted by a libertine and plucked out her eye. "There!" she exclaimed, "take your eye," and gave it to him. One cannot help being haunted by the suspicion that this story became as famous as other Buddhist legends which we now know to have been translated into the vernaculars of the Parthian Empire, the buffer state between Palestine and India. Why should not the story have been familiar to him who said: "If thine eye cause thee to offend, pluck it out!"

In the *Psalms of the Sisters* we meet with converted harlots (pages 52, 121). One is the famous Ambapāli of the Sutras.

The commentary on the Monkish *Hymns* tells us that one brother "dwelt in the infirmary" (page 78). We need

[7] So Mrs. Rhys Davids and her husband now write this word.

not be sceptical about this and cry, "Oh, fifth century!" for Asoka in the third century before Christ established hospitals for men and animals under the immediate inspiration of Buddhism. Anesaki has told us that in Japan a hospital and an asylum were attached to a temple in 593 A.D., soon after the great religion was introduced into that land.

So too in the matter of writing. A monk, says the commentary (page 107), wrote to a distant friend "on the excellence of the Buddha, and sent him a copy of the system." The Ceylon Chronicles relate that the Pali canon was first committed to writing in Ceylon in the first century B.C., but Chinese sources inform us that it was already in writing in continental India.

On page 172 there is some typical eschatology. A monk sums up his past existences: He has been in hell, of course, and often in the Preta-world, where they are all so hungry, with very big bellies and very little mouths; oft has he transmigrated into beasts, mighty glad to be born at last a man! Occasionally he went to heaven. But now the long drear round of births lies before his converted vision, and he sickens of the whole business, heaven and all! It is void of true worth,

"Born of preceding conditions, unstable and constantly drifting."

And so he comes unto the final Peace.

This summary of Buddhist eschatology is echoed in a famous verse of the *Hymns of the Faith:*

> 126. Some to a womb are born again;
> Wrong-doers unto hell;
> To Paradise the pious go;
> The sinless to Nirvana.

The reviewer has pointed out elsewhere that the verb *parinibbāti*, in the last line, can only mean an eschatological Nirvana. True, as Rhys Davids and his wife have often observed, the word also means "to be at

peace, to enter into rest," etc., and is frequently used of Nirvana here and now. But it also means what it does in this authoritative Dhammapada verse. In an apparently exhaustive note on the word, in his *Dialogues of the Buddha*, ii, 132, Rhys Davids quotes another verse from the same Hymns, but unfortunately omits the one here given, which exhibits the eschatological connotation. His wife (page 283) translates the word "wholly pass away," but says in a note (page 417) that it "need not necessarily refer to the *death* of the righteous." She then goes on to quote an explanation from the commentary, but overlooks the fact that the explanation is a pointed quotation of a famous passage in the Logia-Book which declares that there are two kinds of Nirvana: first, wherein one still feels pleasure and pain; second, where one's feelings have become cold.

Now these states are important in this life, but the Nirvana thus attained derives its supreme importance in Hindu eyes from the fact that it is a guarantee against further transmigration. Indeed, on the first page of the Buddhist Logia-Book, the Buddha himself declares, "I am your guarantee that you shall not transmigrate!"

In order to secure both the present and the eschatological connotations of *parinibbāti* therefore, we must neither say "is at peace" nor "passes away," but simply "attains or enters Nirvana." Mrs. Rhys Davids very aptly renders the past participle *nibbuto*, "extinct," by "dwells in Nirvana." [8] The exact words are:

"Cool and serene, I in Nibbana dwell," where the Pali form for Nirvana is used instead of the now naturalized English word. It is therefore appropriate to say "enters Nirvana" in such passages as those which so often recur.

The propriety of this rendering is still further manifest from the fact that there is a little pious snobbery about the word. Like other Orientals, the Hindus are very

[8] Psalms of the Sisters, p. 130.

particular not to use the same verb for the death of a man as for that of a beast, nor the same word for the death of a Buddha as for that of an ordinary man. A beast is "dead," a man has "finished his time," while an Arahat or a Buddha has "entered Nirvana." It is well understood that he can enter it here and now. *Parinibbuto* is also used of a horse in the Middling Collection, in the sense of quieted, pacified by the horse-breaker. But, if that pacified horse had died, no sacred writer would ever use the lofty verb *parinibbāti*. Only those whose germs of renewed existence are extinct can die like this, which is only possible after the human form has been attained. Thus then is *parinibbāti* simply the most aristocratic of all the verbs "to die." The nicety of Hindu usage was recently pointed out by Dr. Eugene Watson Burlingame, in his Pali class at the University of Pennsylvania. "*Viharanto*," said he, "does not mean 'dwelling'; it could never be used of an animal. It means that the monk was *in residence*, as we say of a Christian Canon. Many of these Pali terms are highly technical." As to the verb *parinibbāti*, it is not a subtlety of philology that is at stake, but the treatment by a great religion of the life after death. Why should we allow a nineteenth-century agnosticism to color our translations? Why should we shrink from admitting that the early Buddhists believed in a future life? Their whole thoughts were centred in a future life or lives; their whole religion was a scheme to escape the consequences of such. One hears people say: "Buddhism has no god and no soul!" The statement is very misleading. By turns the Buddha and his Dharma were the gods. True, they had not created crocodiles and sharks and pronounced them very good; that business had been done by sterner forces than the Supreme Ideal, which is God. As to the soul, the Buddhists metaphysically deny it, but practically affirm it. Five hundred

Jātaka stories end: "The hero was I myself." The non-ego doctrine of Buddhism has a Christian counterpart in Swedenborg's statement that the Lord is the only man, that the exterior sight is merely the window for a more interior one, and that in the last analysis, it is the Lord alone who sees. Both Swedenborg and Myers—two names which will go sailing down the centuries when a thousand lesser ones that fill our mouths today are forgotten—both these supreme geniuses agree that as the spirit ascends, the egoism falls off; a whole society appears as a single angel, says Swedenborg. Orthodox Christianity ties us up so terribly in its narrow heaven of Tom Smiths spun out to eternity that we need these daring rebels to unite us with the thoughts of the other side of the planet, where the Buddha declared the bliss of personal life in the highest heaven to become finally tedious; man cannot live forever this separate truncated existence.

Nor is Nirvana nothingness. It is only nothingness for anger, lust, and folly. It is the larger life whereinto we may enter and abide right here. But to enter it here is so rare that the phrase is generally retained for the death of an Arahat. A few generations after Buddha arahatship ceased. (Here we have the Savior idea.) The Beloved Disciple was backward in his development, and was refused admittance to the First Council of the Order after Buddha's Nirvana. But he suddenly attained it and was admitted. This had already been predicted by the Master, who had said, "Even in this present life will Ananda enter Nirvana"—our verb again. To translate "In this present life will Ananda find peace," would miss the point. It is the peace of Nirvana, which for most of us belongs to a far future state, that Ananda was to attain even here.

On page 10 we have an account of Dabbo the Mallian (a race of wrestlers). His psalm (page 11) is a single

stanza, and he too is "perfected" (*parinibbuto*, again). This Dabbo was so spiritual that, according to the canonical commentary on the *Book of Enunciations*, he entered Nirvana by fire. Like Elijah, he ascended into the air, but unlike him he fixed his mind upon the idea of flame, and meditated thereupon so intensely that his body took fire, and he passed away before the astonished monks, so that "neither ashes nor soot remained"! And so did he finally enter Nirvana.

Noteworthy renderings by Mrs. Rhys Davids are "superman" for *Mahāpuriso* (page 311), and "silent Buddha" for *Paccekabuddho* (page 58). This is much better than Warren's "private Buddha," which somehow provokes risibility. "Gospel," for *Saddhammo*,[9] is also very satisfactory. But we cannot congratulate the translator on her rendition of *Dhammo* by "norm." It is doubtless good metaphysics, but rather grates upon one in poetry. To those of us who have been reading her husband's translations since the '70's, "doctrine" is good enough still for this untranslatable word. On page 71 of the *Psalms of the Sisters* there is a rather serious mistranslation where *mā cintayi* is rendered "Think not," instead of "Be not disturbed." Buddha is telling a famous nun that she has come into the presence of the only one who can be her refuge, but the present translation reverses the meaning. Little slips like the following indicate how the forms of the first and second persons of verbs are passing away in English (especially the second person):

> "Sooth am I one who *doth* not seek to be."[10]

So, too:[11]

> "Dhīrā, brave Sister! who *hath* valiantly
> Thy faculties in noblest culture trained."

We must not omit the allusion to baptism (page 197), where a disciple tells how that, before he became a

[9] Psalms of the Sisters, p. 85. [10] P. 110. [11] Sisters, p. 14.

Buddhist, he bathed three times a day to wash away his sins, but now he has found a higher Baptism:

"For I have plunged into the Eightfold Stream."

An oft-repeated formula of conversion is, "Then was my heart set free"; or, to use the exact metre of the Pali: "Straightway my heart her freedom found."

A good example of the conciseness of the Pali compared with the diffuseness of the English is the line,[12]

"Him saw I sitting there, Light of the World."

In the original this line consists of two words, or at the most three, for the second is a compound:

"*Disvāna lokapajjotam*":

"Having-seen world-lamp."

On page 336 is a poetical rendering of a famous prediction of Buddha's about the last times of the church. Indeed, it is one of the scriptural selections fixed upon by imperial authority, 250 B.C., and graven on the rock at Bhābrā. This prophecy was first translated into English in *The Open Court* for 1902, and reprinted in Asia, America, and Europe, in a well-known work.

On page 251 we read, in the Brethren commentary, of a Greek Elder named "Truth-guarded the Great." He lived in the third century B.C., and converted one of the princes. According to the Great Chronicle of Ceylon he also converted the Panjāb, while an Elder with a similar name converted the Bactrian Greeks. Another account adds that he converted them by means of a scripture (still extant) on the Buddha's omniscience. Let us hope that Truth-guarded translated it into Greek, and that Aurel Stein will dig it up in Afghanistan. It would help us to understand so much! Certain it is that so early as B.C. 2 the Buddhist Sūtras were trans-

[12] Sisters, p. 85.

lated into a vernacular.[13] This vernacular was not Chinese, for the Annals declare that the religion, though known in China then, was not believed in. Moreover, the vernacular translation was presented to a Chinese official by an ambassador from the great Yue-chi, that people whose coins have come down to us with Greek on one side and Pali on the other. Was the vernacular Greek itself? Probably not. More likely it was Tokharish or Sogdian, known to have been used by that people. Specimens of Buddhist books in both these tongues have been found in Central Asia. And both were current in portions of the great Parthian empire. Such being the case, we need not be astonished if Luke and John had heard of two towering characters in these *Psalms of the Monks*, viz., the Penitent Thief and the Beloved Disciple. Yes, here they both are, as large as life. Indeed, their absence would raise doubts as to the antiquity and genuineness of the Psalms, so prominent are these characters in the oldest books and sculptures. Quite the reverse would be the case with the Gospels. Were we to find a recension of Luke without the Penitent Thief, we should say at once, "That looks like an earlier edition." And why? Because Luke has to do violence to the text of his master Mark to get the story into the Gospel at all. Compare the synoptic narratives:

Mark	Matthew	Luke
And they that were crucified with him reproached him. (15 32)	And the robbers also that were crucified with him cast upon him the same reproach. (27 44)	And one of the malefactors which were hanged railed on him. . . . But the other answered and rebuking him said. . . . (23 39–40).

[13] The Wei Annals of China, according to Franke, in The Indian Antiquary, 1906.

Why is Luke so anxious to introduce this character at variance with the older tradition? The answer is that the Antiochene physician was a student of religion, and in the Syrian metropolis, which was the terminus of the Chinese silk-trade, he had seen Kanishka's coins, which even now are found from India to Sweden. Upon these coins he had seen the name of Buddha in Greek letters: ΒΟΔΔΟ.

He had inquired who this Buddha was, and had found that he was the founder of a missionary religion of love and forgiveness, whose Scriptures were being translated into Sogdian and Tokharish, two vernaculars of the neighboring Parthian empire. Scenes from these Scriptures were being carved on temple gates in that empire, which ancient geography shows us was studded with a long line of hotels from Luke's own city to the Hindu frontier. He could not escape this knowledge in that great international metropolis. As a poet and an evangelist, he made it his business to adapt the new Christian religion to the Gentile world. The Fathers of the Church are unanimous about this, as we all know. Now among the sculptured figures which he had probably seen himself in his travels as a student of medicine to one of the greatest seats of ancient medical learning, India, were the Beloved Disciple and the Penitent Thief. Even if Luke had not seen them himself, he could easily have heard of them.

That the author of the Fourth Gospel should have introduced, under similar influence, a Beloved Disciple where the Synoptists know of none, I will not assert; he may have been influenced by other motives. Still it is suspicious. But in the case of Luke I feel considerable confidence.

The Buddhist story of the Penitent Thief first appeared in English from the Pali of the Middling Collection in *The Open Court* for October, 1900. Since then it has

been reprinted with Chinese notes by Professor Anesaki, and lately translated into Italian. A better translation than this pioneer one has now been made by Doctor Eugene Watson Burlingame, of the University of Pennsylvania, and will appear in his forthcoming *Dhammapada Commentary*.

It is a Buddhist custom to end an important section of Scripture with a kind of stichometry, giving the names and order of the Sūtras and even the number of the stanzas. This latter item is given in the Brethren's book, though omitted by the translatress. Curiously enough, the Sisters agree with her, and give us no such guarantee of textual integrity:

> "With her two-finger consciousness,
> *That* is no woman competent to gain!" [14]

The commentary explains:

"For women, from the age of seven or eight, boiling rice at all times, know not the moment when the rice is cooked, but must take some grains in a spoon and press it with two fingers; hence the expression 'two-finger sense.'" Mrs. Rhys Davids points out that the Italians have the same phrase to this day.

Well, the old redactor of the *Psalms of the Brethren*, when he comes to the final stichometry, after giving us the dry statistics, turns, in the twinkling of an eye, into a poet, and his stichometry takes fire:

> "Sons of the Buddha, taintless, passionless,
> With lion-voices ye have roared and gone,
> Gone to the goal of calm, gone out, great fires!"

Blank verse is perhaps the best we can do for it, but the music of the Pali (in the words of Ruskin) "smites like the sound of the sea upon men's hearts for ever:"

Agikkhandhā va nibbutā!

Thus endeth the Book of the *Psalms of the Brethren*.

[14] Psalms of the Sisters, p. 45.

BOOK REVIEWS

PÄDAGOGIUM, BAND I: DIE PSYCHOANALYTISCHE METHODE,[1] von Dr. OSCAR PFISTER, Pfarrer und Seminarlehrer in Zürich; mit einem Geleitwort von Prof. Dr. S. FREUD. Verlag von Julius Klinkhardt, Leipzig u. Berlin. Pp. 490.

This book is noteworthy, not alone because of the nature of the subject and the interesting manner in which it is handled, but also because the author is at once a clergyman, an educator, and an expert psychoanalyst, and has found useful, in each of these capacities, the method and the principles which the book describes. The introduction by Professor Freud, the able founder of the psychoanalytic method, calls attention to these facts in suitable terms, and forms a valuable addition to the remaining portion.

It may be known to the readers of this journal that the term psychoanalysis is applied to a method elaborated many years ago by Professor Freud of Vienna [2] for a strictly therapeutic purpose—namely, as a means of relieving a class of patients presenting such symptoms as morbid fears, distressing obsessions, and compulsive acts and thoughts, for which no adequate or systematic mode of treatment had been found available. It soon became clear, however, that the method thus indicated meant a good deal more than a step in therapeutic progress. It meant also an advance along the whole line of studies through which it is sought to gain a more intimate knowledge of human nature and human motives, and has laid the foundations for a very considerable revision of our beliefs respecting psychology and the history of childhood and of folklore, besides proving of great assistance in determining the underlying influences which have prompted men to devote themselves to religion, philosophy, and art. The essence of the matter lay in the demonstration that it is possible, through a sharpening of the memory, through the legitimate use of reasoning by inference, and through the study of one's dreams (which, when properly analyzed,

[1] To appear in English later.

[2] The first impulse in this direction (not to speak of the work of Charcot or the important pioneer work of Janet) was given by Dr. Jos. Breuer of Vienna.

are found to reveal one's deeper motives to a remarkable extent), to gain a kind of first-hand evidence with regard to the history of one's inner, largely unconscious, life, such as had never previously been furnished in a convincing, thorough-going, and scientific form, and cannot be obtained in any other manner.

It is one of the merits of Dr. Pfister's exposition that he emphasizes—what has been overlooked by many of the critics of this movement—that Freud's generalizations were arrived at as a result of the patient accumulation, through many years of painstaking research, of a vast number of important facts. Whatever theorizing he has done has been on the basis of these facts. As new students took up the same task with him and by the same method, these facts were usually verified afresh, one by one, and to the astonishment of each investigator in turn. The mode of interpretation of the observations and the theories of origin of the various disorders above noted have been modified both by Freud himself and by others who have worked in the same field, so much so that of late years considerable divergence of opinion on certain points has become evident; but the accuracy of the large series of observations which formed the basis of the earlier statements has been but rarely called in question, except by outspoken opponents of the whole movement. As time went on, it became evident, on the one hand, that these psychopathic disorders did not stand alone but passed over by insensible degrees into the far more numerous, in general anti-social, peculiarities of persons classified as normal; and, on the other hand, that in making a study of this whole group of peculiarities and symptoms, one necessarily comes up against the exceedingly important and engrossing problem of the psychology of childhood, as representing a period of vast significance, in certain respects, for the establishment of character and temperament.

One should say "in certain respects," because, while it is true that the habits formed in childhood determine those of later life far more than is commonly believed, it is evident also that the ability to work with conscious volition for the best outcome of our evolution does not reach its climax until a later period.

Many thoughtful persons had indeed become aware that the intense and never-ending struggle variously described as the contest of the carnal, or the animal nature against the spiritual nature, of the immature tendencies against the maturer tendencies, of pleasure against duty, of a partial self-expression against a completer self-expression, in fine, of the assertion of one's self as an a-social individual against the assertion of one's self as a "*Glied-*

ganzes," to use Froebel's term, begins during childhood in good earnest. Previous to the investigations of Freud, however, it was impossible that the full significance of this beginning should have been known, because the history of childhood itself (whether of the man or of the race) had been understood only to a very inadequate extent. The writer of this review has recently heard an eminent psychologist declare that in presenting the subject of emotion to his classes, he has learned to distinguish sharply between pre-Freudian and post-Freudian periods of knowledge of what emotion practically means.

Many children, of course, contain in themselves at the outset the "promise and potency" of progress to such a degree that everything which they experience and everything which they do seems to point onward to something better. And this desirable situation is sufficiently well marked with even the great majority of children for their parents and teachers to accept them as conforming to "normal" types, even when an accurate statement would not bear out this estimate. On the other hand, there is now much evidence to show that every child is wooed by temptations to dwell on the sense-elements of his experiences, not as pointing to a future spiritual meaning, but rather in and for themselves alone (that is, as affording materials for self-indulgence), and that many children do this to such a degree that they can never afterwards succeed in shaking themselves free from this tendency. In this fashion specific cravings of one or another sort become established, which may be so strong that their presence, even though unperceived, may check, to a notable degree, the further development of the spiritual life. Sometimes the child seems to protest and to react strongly against these early tendencies, with such vehemence as to form habits of an opposite sort; but in spite of this, his protest may amount only to a yielding to the same temptation in another form. Thus, to offer one illustration out of many that could be given, it becomes clear that such qualities as self-abnegation, self-reproach, over-conscientiousness, and the like, in spite of the fact that they may contain elements of real sublimation and may have owed their existence to a reaction against real faults, often constitute a new means of perpetuating egotistic self-admiration or self-indulgence.

More important still is the discovery—and here again one should distinguish between the sufficiently familiar general principle and that detailed knowledge which alone gives us the information that we need in practice—that the child very quickly learns to crowd out of sight ("repress") great numbers of sensuous or self-seeking

tendencies which his own feeling for better things and the influence of society have taught him to reprobate and avoid, and yet at the same time to retain them as a hidden source of illicit pleasures and undying cravings, without realizing that he is doing this. The reactions just mentioned might be used also in illustration of this point. Then begins that long course of self-deceit by which, in greater or less measure, perhaps every human being finds his value as member and representative of an ideal community more or less impaired. We all lead, in a sense, double lives, and the hidden life of the *alter ego*, to the thorough exploitation of which these researches have been dedicated, makes itself felt by keeping alive a series of hidden impulses and desires—often innocent enough if rightly understood and properly utilized—from which we would fain think ourselves free, and which show themselves externally as fears and doubts. Thus fear is often the disguise under which desire masquerades, and, in analogous fashion, the doubt about some apparently external problem conceals a far more real doubt which has some personal craving as its actual cause and is thus a doubt about one's ability to resist this or that temptation. This instinctive attempt to keep alive in some new form the cravings which it had been sought to get rid of in their original form, often colors and modifies the most serious efforts of adult life.

It has been a notable service on the part of Dr. Pfister that he has studied carefully, from the standpoints here outlined, and others equally important, a number of the religious movements of earlier days and the personal history of their exponents, and has thus supplemented the descriptive histories of religion in significant respects.

In similar manner he and others have sought to make clear the kind of aid which this mode of studying human motives can bring to the cause of moral reform. Many of the bad habits into which children often fall, such as habits of lying and stealing (which may take on a compulsive form), can be shown to be substitutes for passionate cravings of a self-indulgent, usually sexual, nature, or of a craving for some sort of egotistic self-assertion, and the thoroughgoing recognition of this fact, on the part of the child, has often been followed by excellent results. The same statement may be made of the dipsomanias and other compulsive tendencies of the adult.

It must not be thought that these efforts at reform can be undertaken lightly on the part of either patient or educator or physician. To attempt such a task often means an attempt to revise one's character and temperament, a revision to be carried out by means of a sort of living over again of one's past life, and rebuilding it,

as it were, on the basis of a wider knowledge and a broader vision of one's possibilities and purposes.

It is true, of course, that strong influences, whether of a personal nature or as provided by work or by religion or by both, may enable a person not only to repress but effectually to suppress, the unfavorable elements of his past life. But this result cannot be counted on, and even if it could be it would still remain true that if such a person has the opportunity, in addition to this, to revise the misunderstood conflicts with unlucky outcome to which he may have been exposed, he would usually do well to avail himself of this chance. In so doing he would only be assuming a responsibility which is of a wholly natural sort. For the external problems which each individual is called upon to meet are foreshadowed in his internal problems. A man's religion and conduct are likely to be freer from hampering mistakes if he has learned to subject the past decisions which he has made to a critical and scientific scrutiny, carried on with the aid of some one who has studied the psychological questions involved, in the light of the experience, not of one person alone but of many persons. The temptations inherent in his own nature, his own "original sin" (if one wishes to adopt the old term), are the problems which present themselves most naturally and most cogently to every one as problems for his study, in preparation for "taking the cities" against which he must march. It is not morbid introspection but a rational study of one's self (a process which is the very enemy of morbid introspection and its antidote) that is here at stake. Can any one believe that Dante's progress into Paradise would have counted for what it did to him, had it not been preceded by his journey through the Inferno of his own temptations and the Purgatory of his convalescence? It is difficult to fight against an unseen enemy, and the attempt to place one's self wholly before one's self is like the attempt to make visible an unseen foe, and thus to avoid such disasters as befell Braddock's gallant army in its vain battle against the Indians in the wilderness of Pennsylvania.

Dr. Pfister deals with these important questions, and many others not here touched upon, in a thoroughly scientific spirit, and yet from the standpoint of the practical and moral educator and the religious teacher. The book is divided into two parts. The first of these deals at length with the modifications of psychological theory which these new investigations have made necessary, and shows how by the aid of this newer mode of looking at the subject it is possible to explain physical and mental symptoms of the psy-

choneurotic illnesses better than they have ever been explained before.

In this part also a variety of important traits are dealt with such as show themselves among persons not to be classified as patients.

Dr. Pfister's views expressed in this theoretical portion are for the most part in accordance with those of Freud and other prominent psychoanalysts, although important divergences of judgment appear which he does not hesitate to state clearly. He has done some valuable original work bearing on some of the problems here discussed. The researches with regard to kryptographia and kryptolalia deserve especial mention, the more so that these phenomena have figured in religious history. It has long been one of the general theses of the leaders of this school that events do not occur without causes in the sphere of mental manifestations any more than in the sphere of material phenomena, and that when people seem to talk gibberish or nonsense, as under the conditions just referred to, or when their conduct seems irrelevant, emotional causes for these apparently causeless happenings are to be found if any one is willing to make diligent search for them. Dr. Pfister has shown, for example, that one may challenge a person to invent a long gibberish word or sentence, and then may discover, through adequate analysis, that a meaning or a series of meanings, often of an important sort, have underlain it. The criticism has often been made in regard to just such claims as this that psychoanalysts go very often much too far. It is quite possible that from time to time they may have done so, and that in this or that particular instance occult meanings may have been read into what was really nonsense. Nevertheless, the important point is that sense does unquestionably often lie concealed behind apparent nonsense, and that deep emotions of important sorts for the welfare of the person who has to deal with them may lie behind disguises which the physician and the teacher can and should learn to strip off. The motives of most men are mixed and the motives which are the most cogent are of a different sort from those which lie upon the surface. For this reason, to acquire the power of getting at the truth, for better or for worse, beneath its outward cloak, is important enough to justify the risk of sometimes going wrong. Many pieces of rock, of doubtful value, may be gathered in on the chance that they may prove ore-bearing. After all, it is the patient, or the person whoever he may be that desires to learn to know himself at closer range, to whom the final judgment in all cases should be left. This is a cardinal point

in psychoanalytic doctrine. Interpretations should never be forced upon unwilling recipients, hardly even offered to them; but they should be led to recognize, what is obviously true, that in dealing with their own unconscious selves they are dealing with a very subtle quantity—often a subtle adversary, one might say—and yet that within they have their own consciousness as a touchstone which can enable them to judge as to the truth or falsity of the conclusions at which, with the aid of the physician or the teacher, they arrive. Every one knows that the anatomy and physiology of the brain are complex matters. But it is not so often realized that what one might call the anatomy and the physiology of the mind are far more complex still.

The second part of the book is taken up with the details of method and the conditions necessary on the part of the patient and physician before a successful treatment should be attempted.

Then comes a summary of fifty pages, dealing with the practical outcome of this method, whether applied as a means of treatment in illness or as a help to the teacher, and with a number of practical and theoretical questions, such as the relation of the child to its parents, the proper attitude of the teacher, the relative value of authority and freedom, asceticism, confession, punishment, and various problems relating to sexual, moral, and religious instruction.

Whatever criticism this or that person might be inclined to offer, here or there, the final judgment of every reader who is sympathetic with the important movement described and who looks for well-defined, fearless, and honest statements presented in a straightforward and unvarnished manner, will not be disappointed in the perusal of this volume.

In conclusion I would offer a somewhat free translation of a few lines which occur on page 481 of Part II. An apology is perhaps due the author for the liberty taken in inverting two sentences. This seemed desirable on account of the absence of the context with which they occur in the original. The sentiments here expressed have reference to the theory of which much is made in the course of the work, and which has at least considerable value as a working hypothesis. This theory is that we may look upon the formation of the character, temperament, and conduct of every human being as determined in considerable part by the fact that he starts life with what, for convenience' sake, may be called a reservoir, or, potentially, a stream of living energy (*libido*), the function of which is, primarily, to enable him to play his part as

perpetuator of his race, but which may be converted into a means for making him a useful member of society in any sense. It would take us too far afield to discuss the philosophical merits of this theory, which, as the author might agree, could perhaps be rendered more intelligible if made subservient to the general doctrine of "self-activity," which has played so large a part in philosophical thought. However this may be, the important point remains that when the whole matter is looked at in a purely practical way, every individual does find himself possessing or possessed by a great stream of energy which may enable him to expend upon his fellowmen love and devotion, which may be sensual, or may be disinterested, or which, again, may enable him to follow the highest aims of the religious life. If this stream of energy does not find suitable outlets in the direction of disinterested well-doing and of active work, it is likely to lend itself to the cultivation of personal egotism and personal self-indulgence.

The paragraphs referred to run about as follows:

"Evidence has been offered in the foregoing pages to support the view that one of the most important tasks which presents itself to the young child, is that of finding, at an early age, suitable objects on which to expend his interest and love. If he does not find such outlets, his interest and love are likely to turn inward upon himself, and thus to lead to the formation of habits of introspection, debilitating day-dreams, apprehension, a hostile sense of terror, a suicidal weariness of life; or, to serious disorders of the nervous functions. This being so, it may be said that human happiness and human power are largely dependent, first on the relationships which are early formed between the child and those about him, especially the father and mother and such persons as in a psychological sense come to occupy their places; next, upon the capacity which the child may be led to display for turning the energy first exhibited in his earliest instincts upon the higher, and eventually the highest, means of promoting the welfare of the community as a whole."[3]

James J. Putnam.

Boston.

[3] Important as the matter of this book is, it should not be assumed that the reading of it is a light task. The author's style, though precise, is not fluent, and the reader, if unfamiliar with the subject, must be prepared to find much that is strange and even for a time repellent.

MEMORY. Lectures on the Specific Energies of the Nervous System. By Professor EWALD HERING. Fourth Edition, enlarged. The Open Court Publishing Co. 1913. Pp. 70. $1.00.

The first chapter of this book is a lecture on Memory as a general function of organized matter, delivered by Professor Hering at Vienna in 1870. In it the author attempts to correlate physiology and psychology. While the title of the lecture would seem to imply materialistic assumptions, Professor Hering denies such implications. He is quite willing to admit that "the material processes of the cerebral substance also appear to be functions of the phenomena of consciousness."

As a psychologist having strong interest in physiological processes, Professor Hering has undertaken to explore the nebulous realm of relation between the physiological and the psychological. While his conclusion that there are brain changes accompanying the phenomena of memory may be accepted without controversy, there appears to be little profit in speculating about the chemical aspects of the processes involved. Professor Hering in his logical wanderings seems to have left behind the realm of possible verification through experiment. His conjectures have been scientifically unproductive in the forty odd years since the lecture was delivered. Few biologists to-day will give much credence to his deduction that "the substance of a germ is able to reproduce what the parental organism has acquired during its individual life." Since this conjecture was made, we have accumulated too much evidence to the contrary, and have learned that the acquisitions of the parent, beneficial or injurious, are not transmitted to the offspring. At least this form of organic memory, which is so strongly emphasized in Dr. Hering's lecture, seems disproved.

The other essays—upon "The Specific Energies of the Nervous System" and "The Theory of Nerve Activity"—are more specifically discussions in the domain of nerve physiology. Dr. Hering appears to have good grounds for the supposition that the impulses along nerves differ qualitatively, but experimental demonstration of the fact is still wanting. It has only recently (1913) been proven that the transmission of impulses along a nerve involves a chemical change. Dr. Hering thinks that he is able to demonstrate on logical grounds that "the path taken by an excitation is coincidently determined by the quality of that excitation," and is led to infer an unconscious organic memory of past nervous experiences. It would seem that other terms than psychological ones might be used

to express the physiological processes under discussion. Even if the psychologist finds it advantageous to use the question-begging phrase of "unconscious memory," physiological students may properly object to its introduction into a treatise on nerve physiology. Possibly, however, in the case of a theoretical thinker like Professor Hering, who has made important contribution to the theory of color vision and other aspects of physiological-psychology, considerable license may be permitted.

THE MEANING OF EVOLUTION. SAMUEL CHRISTIAN SCHMUCKER, Ph.D. The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. 298. $1.50.

"How beautiful!" exclaimed a college student, as for the first time he saw a living cell under the microscope. "Never mind the beauty," said his instructor, "we are not concerned with beauty in this course." Technically the pedagogue was correct, although the student might have suggested that in a complete interpretation of life beauty may not be disregarded.

It is refreshing to read a book like Professor Schmucker's in which evolution is studied from more than a single aspect and is interpreted in other terms than those of morphology alone. The interests of the writer are broad, and in this book he brings his science into relation with his philosophy and his theology. He seems to have no difficulty in reconciling a mechanistic with a teleological view of the universe. While his interpretation of nature is naturalistic and thoroughly scientific it is also idealistic and reverent. To Professor Schmucker evolution is God's mode of creation. Nature reveals the Infinite Presence. With an increasing number of biologists the writer of this book appreciates the bankruptcy of materialism.

The book is persuasively written, full of interesting observations of which many are original, and is evidently the product of mature thought. The scientific layman will find the terminology comprehensible and the style lucid. The writer has given us a book which is readable as well as scientifically trustworthy. The sentimentality of the foreword is amply atoned for in the subsequent chapters.

For excellent reasons Professor Schmucker emphasizes the distinction between evolution and Darwinism, and shows that the acceptance of evolution as a fact does not depend upon the Darwinian hypothesis. He is tolerant of Lamarckism—as might be expected of a pupil of Cope—and thinks that the inheritance of acquired characteristics may have been a factor in organic evolu-

tion. Yet he does not fail to recognize that Darwinian factors may explain all that the Lamarckian factors will—and more. Very properly—in a book intended for lay readers—he does not enter into a discussion of the controverted points of recent advances in the study of heredity.

The spontaneous generation of living substance inspires in the writer no theological fears nor suggests materialistic assumptions. After speaking of the origin of life he sketches with considerable vividness the ascent of life toward man. Eugenics receives rational treatment. The volume ends with a chapter upon "Science and the Book" which would not disturb progressive churchmen.

The book may be highly recommended to those who still cling to the notion that evolution is subversive of religion—that is to say, of theology.

THE MECHANISTIC PRINCIPLE AND THE NON-MECHANICAL. Dr. PAUL CARUS. The Open Court Publishing Co. 1913. Pp. 135. $1.00.

The title of this most recent book from the prolific pen of Dr. Carus is taken from the opening essay by the author, in which he attempts to reconcile a mechanistic with a teleological view of the universe. The shortcomings of philosophical materialism and the myopia of the thinker who attempts to reduce all phenomena to the laws of motion, seem convincingly demonstrated. In the opinion of Dr. Carus motion cannot be translated into emotion. He takes up the perennial problem of freedom, to which he gives an affirmative answer after an interesting discussion. He also inquires into the nature of the categories of time, space, and causality, and in the end is led to the conviction of the divinity of both mechanical law and man.

The second essay is a summary of Mark Twain's posthumous work, *What is Man?* Dr. Carus finds in Mr. Clemens's grounds for a pessimistic view of man—which he holds to be identical with the reasons for a mechanistic view of the universe—the very best of reasons for optimism.

The essay on La Mettrie's *L'Homme machine* tends to show this much-abused Frenchman to be a pioneer in defence of the mechanistic interpretation of nature and of life.

The extracts from Dr. W. B. Smith's article in the January *Monist*, which form the next chapter in the book, constitute a further defence of the thesis that there is no antagonism between the belief in mechanical causation and purposiveness in nature.

The book closes with a review of Dr. James T. Bixby's book, *The Open Secret*, in which the materialistic conceptions of science are found wanting and a philosophical dualism defended. With the latter view Dr. Carus does not find himself in accord.

An Introduction to the Study of Social Evolution. F. Stuart Chapin, A.M., Ph.D. The Century Co. Pp. xxii, 306.

An introduction to the study of society, readable and popular in style, intended for college classes primarily. The book covers a long tract of time, and many controversial matters, and consequently it is too summary for the advanced student; but it should prove useful in its way.

Religion in Social Action. Graham Taylor. Dodd, Mead, and Co. Pp. xxxviii, 279. $1.25.

This is hardly a serious study of either religion or society. It is, rather, a rhetorical call to action, doubtless effective in the assemblies where the substance was used for addresses, but not satisfying to the serious student, or even to the general reader who likes clear thinking. The work is the outcome of generous emotion and an unselfish life; but it gives the impression of being the labor of one who is too immersed in the local struggle to speak convincingly of its meaning.

George T. Smart.

Newton Highlands.

The Church and Social Reform. Professor James R. Howerton. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1913. Pp. 127. 75 cents.

This book contains three lectures. In the first lecture the author treats of the church and the revolutions of the past, and shows that the church has always played some part in them. In the second lecture he deals with the causes of the present social crisis; which he finds in the increasing solidarity of social life and in a growing moral sensitiveness. In the third lecture he discusses the church and the social reforms of today, and demands social interest on the part of the church in obedience to the ethical principles of the gospel and the needs of the world. There is much outspoken criticism of social conditions and a warning against being silenced by alliance with the money-powers.

Daniel Evans.

Cambridge.

Social Programmes in the West. Professor C. R. Henderson. Chicago University Press. 1913. Pp. xxviii, 184. $1.25.

We have sent missionaries to the Far East to preach the Christian Gospel, to establish hospitals, and to introduce new industrial appliances and scientific methods of agriculture. The Barrows Lectureship has made it possible to send some thinkers to interpret to the learned classes the significance and value of the Christian religion. It was a happy thought to select and send Professor Henderson to make known to the leaders in this same Far East the leading social policies of our Western world. The economic and social problems of the West are making their appearance in the East and are destined shortly to become acute. The experience of the West should be of great value to the leaders of the East; but our mistakes should be avoided and only our successes imitated. To secure these desirable ends by sharing our experience with them, Professor Henderson discusses the social programmes of the West in matters of economics, private and public relief, the warfare against anti-social forces, preventive and constructive policies in public health and education, and the movements which seek to improve the conditions and life of the working people. He then points out the way of social progress. He lays stress on the worth of the common man and justifies unusual efforts on his behalf. In like manner, he places a high estimate on woman, and tests our own and other civilizations by the treatment of women. The book gives full proof of the social results of the Christian religion. It is a social apologetic. It has value for men in the West as well as in the East, and it suggests the thought that the better our social programmes, the more valuable and commendable will our religion be for others and the more conscientiously can we offer it to them.

Daniel Evans.

Cambridge.

The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature. James Y. Simpson, D.Sc., F.R.S.E. Hodder & Stoughton. 1912. Pp. xvi, 383.

A large part of this book is occupied with a task which needs to be performed at frequent intervals, that of presenting a plain summary of the present state of biological knowledge so far as it bears on problems of philosophy and religion. In his chapters on The Principles of Biology, Evolution, Natural Selection, Variation, Heredity, Environment, the author, who is professor of Natural Science in

New College, Edinburgh, is everywhere competent and informing, and nearly everywhere clear. The intention and value of these expository chapters is largely independent of those in which Professor Simpson records and defends his own interpretation of the living world—The Directive Factor in Evolution, Evolution and Creation, Science and Miracle, Evolution and Immortality, and others.

This interpretation is in the first place anti-mechanical. The points in which living things differ, or appear to differ, from machines are described with much skill and with much detail: the organism changes itself, adjusts itself, regenerates itself, repairs itself, reproduces itself, and often emerges complete from one of its fragments, as inorganic arrangements cannot do. Here mechanical explanations fail; but it is especially in the facts of growth and of development from species to species that we are obliged to assume for purposes of explanation not only a free conscious impulse, such as Bergson appeals to, but an intelligent directive purpose as well. The author insists that the appeal to teleology as an explanatory factor is not a resort of ignorance; he regards it rather as a matter of positive evidence (pp. 131, 141). Yet the items of this positive evidence, so far as he offers it, resolve into simple assertions that mechanical theory fails to explain the phenomena. Somewhat uncritically, we feel, he accepts a cumulative account of the difficulties of one type of theory as sufficient evidence for another type. Hence the faith which provides his interpretation of nature, though based on a better perception of the life of things than that of Butler or of Paley, leaves with us the impression of subjectivity. It is analogic rather than metaphysical.

The author takes full advantage of the corollaries of his anti-mechanistic biology. If a purposive direction is the supreme fact in nature, and law a subordinate fact, miracle in a literal sense is possible. Accordingly we find here a plea for openness of mind in regard to miracle, in particular the miracle of the Resurrection, "belief in which must ever be easier than unbelief" (p. 360). The interpretation of nature which results is thus not only a spiritual one; it is a theistic, a Christian, perhaps we should say a Trinitarian interpretation.

William Ernest Hocking.

Yale University.

CONSTRUCTIVE NATURAL THEOLOGY. NEWMAN SMYTH. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. viii, 128. $1.00.

Dr. Smyth is preparing for future publication, as he tells us in the preface, a volume on that ultimate problem toward which the natural sciences and our spiritual faiths alike lead up—the problem of personality as a fact in nature. The chapters which compose this present volume are a by-product of that larger study, and were given as a course of lectures upon the Taylor Foundation of the Yale School of Religion. If the forthcoming and larger volume is as suggestive and stimulating as this smaller one, we may well eagerly await it.

In the first chapter the author shows in several aptly chosen illustrations the vast fields of knowledge that science is opening up as material for interpretation in the construction of a new natural theology. The watchword for that new theology is that it must be constructive. It must grip known facts, see them in their straight lines and right relations, discern their true proportion and perspective, but its final problem is one of values and meaning.

Dr. Smyth next deals with the problems which confront one in this arduous quest and the method to be pursued. Taking his stand on the "electron," that "last jumping-off place of physics into the unknown and inconceivable," he pushes fearlessly on that he may lead us to see the light and "interpret the spiritual expression that is on the very countenance of true science."

It is admitted to be a venturesome attempt to approach the person of Christ from the nature side, and to read the meaning of human life in the personal consciousness of Jesus. Yet "nature itself leads to the consummate Man, and the inner consciousness of the perfect man throws back its light on all that has been before him." Both the man of science and the man of faith have a right to stand on holy ground. When Moses saw the burning bush, he was a natural scientist when he said, "I will turn aside now, and see why the bush is not burnt." Moses was a religious man when from out the midst of the bush he heard God calling him, and he hid his face, for he was afraid to look upon God. In that presence he quickly forgot his question, "Why?" We may the more readily discern the revelation if we recognize how naturally from the midst of the material world the unconsuming flame shines out.

EMERY L. BRADFORD.

BOXFORD, MASS.

What does Christianity mean? W. H. P. Faunce. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1912. Pp. 245. $1.25.

In this volume, containing the Cole Lectures delivered before Vanderbilt University in 1912, President Faunce places himself squarely on the side of Voluntarism, finding in Purpose the essential nature of God, of Christianity, and the righteous life, as well as the basis of Christian fellowship and the goal of education. Christianity is defined as "the revelation through Jesus of Nazareth of the eternal unchanging purpose of God, and the developing of that same purpose in the lives and institutions of men" (p. 40); and in this definition all the issues of the book are implicit. God is regarded as the subject of a progressive experience, in whose becoming the permanence of being consists in abiding purpose. Righteousness is not conformity with a code but loyalty to an ideal purpose, as indeed the New Testament doctrine of justification by faith plainly teaches. The modern representative of the eschatological doctrine of early Christianity is the hope of the fulfilment of this comprehensive purpose in the perfected kingdom of God. Dr. Faunce has made a genuine contribution by this course of lectures; for he has put in popular form, with much richness and pungency of phrase, ideas which are destined to play an important part in theology. The concept of purpose as interpreting the unity, the being, and the righteousness of God will be established only after much more thorough examination and discussion than Dr. Faunce gives it, for there are difficulties and implications in the idea which he does not consider; but it is of extraordinary service to have it put in enlivening rhetoric with the skill and force of a popular preacher of the best and noblest sort.

W. W. Fenn.

Harvard University.

The Assurance of Immortality. H. E. Fosdick. The Macmillan Co. 1913. Pp. 141. $1.00.

Intimations of Immortality in the Sonnets of Shakspere. The Ingersoll Lecture, 1912. George H. Palmer, LL.D. Houghton Mifflin Co. Pp. 57. 85 cents.

Nothing could better illustrate the change which has come over theological thinking than the fact that a Baptist clergyman, in a book dedicated to the congregation which he serves, discusses the idea of immortality absolutely without reference to revelation, the

resurrection of Jesus, or even the authority of Jesus save as he is numbered among the spiritual seers of our race. The principal argument is that personality is so significant both in itself and as fruit of the prolonged evolutionary process that no one who believes in a rationally and morally significant universe can doubt its continuance. As the author acknowledges, the book makes no original contribution to our thought on the subject, but it marshals familiar arguments with unusual effectiveness.

In explaining his reasons for making his Ingersoll Lecture a literary rather than a philosophical study, Professor Palmer refers to *The Christian Hope* by Professor Brown of Union Theological Seminary as "a little masterpiece, making superfluous for the present any other vindication of the claims of immortality." This is high and deserved praise, and we are glad that Professor Palmer felt himself free for the subject which he has treated with characteristic insight and suavity of style. Dividing the Sonnets into three groups, he finds in the successive groups corresponding ideas of immortality—natural, ideal, and spiritual; the last and highest of which was "born out of the experience of monstrous and degrading sin which lies behind the second group of the Sonnets." "Did Shakspere plan anything of the sort? Did he mean to announce a theological doctrine with three stages of successively larger hope? No, he certainly never meant that, but nevertheless it meant him."

W. W. Fenn.

Harvard University.

Protestantism and Progress. A Historical Study of the Relation of Protestantism to the Modern World. Ernst Troeltsch. Translated by W. Montgomery. The Crown Theological Library. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1912. Pp. 210.

Professor Troeltsch, in a preface to this translation, states concisely his aim. He sets himself to inquire what are the elements in modern civilization which have proved their value, in distinction from those which lead nowhere. He holds that these possibilities of progress are to be found in Protestantism, and he examines the modern spirit to determine how much it owes to Protestantism and how much to other sources. The main difference between the religious outlook before the Reformation and since, he finds to be that the former was based on submission to authority as such and the latter on personal conviction. Yet he avoids the mistake which sees in the Lutheran movement a revolt against the principles of

Catholicism. Luther retained unchanged the assumptions of Catholicism, but endeavored to draw from them different conclusions. In regard to ecclesiastical authority, for example, both Lutheranism and Calvinism continued the practice of Catholicism in maintaining orthodox doctrine by compulsion and prosecuting heresy. The freedom of thought and action which now exists comes not directly from these Confessions but from those movements which they opposed—that of the Anabaptists and Mysticism. This parenthood of religious liberty on their part constitutes a belated compensation for the suffering these outcasts had to endure at the hands of all the Confessions of the sixteenth century.

Professor Troeltsch in summing up characterizes the agency which must be relied on to preserve the civilization of the future as "the religious metaphysic of freedom and of a faith based on personal conviction; which has established freedom upon a foundation which an all-too-human humanism cannot destroy, upon faith in God as the power whence freedom and personality come to us—namely, Protestantism."

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

DIE SCHRIFTEN DES NEUEN TESTAMENTS IN IHRER ÄLTESTEN ERREICHBAREN TEXTGESTALT HERGESTELLT AUF GRUND IHRER TEXTGESCHICHTE. HERMANN FREIHERR VON SODEN. I. Teil, Berlin, 1902–1910; II. Teil, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1913. Pp. xvi, 2203; xxviii, 908.

GRIECHISCHES NEUES TESTAMENT; Text mit kurzem Apparat (Handausgabe). HERMANN FREIHERR VON SODEN. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen. 1913. Pp. xxviii, 436.

Professor von Soden's tragic death in January of the present year by a railway accident in Berlin gives a touch of solemnity to the deep respect with which these massive volumes must be viewed—the great monument, as they are, of the life-work of a brilliant and industrious man, distinguished as scholar and university professor, as pastor of a great city parish, and as public-spirited citizen of a great capital, intimately concerned in the varied forms of its higher activities.

A trustworthy text of the New Testament is the foundation of all critical knowledge of the origins of Christianity. Since the critical editions of Tischendorf and Tregelles forty years ago and of Westcott and Hort in 1881, not only has knowledge grown through

discovery and research but it has become increasingly apparent that the solution of the problem required an examination of all the later Greek manuscripts, sometimes called "cursives," more than three thousand in number. The most essential part of this has now been done, thanks to a subvention (which must have amounted to many tens of thousands of dollars) from a generous German lady. Her grant made it possible for Professor von Soden to organize the work of younger scholars (forty-five in all were engaged on the task) in travel and various kinds of research for more than sixteen years. Substantially all Greek manuscripts offering a continuous text were examined, and a large number collated.

The result lies before us, in a huge body of introductory discussions and lists of readings, and a volume of text with apparatus. The successful completion at last was due to the liberality of the ancient firm of theological publishers at Göttingen, Messrs. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, whose service to learning and the church will never be repaid in money and ought to be mentioned in the same connection as that of the patron and the scholars with whom they have collaborated.

Von Soden's textual theory, to which he has come with greater knowledge of facts than any one ever had before, has several new and striking elements. First, he thinks (in opposition to Westcott and Hort) that the earliest period of textual history was one of relatively careful copying, and that the great divergences which admittedly arose before the end of the second century were due not to scribal carelessness and freedom but to certain specific causes of corruption. The chief of these was, for the gospels the Diatessaron of Tatian, for Luke and the epistles of Paul the modified text of Marcion, for Acts and the epistles a corrected edition, perhaps also the work of Tatian, of which the "Western Text" has left clear evidence. In addition, much influence is ascribed to the reaction on the Greek text from Latin, Syriac, and Coptic translations. Against these sources of corruption the text of Origen and of Tertullian bears its mute protest.

Secondly, von Soden classifies the whole body of manuscripts in three great groups,—*I*(erusalem), *H*(esychius), *K*(oine), representing three independent recensions all made about the year 300. *I* was the text of the New Testament sent out in such numbers from Caesarea by Eusebius; *H* became the established text of Alexandria; *K* is Lucian's Antiochian recension. The later history of the text is mainly the process of mutual contamination between *I* and *K*, out of which arose the subordinate later groups.

Thirdly, under this view the procedure of textual criticism is to find the authentic text of each of the three recensions, and then (subject to some qualifications) to adopt those readings in which any two of the three concur. It is gratifying to find that the resulting text corresponds on the whole, though with many differences in detail, to Westcott and Hort's and other modern critical texts. Whether it is better than they, and whether these theories and their application really give new and conclusive grounds for confidence in it, can be told only after the work of many years yet to come. In any case, the actual classification of the minuscule manuscripts (however the relation of the groups may have to be interpreted) may be confidently declared a permanent achievement.

The second Part of the great edition, containing the text, is sold separately, and will be needed by every critical student of the New Testament. The *Handausgabe* will also, it is hoped, be widely used. It gives the same text, with an abridged apparatus, and is sold at a very low price.

James Hardy Ropes.

Harvard University.

The New Testament Period and its Leaders. How Christianity was prepared for, inaugurated, emancipated from Judaism, and became universal. Frank T. Lee. Sherman, French, & Co. 1913. Pp. 358. $1.35.

Dr. Lee has written a skilful popular sketch, with grace and urbanity of style, in which a brief outline of the Gospels is followed by the material of the Book of Acts distributed among studies of the life and character of the several leaders of the apostolic church. The point of view is that of a full acceptance of the New Testament narratives, such that for it the problems of the critical historians do not exist. To this is prefixed an account of Jewish life and religion in the time of Christ. The relative fulness of this section is significant of the importance which such information has gained in the last twenty years. The dark and hard picture, however, which has become conventional and for which Talmudic statements furnish convenient evidence, surely rests in large measure on lack of historical sympathy combined with undue generalization from the frankly polemic attacks found in our Gospels. Polemic and satire have their rightful place and use; but the historian may not treat them as if they preserved due proportion of emphasis. Both later Jewish literature and the documents and history of early Christianity are very

hard to understand if the amount of spiritual religion in Judaism was so small as is often represented even by the most learned and in other respects trustworthy writers.

James Hardy Ropes.

Harvard University.

The Life of Jesus in the Light of the Higher Criticism. Alfred W. Martin. D. Appleton & Co. 1913. Pp. x, 280. $1.50.

These eight lectures by the Associate Leader of the Society for Ethical Culture, New York City, are honest, well-meant, and reverent, but utterly inadequate in scholarship. That the abundant errors and ill-informed discussions often relate to matters which are of no possible consequence to the readers for whom the book is intended, will not diminish regret (even on the part of those who share many of the positions taken in the book) that the writer yielded to a request for publication from "several hundred" of the hearers who had been interested by such a glimpse into New Testament themes, and who may well have been helped by the lecturer's personal attitude.

Christ the Creative Ideal: Studies in Colossians and Ephesians. W. L. Walker. T. & T. Clark. 1913. Pp. vi, 236.

Mr. Walker is already well known as the author of several books in which he has sought to reconcile the doctrines of Christianity with the results of modern science. He keeps the same general object before him in the present work. The book is primarily an exposition of the theological teaching of the twin Epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians; but in the light of this exposition he seeks to present a view of Christianity which will bring it into full accord with the intellectual movement of our own time. Briefly stated, his conclusions are these: The true life of man was revealed in Christ; and the Christ who appeared as Redeemer existed eternally in the thought and purpose of God. The Incarnation is not to be regarded as a sudden interposition of God in the natural order. It was involved in the very act of creation, and was realized in due time through the evolutionary process. Throughout the world's history the divine ideal was unfolding itself more and more fully, until it found absolute expression in Christ. "The creative thought and power that formed the world became manifest in him in human form. Therefore the apostle can say truly, 'It pleased the Father that in him should all fulness dwell.'" Mr. Walker expounds from

different points of view this conception of Christ as the Ideal involved in the whole purpose of creation, and endeavors to show how it provides an answer to the perplexing questions forced upon us by the conclusions of science. The book is able and suggestive, and deals boldly with problems which are too often shirked or overlooked. Its treatment of the teaching of the Epistles is at times illuminating, although it suffers from the continual effort to read a modern philosophy into Pauline ideas. Likewise the attempt to maintain the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation while construing it along the lines of evolutionary theory, is more ingenious than successful. We are afraid that those honest doubters whom Mr. Walker is anxious to win back to the faith will only find their difficulties increased by his explanations. The book serves to remind us (and this perhaps is its chief value) that the need for reconciling Christian doctrine with the cosmic order was already felt by the earliest thinkers of the church. Mr. Walker has done well to confront us once more with the ancient problem; but he has rather re-stated it for us in modern terms than helped us towards its solution.

E. F. Scott.

Queen's University,
Kingston, Canada.

The Country Church. C. O. Gill and Gifford Pinchot. The Macmillan Co. 1913. Pp. xii, 222. $1.25.

One of the really serious problems which confront the religious forces of our eastern States today is the declining effectiveness of the country church. She is altogether too much left out of the reckoning in the discussions of our Associations and Conventions and Conferences. The fact is that the country church lies close to the heart of civilization. The country is the great feeder of the vital forces of all our great urban populations, and no one has a better right than its church to all the enthusiasm and devotion, the resource and ability, of the best Christian thought and enterprise. This study is a serious attempt to get at the facts in the case, and to suggest some remedies.

The volume presents the results of a careful study of the facts as to the gains and losses, over a period of twenty years, in attendance, expenditure, and membership, first in Windsor County, Vermont, where every Protestant Church was covered, and next in Tompkins County, New York, where every Protestant Church outside the city of Ithaca was included. These two counties were chosen because of their representative character. The results are gathered in an

admirable series of diagrams and tables, separate for each county. The tables are well arranged, clear, cogent.

The findings of the investigation are summed up in these words: "They show that in these counties the country church has suffered a decline which proves beyond question that it is losing its hold on the community."

But the recognition of the facts is only the first and necessary step in the pathway of betterment. The facts here presented are sobering, but the book is by no means a wail of despair. Its constructive section, though brief, is wise, suggestive, courageous. The book should deeply interest all who have the problem of the country church on their hearts and are seeking its solution.

Emery L. Bradford.

Boxford, Mass.

The Religious Life of the Anglo-Saxon Race. M. V. B. Knox. Sherman, French, & Co. 1913. Pp. iii, 536. $2.00.

The title of this book arouses expectations which its contents do not fulfil. Perhaps this was inevitable, for to describe adequately the religious life of a comparatively homogeneous community, indeed even of a single individual, calls for the finest and rarest insight, and when the subject is the Anglo-Saxon race in its various homes—Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States—considered, moreover, through some thirteen centuries, almost encyclopedic knowledge must be added to penetrating insight. That the author attempted so stupendous an undertaking is creditable to his courage; that he has failed is not surprising. Unfortunately, the book, although pleasantly written, has many errors, some of which in the judgment of charity may be deemed typographical.

W. W. Fenn.

Harvard University.

Church and State in the Middle Ages. A. L. Smith.

Under this somewhat misleading title Mr. A. L. Smith, the well-known history tutor of Balliol College, Oxford, publishes six lectures given by him on the Ford foundation eight years ago. The title is misleading because it seems to announce some wide and general treatment of a vast and highly interesting subject, whereas in fact the real topic is: "The good and evil of the connection of England

with Rome, especially in the middle of the thirteenth century." Mr. Smith's thesis is that down to the time of Pope Innocent IV England stood in a loyal and appreciative attitude toward the papal government. He illustrates this throughout his first three lectures by reference to specific cases of recognition. He thinks that the common sense of Englishmen was showing them that if any reasonable standards of religious life were to be maintained in their country, there must be an effective appeal to some powerful central authority superior to all others and both willing and able to keep the balance among them. As things were, the only power that could possibly meet this requirement was Rome, and Mr. Smith thinks that, down to the time he indicates, the demand was adequately met.

In support of his view he gives several illustrations from contemporary documents, partly English and partly Roman, especially from the papal registers. The complaints of English critics against clerical abuses he finds substantiated by actual provisions of the papal legislation. An entire lecture is given to a sympathetic survey of the church laws regarding marriage, which Mr. Smith believes were, on the whole, conducive to the higher welfare of a society nominally Christian but in fact just emerging out of barbarism. In passing, the author disposes of the supposed hostility of Bishop Grosseteste to the Roman system, a false impression which he ascribes to the anti-papalist tendency of Matthew Paris. So far, England and the Papacy appear in a relation of mutual support and confidence; but then begins the fatal policy of temporal aggrandizement in Italy, which finds its chief expression in the deadly conflict with the emperor Frederic II, the ultimate defeat of the Hohenstaufen scheme of empire, and the introduction of French control in southern Italy.

The reaction of this struggle upon England is shown in the political bargainings with Henry III and the continually increasing tension of the papal financial system, until a profound change in the attitude of England toward Rome is produced. The volume closes with an examination of the personal character and methods of Innocent IV as the decisive factor in this change. It is obvious that Mr. Smith's own conception of his subject is clear and orderly; but it is to be regretted that he did not see fit to throw his lectures into the melting-pot and bring them out again in a unified and readable narrative form. As they now appear, in spite of all their luxury of type and marginal notes, their effect is rather to confuse than to clarify. They are filled with unexplained references to persons and things with which the average intelligent reader can

hardly be expected to be familiar. There are frequent quotations from classic authors, many side-thrusts at modern institutions, and occasional gibes at things British; but of style, in the best sense, there is little trace.

ITALY IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY. HENRY DWIGHT SEDGWICK. 2 vols. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1912.

It is always interesting to see an impossible task confidently assailed. To depict a century as a unity is almost impossible, for this demands the insight and mastery of an epic poet. Failing this, the account is liable to become a dictionary of periods and movements. The author of this book has faced his task cheerily, and has but partially accomplished it. It is a glittering pageant that is unrolled before us of different sides of the life of the thirteenth century; but they are not exhibited as the onward march of a single vital force. Of the three great movements of the century, the development of the Franciscan Order is treated but scantly. Knowledge of it is assumed, while its kinsman and rival, Dominicanism, is almost wholly passed by. The contest between Guelfs and Ghibellines which resulted in the banishment from Italy of the Hohenstaufens, is more extensively and adequately treated. The account of the rise of art and literature, in its mention of this and that painter and poet, does not escape sketchiness. In a style, readily readable though without charm, the author has done for his subject all that could be done without the epic outlook. Carlyle's histories needed the touch of fact. This history needs a touch of Carlyle.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY. The Macmillan Company. Each volume, $1.50.

The Apostolic Fathers. English translation by Kirsopp Lake. Vol. I, 1912. Vol. II, 1913.

Philostratus, The Life of Apollonius of Tyana; The Epistles of Philostratus; The Treatise of Eusebius. English translation by F. C. Conybeare. Vol. I, 1912. Vol. II, 1913.

The Works of the Emperor Julian. English translation by Wilmer Cave Wright. 3 volumes. Vol. I, 1913.

St. Augustine's Confessions. 2 volumes, 1912. English translation by William Watts (1631).

These volumes, containing texts and translations of authors whom even the proficient classical scholar too often neglects, are part of the fulfilment of Mr. James Loeb's generous promise, in founding the Series, to "include all that is of value and interest in Greek and Latin literature from the time of Homer to the Fall of Constantinople." In the careful editing of the original texts, in the grace and general accuracy of the versions, it would seem that the aim of the editors should be realized, namely to "appeal not only to scholars who care for a uniform series of the best texts, and the college graduates who wish to renew and enlarge their knowledge with the help of text and translation, but also to those who know neither Greek nor Latin, and yet desire to reap the fruits of ancient genius and wisdom."

In the *Apostolic Fathers* Professor Lake offers a new and admirable rendering of Clement, Ignatius, Polycarp, Barnabas, the Didaché, the Shepherd of Hermas, Polycarp's Martyrdom, and the Epistle to Diognetus. The plan of the Series does not contemplate extended annotation, but a brief critical apparatus accompanies the text, and excellent notes, of amazing compactness, are appended to the translation.

Professor Conybeare's translation of the Life of Apollonius is most timely, for in conjunction with Harmon's Lucian it enables the student to realize vividly the pagan environment of early Christianity.

Only the first volume of Mrs. Wright's *Julian* has appeared as yet. For this work, which requires thorough mastery of the earlier and classical literature, she has already proved her competence, notably in her *Julian's Relation to Neo-Platonism and the New Sophistic*. A translator might well be pardoned for yielding to the temptation to display his learning, but the notes, while they are adequate, are judiciously brief.

For Augustine's *Confessions*, William Watts's translation of 1631 is here reprinted with introduction and Scriptural references by Mr. Rouse, one of the general editors. In view of Harnack's remark that the diction and phraseology of modern Christianity, in prayer and hymn and discourse, are directly traceable to Augustine, it was probably wise to select this version, contemporary with the King James Bible, out of the four or five that exist in English. But the editor might have exercised his discretion in correcting more errors, and even making considerable alterations in the interest of a clearer modern idiom. Thus, when Augustine describes his mother's devotion he says (Book ix, chapter iv): "*Matre adhaerente nobis, muliebri habitu, virili fide, anili securitate, materna caritate, Christiana pietate.*" The English of Watts—"and with my mother likewise inseparably sticking unto us, in a woman's habit verily, but with a masculine faith, void of worldly care as a woman in her years should be, yet employing a matronly charity and a Christian piety"—is not only too diffuse when compared with the terse original, but lacks its dignity and climactic power.

Future editions should correct many misprints, especially in the Greek, and German commas before restrictive relative clauses in the original texts, Greek and Latin, might be removed to advantage.

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LUTHER'S CORRESPONDENCE AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY LETTERS. Translated and edited by PRESERVED SMITH, Ph.D. Vol. I, 1507–1521. The Lutheran Publication Society, Philadelphia. 1913.

Dr. Smith follows up his *Life and Letters of Martin Luther* (1911) with this first volume of a translation of letters written by and to the Reformer, adding also such other contemporary epistles as serve to illustrate important episodes in his life. The translation is accompanied but not overburdened by useful notes giving information as to persons and conditions. It is mainly Dr. Smith's own work, but includes also a number of letters already done into English elsewhere. The volume should prove a welcome addition to the working material of Luther students and is at the same time adapted to the needs of the general reader.

HISTORY OF ENGLISH NONCONFORMITY FROM WICLIF TO THE CLOSE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. HENRY W. CLARK. Chapman & Hall, London. 2 vols., 1911, 1913. Pp. xvii, 439; xx, 458.

These two sturdy volumes are from the pen of an English Congregational minister, now devoting himself principally to literature and history. They will repay reading. While the story of English Nonconformity is told with no little fulness, and many of its leaders are characterized with much clearness, it is by no means a history of the ordinary pattern. Mr. Clark's work is primarily an interpretation of English religious life in the light of his fundamental definition of Nonconformity. "The Nonconformist spirit is, in succinct summary, the spirit which exalts life above organization. More than that, it is the spirit which holds that life should *make* organization, and that organization is at least greatly reduced in value (sometimes even valueless, sometimes even actually harmful) unless it be thus the direct product of life." This principle constitutes the touchstone by which the author would test all English religious organization. Democracy in church administration; freedom from any particular form of ecclesiastical control, especially if that freedom implies submission to another form; even the attempt to reproduce some supposedly Biblical pattern of the Church—all these are misreadings of the real Nonconformist spirit.

Of that true Nonconformist spirit Mr. Clark finds Wiclif the brightest illustration. In him it showed itself in a purity and power since scarcely equalled in English religious life. Its fundamental character was, however, soon obscured. Naturally the author finds little of it in the story of the Reformation. Nor do the earlier English Presbyterians, with their belief in a *jure divino* model of the Church, seem to him much better exemplars. "When Presbyterianism, through the voices or the pens of Cartwright, Travers, and their colleagues, contended for the establishment of the Genevan system as the one thing—or at least the first thing—demanded by the interests of religion, we are not within sound of a call to make organization secondary to, and the product of, life; the call is still for the establishment of an organization on which life is supposed to depend; and it is not the Nonconformist spirit that can be credited with the authorship of a call like this." With Puritanism the case is somewhat better. "The Puritans assuredly embodied the Nonconformist protest in some degree." Yet Puritanism lost its clerical leadership largely through the policy of Laud, which settled New England, "with the consequence that Puritanism, being lay and undirected, and allying itself with Presbyterianism

for ends of political reform, became merged in Presbyterianism and virtually ceased to exist." Independency was in scarcely more satisfactory situation, for it "fell into that falseness to its own principles shown in the ecclesiastical settlement of Cromwell's time." Quakerism, indeed, "was a new protest of the Nonconformist spirit"; but it too, free as it was in its beginnings, had organization imposed upon it, rather than spontaneously growing out of it, before the death of its founder.

With the Restoration the Nonconformist ideal, in the author's understanding of it, largely faded. The first struggle of Dissent was for the right to live. Toleration, won in 1689, was followed by spiritual decline, which brought the Nonconforming communions to their lowest ebb, till their current was changed by the effects of the work of Wesley and Whitefield, in which Mr. Clark sees "the resurrection of Puritanism within the Established Church." Since then the progress has been upward, first through a revived religious zeal, and then through increasing freedom from outward shackles; but the real meaning of the Nonconformist spirit is far from being grasped in its fulness by the Nonconformist churches even yet. Of modern men, Dale of Birmingham most fully comprehended it. "It is no extravagance to say that if one sets one's hand imaginatively upon Wiclif's head, and then brings the hand down the years along the ranks of those by whom the Nonconformist principle has been expounded, it is only when the hand comes to Dale that it rests again upon a head quite as high."

The author is specially critical of the conception that Congregationalism finds its value chiefly as an expression of democracy in the Church. Its primal vision was of "the Church as a body of Christian men and women through whose united minds and wills the mind and will of the living Head of the Church were revealed, through whose united voices the voice of the living Head of the Church was heard, through whose united hearts the very life of the living Head of the Church was beating." Oppression led, however, to emphasis on "toleration" and "freedom." "That Congregationalism represents 'self-government,' the settlement of Church affairs by a sort of process of parliamentary debate and division, has been assumed by practically all historians who have touched the theme; and worse still, it has to be confessed that many Congregationalists themselves have accepted and still accept the reading as correct." To the author's thinking such a definition of Congregationalism "is really an intrusion of the Conformist spirit."

This is a suggestive work. The author's thesis is vigorously maintained. But at the risk of being classed as a "Conformist," the reviewer is constrained to feel that we have here, as so often in English Dissenting literature, a point of view which, developed under the dominance of an ever-present Establishment, emphasizes the ideal and the theoretical at the expense of the practical. Christian organization has always been the product of life—that is, of life in some period and some part of the Christian community. The question of the extent to which the institutions produced by the life of a by-gone age should serve to express the life of the present, or of one land those of another, is undoubtedly most difficult. But at least equally difficult is it to see just how, as a practical matter, the life of any given period can "make organization" that will not of necessity include much of inherited form and method which may not be the immediate outgrowth of the life of the particular age. Doubtless a compromise will always be made between the principles which the author styles "Conformity" and "Nonconformity"; and such compromise has been the actual history of English Nonconformity.

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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE HIGH COMMISSION. ROLAND G. USHER. Clarendon Press. 1913. Pp. 380. 15*s*.

The recent dictum of one of our most distinguished scholars, that for "very very much history there is more importance in the ancient error than in the new-found truth," is significantly illustrated in the apparent ineradicability of the old idea that the Star Chamber and Court of High Commission were originally and always instruments of tyranny and oppression. The bitter hostility of their many opponents during the last decade of their existence, when they were the tools of a monarch as unpopular and inefficient as his Tudor predecessors had been the reverse, has blinded posterity to the indubitable fact, that during the vastly preponderant portion of their lifetime, they were both regarded as useful and beneficent institutions. But the efforts of modern historians to secure any general recognition of this truth, outside the pale of the specialists, have met with singularly little success. Hitherto the Star Chamber has been the beneficiary of the larger number of attempted rehabilitations; but now the sister institution has evoked a doughty champion in the person of Professor Usher; to whose diligent labors in

the Tudor and Stuart vineyards the enormous number of references to his own previous writings in the foot-notes of the present volume bears eloquent testimony. He has certainly produced an excellent piece of work. Abundantly furnished, as always, with original material, he has organized and digested it far more thoroughly than in any of his previous books; best of all, he has learned to write simply, clearly, and unpretentiously. The result is a volume which reflects great credit on the author, and which will prove an indispensable guide to all who are interested in the constitutional and ecclesiastical history of the period with which it deals.

Three features of the present work deserve special notice. In the first place, Professor Usher has done good service in emphasizing the continuity of the development of the institution which he describes, from the commission issued to Thomas Cromwell in 1535, to its emergence as a permanent ecclesiastical court about 1580. The view taken by Coke and the later assailants of the Commission, that it owed its legal existence to the Act of Supremacy of 1559, ignored the earlier phases of its growth; and, from the point of view of the historian, is entirely misleading. Secondly, the author has done much to elucidate the jurisdiction, actual working, and procedure of the body, as constituted between 1580 and 1641. It could reach crimes with which the ordinary ecclesiastical court was powerless to deal, and could render a final decision. Its procedure was swift and effective (the court often transacted business in a hundred suits on a single day), and much was left to the discretion of the Commissioners. Those who continue to regard the Commission as an instrument of tyranny and oppression will probably be amazed to learn that during the last thirty years of its existence only about five per cent of the cases that came before it were instituted by the Commissioners themselves, while at least eighty per cent were suits between party and party; in other words, it was resorted to voluntarily, and the notion that it was the chief work of the Commission to ferret out cases must be discarded.

Lastly, Professor Usher deals at length with the growth of the opposition to the Commission. In that growth he distinguishes three phases. During the first (1584–1592) and during the last (1611–1642) the assaults emanated for the most part from isolated Puritans, who had felt, directly or indirectly, the weight of the Commission's authority. The majority of these assaults, at least during the latest phase, were delivered from the floor of the House of Commons, where the Puritan opposition was assured of a sympathetic audience. In the intervening stage, from 1592 to 1611, the attack was far more

systematic, and was directed by the judges of the common law under the leadership of the irascible Coke, whose sturdy championship of the legal system which he represented caused him to regard with bitter hostility any institution which did not recognize its supremacy. Royal intervention, the penal promotion, and finally the removal of the Lord Chief Justice ended this phase of the assault; and the common-law judges were forced jealously to acquiesce in a jurisdiction which they found it impossible to overthrow. Professor Usher's treatment of this phase of his subject, especially his discussion of the relative merits of the legal arguments, is admirable. His efforts to reconcile the virulence of the opposition to the Commission in the last ten years of its existence with the "overwhelming evidence" in favor of its popularity, are perhaps somewhat less convincing; but the problem is scarcely susceptible of entirely satisfactory explanation. Certainly it was the whole system which the Commission represented, rather than the Commission itself, which was at fault. Personal considerations probably had much to do with it. That the first systematic attack on the Commission followed so closely on the substitution of the stern Whitgift for the gentle Grindal, is highly significant. The story of the man who, fifty years later, threw a long stick with a prohibition nailed to the end of it, into the room where the Commission was sitting, to show that he would not touch the Archbishop with a ten-foot pole, indicates that much may be explained by the unpopularity of Laud.

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